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This thesis explores Taiwanese national identity among supporters of so-called “Third 
Force” political parties that have emerged as an alternative to Taiwan’s two “old” parties, 
the KMT and the DPP. The Third Force parties are taken as a manifestation of a stronger 
Taiwanese identity in a society long characterised by competing Taiwanese and Chinese 
identities. Taiwanese identity has strengthened in surveys simultaneously with Taiwan’s 
deepening economic and political integration with China in 2008–2016, and the 
establishment of the Third Force parties can be seen as a counter-reaction to increasing 
Chinese influence over Taiwan. This thesis analyses these developments by examining 
how supporters of Third Force parties define and understand their Taiwanese identity and 
how this identity relates to Taiwan’s history and the recent socio-political developments, 
particularly the deepening integration with China. 
 Based on a theoretical background of social constructionism and interdependence 
in international relations, this thesis uses secondary research to explore the history and 
contemporary developments of Taiwanese identity and primary research through 
qualitative semi-structured interviews with Third Force supporters, complemented by an 
interview with a Third Force politician. The national identity of the interviewees is 
examined through qualitative content analysis. Additionally, the study includes the 
author’s personal field observations from Taiwan in 2016–17. 
 The results indicate that Third Force supporters construct their identity through 
democratic civic values. Thus, their rejection of Chinese identity arises from the lack of 
similar values in China. This sense of identity has evolved dynamically through societal 
functions such as education and life experiences within the context of contested official 
and popular nationalisms. Owing to this identity, the Third Force supporters wish that 
Taiwan could become a “normal” country whose existence is not defined in relation to 
China. A similarly broader focus is desired in domestic politics to break the old dichotomy 
of the KMT and the DPP. 
 Through comparisons with earlier research, this study proposes a model of 
national identity among Third Force supporters. It depicts a civic community that governs 
a multitude of ethnicities, political actors, and international networks grounded in shared 
civic values. Adherents to this model reject ethno-nationalism and the dichotomous 
struggle between Taiwanese and Chinese identities by asserting an inclusive and flexible 
yet overtly Taiwanese civic identity. Further research should be conducted to establish 
the validity of this model and its relation to Taiwanese society in general. 
 
Keywords: national identity, nationalism, social movements, political parties, 
international relations, interdependence, Taiwan, China.   
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Note on Chinese characters and romanisation 
 
For relevant Mandarin Chinese terminology, this thesis gives the Mandarin word both in 
traditional Chinese characters (officially used in Taiwan) and hanyu pinyin romanisation 
(officially used in Taiwan and mainland China). For Taiwanese place names, proper 
names and personal names, this paper uses the most commonly used romanisation since 
there is considerable variation and inconsistency in the romanisation systems used in 
Taiwan. For example, the name 馬英九 is written as Ma Ying-jeou, while the pinyin 
























“My thinking is neither red nor black. I simply try to accept what is natural 
as natural and see reality as reality.” 
 
Hu Taiming 




“Zilu said, ‘The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you 
to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be 
done?’ 
  The Master replied, ‘What is necessary is to rectify names.’”  
 
Confucius 











The question of Taiwan, an island of 23 million inhabitants some 160 kilometres off the 
eastern coast of China, remains one of the pressing socio-political issues in contemporary 
East Asia. Over the years, Taiwan has repeatedly been labelled a dangerous “flashpoint” 
(e.g. Chase 2005: 162; Kastner 2015: 54) that could lead to an “immensely destructive 
war” (Tucker 2009: 1) if handled improperly. The danger lies in Taiwan’s relationship 
with China, which considers the island one of its provinces and a “core interest” (核心利
益, héxīn lìyì), and thus seeks to unify Taiwan with the mainland as “one family with 
blood that is thicker than water” (Ramzy 2015). By contrast, decades of sustained 
separation have made Taiwan itself increasingly averse to unification, and today most of 
its population no longer consider themselves Chinese. 
 This situation stems from Taiwan’s troubled history. While Taiwan was part of 
China for over two centuries during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the island has since 
been outside mainland rule for the past 120 years, save for a brief reunion in the 1940s. 
In 1895–1945, Taiwan was a Japanese colony, and in 1949 it became a base for the exiled 
Kuomintang (KMT; 國民黨, Guómíndǎng) party after it lost the Chinese civil war against 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP; 中國共產黨, Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng). The KMT 
moved the government of the Republic of China (ROC) to Taiwan, while the CCP 
established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. As a result, the world 
was left with a conundrum of two competing Chinas on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Entangled in Cold War geopolitics, neither side was able to eliminate the other to claim 
final victory, and the volatile division persisted. The ROC initially retained international 
legitimacy, but geopolitical realities gradually eroded its status. In 1971, China’s seat in 
the United Nations (UN) was taken from the ROC and given to the PRC, and in 1979, the 
United States (US) recognised the PRC. This pushed the ROC and Taiwan to increasing 
international isolation. 
 The unresolved civil war left the two sides operating ideologically opposing 
authoritarian party-states. The one thing both governments shared was the desire for 
unification – it was merely a question of who would rule the unified China. But both sides 
were transformed in the twilight years of the Cold War. In the 1980s, the PRC abandoned 
strict communist ideology in favour of market reforms and a wider notion of Chinese 
nationalism, while the ROC loosened its grip on power and initiated a process of 
democratisation in Taiwan. These developments diminished the immediate threat of 
military conflict, but they also recalibrated cross-Strait relations so that division persisted. 
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While the PRC kept its party-state structure and strong desire for unification1, Taiwan’s 
democratisation created a society fundamentally at odds with the authoritarianism of the 
mainland. For the first time in Taiwan’s history, the people of the island gained the ability 
to advocate their vision for its future. This vision was increasingly built upon the sense 
of a distinct Taiwanese identity, and support for independence started growing. Today, 
most Taiwanese no longer consider themselves Chinese nor desire unification with the 
mainland.2 
 Owing to the above development, the issue of national identity has become one 
of the focal points in contemporary social science research on Taiwan. A number of 
volumes has been published on the issue itself (e.g. Wachman 1994; Hughes 1997, 2000; 
Ching 2001; Brown 2004), and the identity question has also featured in studies on 
ethnicity (Chen et al. 1994), domestic politics (Mattlin 2011), and international relations 
(e.g. Tanner 2007; Tucker 2009; Cole 2017). Much of this research has been characterised 
by two dominant dichotomies: the cross-Strait duality of the ROC and the PRC, and 
Taiwan’s domestic duality of Chinese and Taiwanese identities. Common to these 
dichotomies is their focus on China: they examine Taiwan not in itself, but through its 
relationship with the mainland. This focus is understandable because it reflects Taiwan’s 
domestic politics after democratisation: the political scene has become dominated by the 
agendas of two main parties: the KMT, traditionally pro-unification, and the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP; 民主進步黨, Mínzhǔ jìnbù dǎng), traditionally pro-independence. 
Thus, the KMT and the DPP operate as political manifestations of the competing Chinese 
and Taiwanese identities. 
 The KMT/DPP domination persists to this day, but a new political phenomenon 
has emerged in the past few years that seeks to present a new alternative to this duality. 
The genesis of this development was the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement (太陽花學
運, Tàiyánghuā xuéyùn) that protested the KMT government’s opaque attempts to sign a 
free trade agreement with China. Many saw the trade agreement as a textbook example 
of dangerous economic integration that would render Taiwan vulnerable to Chinese 
influence, and the government’s dubious actions in its preparation drew widespread 
                                               
1 The PRC government’s 1993 white paper on Taiwan describes it as an “inalienable part of China” that 
has “belonged to China since ancient times” (Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office of the State 
Council 1993). 
2 In the latest survey of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, 56% of Taiwanese 
identified as “Taiwanese”, 36.6% as “Both Taiwanese and Chinese”, and 3.8% as “Chinese”. 58% favour 
maintaining the current cross-Strait status quo, 23,6% lean towards independence, and 11,6% lean towards 
unification. (ESC NCCU 2017). 
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criticism. The Sunflower Movement channelled the dissatisfaction of Taiwan’s younger 
generation into new activist-led political parties collectively known as the “Third Force” 
(第三勢力, Dì sān shìlì). Two parties, the New Power Party (NPP; 時代力量, Shídài lìliàng) 
and the Social Democratic Party (SDP; 社會民主黨, Shèhuì mínzhǔ dǎng) emerged as the 
spearhead of this movement, and in the 2016 general election, the NPP won five seats and 
became the third largest party in the Legislative Yuan.3 The NPP’s popularity appears to 
have grown since the election, and in a December 2016 poll, it had become the most 
popular party among people in the 20–29 age bracket (Yeh & Hou 2016). The Third Force 
parties share the fundamental notion of Taiwan as a sovereign country in its own right, 
and this is reflected in their policies that focus on Taiwan itself rather than the 
omnipresent China-Taiwan/unification-independence debate that characterises the KMT 
and the DPP. This notion attracts the younger generation that, having been born and raised 
in Taiwan with no direct connection to the mainland, could be characterised as “naturally” 
Taiwanese. Thus, the Third Force could be seen as a political manifestation of 
contemporary Taiwanese identity. 
 With the above phenomenon in mind, this study explores Taiwanese national 
identity by focusing on the Third Force. It will contrast the historical development of 
Taiwanese identity with the current situation of the Third Force, exploring how the latter 
has been produced by the former. By focusing on the Third Force parties and their 
supporters, this study attempts to illuminate how the current generation understands 
national identity and how these modern notions relate to the complex history of identity 
construction in Taiwan. As such, this study is grounded in social construction as the 
underlying process of national identity formation: I will look at national identity as a 
dynamic construction shaped over time by the contestation of multiple influencing forces, 
both official and popular. As political actors, the Third Force parties represent one of the 
myriad forces engaged in this contest. The official/popular dimension is complemented 
by another contest between domestic and the foreign agents, complicated by the growing 
interdependence between states in the age of globalisation. I will look at the significance 
of this international environment as demonstrated by the cross-Strait relations between 
Taiwan and China. My aim is thus to locate the Third Force and the national identity it 
represents in the juncture of these official, popular, domestic and foreign forces. In doing 
so, I will attempt to explain how national identity is shaped by and reflected in the 
                                               
3 The Legislative Yuan (立法院, Lìfǎyuàn) is the legislative branch of the ROC’s five-branch government 
modelled according to ROC founder Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People (三民主義, Sānmín 
zhǔyì). 
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personal and socio-political dimensions of the lives of Third Force supporters.  
 
1.1 Research questions  
 
Much of the existing research on identity issues in Taiwan has focused on quantitative 
(e.g. Chu 2004; Chen 2012; Liao et al. 2013; Zhong 2016) or historiographical (e.g. 
Wachman 1994; Ching 2001; Brown 2004) analysis of the general trends of identity 
formation. As such, studies have often dealt with macro-level temporal variations in 
labels such as “Taiwanese” and “Chinese”, but less so with the meanings of these labels 
and the nature of their interrelatedness. Hence, I strive for a more qualitative focus that 
stems from the observation that national identity is a dynamically evolving social 
construct that can mean different things to different people at different times. Therefore, 
to better understand the significance of the recent rise in Taiwanese identity, it is 
necessary to study the meaning of that identity to the people who subscribe to it. Based 
on this focus, I will employ semi-structured interviews with supporters of the NPP and 
the SDP to explore how contemporary Taiwanese identity operates on the micro-level, 
what it practically means for the people themselves, and how this is reflected in more 
general terms in the policies of the parties. The interviews will be complemented by an 
e-mail interview with NPP legislator and activist Freddy Lim, as well as a historical 
review, national level survey data on identity questions, and personal observations from 
Taiwan during an exchange semester in 2016–17. The above combination is intended to 
provide answers to the following twofold research question: 1) what is the meaning and 
significance of Taiwanese identity to the supporters of Third Force parties, and 2) how is 
the formation of this identity connected to the historical background and the recent social, 
political and economic developments in Taiwan. 
 Based on the answers to these questions, I attempt to formulate a preliminary 
model of national identity among Third Force supporters. By including an insider’s 
political perspective through the interview with Freddy Lim, and by placing the overall 
interview results in the context of existing survey data and other secondary sources, I will 
expand this model so that it examines the Third Force as an entity comprising its 
underlying social movements, the political parties, and their supporters. My use of the 
term “Third Force” will henceforth refer to this collective entity. As noted, the qualitative 
focus is intended to complement existing quantitative research on Taiwanese identity; by 
design, this study cannot provide an exhaustive or generally applicable definition of 
national identity in Taiwan. The results of the qualitative data will thus constitute a 
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snapshot of identity formation within a temporally and demographically limited section 
of society. However, the Sunflower Movement and the emergence of the Third Force are 
among the most prominent new socio-political developments in Taiwan in the past few 
years. Thus, this phenomenon has a wider significance to the Taiwanese society in general, 





The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 will present the theoretical background 
of the study, focusing on the social construction of national identity and the contemporary 
reality of interdependence between states. Chapter 3 will then explain the methodology 
of this study in more detail and describe the practical fieldwork process. Chapter 4 
explores the history and contemporary developments of national identity in Taiwan 
through secondary sources, connecting the Taiwanese situation to the theoretical 
framework of social constructionism presented earlier. The results and analysis of 
primary data are presented in chapter 5, and finally, the concluding chapter 6 will describe 
a preliminary model of national identity among Third Force supporters and examine the 
significance of this identity. 
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2 Theoretical framework and definitions 
 
This study leans toward modern interpretations in both social science and international 
relations, the two fields that it primarily deals with. This means that the question of 
Taiwanese identity will be examined through theories that have emerged in response to 
previously dominant realist perspectives; namely, social constructionism in social science 
and interdependence in international relations. In a general sense, this theoretical 
framework arises from the observation that Taiwan as a society and concept is fluid and 
ambiguous, and therefore invites non-essentialist conceptualisations. Taiwan’s relatively 
short recorded history and lack of naturally dominant national mythology mean that the 
social construction of its national identity is perhaps more readily observable than in more 
established societies. And in the age of globalisation, with the transformative processes 
of China opening up and Taiwan democratising from the 1980s onwards, economic 
interdependence across the Taiwan Strait has arguably replaced the Cold War balance of 
power as the key element in cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan. Thus, the 
dynamic status of Taiwan as a region corresponds well to the premises of the 
aforementioned theories. This chapter will introduce these theories and define the related 
key concepts. 
 
2.1 Social constructionism 
 
Social constructionism in its modern form was introduced in 1966 by Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann in their book The Social Construction of Reality. As the title implies, 
the book argues that reality is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 13). 
Grounded in the sociology of knowledge, the book charts the social construction of reality 
through processes of objectivation, institutionalisation and legitimation. In a more recent 
study, Elder-Vass (2012: 4) summarises the basic argument of social constructionism as 
the notion that “the ways in which we collectively think and communicate about the world 
affect the way that the world is.” In essence, social constructionism holds that reality, or 
certain elements of it, do not exist independently from human conceptualisation. The 
opposite view is that of realism, which holds that “the world exists independent of our 
representations of it” (Searle 1996: 153). 
In total contrast to realism, a radical interpretation of social constructionism is that 
reality is entirely a human construction. A moderate perspective, on the other hand, 
accepts that an independent reality exists, but argues that some aspects of it are socially 
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constructed. Both Elder-Vass (2012: 7) and Searle (1996: 2) support the moderate 
interpretation, thereby suggesting that the most accurate description of reality is some 
form of fusion between realism and constructionism. In this context, Searle (ibid.: 1–2) 
suggests the concept of “institutional facts”: parts of the real world that are facts only by 
human agreement. In other words, while an independent reality exists, certain facts can 
only exist within human institutions that depend on systems of “constitutive rules” (ibid.: 
27). Searle presents both citizenship and nationhood as examples of such institutional 
facts (ibid.: 114, 118). Thus, the idea of nationality4 in this study can also be considered 
an institutional fact dependent on the human institution of nationhood. The national 
identity that arises from this institution is therefore based on a socially constructed human 
community: the nation. 
 A noteworthy point relevant to this study is Searle’s notion that institutional facts 
rely on continued existence. He notes that the status of institutional facts depends on 
members of the relevant community continuously recognising and accepting their 
existence. (Ibid.: 117–9.) Therefore, as soon as the collective acceptance of institutional 
facts breaks down, so do the institutions. Nation-states are obvious examples of 
institutions that are created and dismantled in this manner, and this point will be 
elaborated later when the social construction of nations is examined further. Before that, 
I will briefly introduce the general concept of identity. 
 
2.1.1 Identity as a dynamic experience of sameness and 
otherness 
 
The focus of this paper is on identity. Thus, before going into the characteristics of modern 
national identities, it is useful to make a few general remarks about the term. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines identity broadly as follows:  
 
The quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, 
or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness 
(OED Online 2017). 
 
Identity is thus based on the experience of sameness. In a system where people identify 
with others based on sameness, this self-identification is necessarily juxtaposed with, and 
                                               
4 “Nationality” as a term can be somewhat ambiguous. Seton-Watson (1977: 4) notes that in the English 
language, it can be used in the meaning of “state citizenship”, but also more generally to simply mean the 
quality of belonging to a nation. This study adheres to the latter, general meaning. 
17/117 
measured against, its opposite: otherness. Examples of this are manifold. In the age of 
enlightenment, Europeans constructed their notion of Western civilisation not only by 
examining their own achievements, but by comparing them to the supposed backwardness 
of the East. Otherness thus manifests as the negative version of a positive experience of 
sameness. As Said (2003: 54) explains, a “fifth-century Athenian was very likely to feel 
himself to be nonbarbarian as much as he positively felt himself to be Athenian.” The 
focus on civility and barbarianism is significant, because it reappears throughout East 
Asian history as well. Imperial China regarded everything outside its realm as barbarian, 
and the West was perhaps the pinnacle of otherness: in London in 1876, as part of the 
first Chinese mission to the West, diplomat Liu Xihong described his impression: 
“Everything in England is opposite to China” (Tiedemann 2006). Imperial Japan, despite 
owing much of its civilisation to Chinese heritage, would in turn come to view the 
Chinese as barbaric. With his country modernising in the wake of the Meiji restoration of 
1868, historian Takekoshi Yosaburō (1907: 317) declared: “We, Japanese, usually look 
down on the Chinese and despise them on account of their dirty habits.” A notion of 
difference also characterised post-war Japan, where the concept of Japaneseness likewise 
relied on being diametrically opposed to the West. This was specifically centred on the 
United States, which was imagined as being everything that Japan was not (Martinez 
2007: 9). This difference was based on a sense of uniqueness rather than superiority. It 
also suggests that, in addition to affirming a pre-existing notion of superiority or 
uniqueness, the experience of otherness can help define the national element of a thus-far 
vague identity: Martinez (ibid.: 10) notes how the ambiguous concept of Japaneseness 
becomes clear to the Japanese when they encounter foreigners. The consolidation of 
identity can thereby arise from the first-hand experience of otherness. 
 Another key point about identity is that it is dynamic. Berger & Luckmann (1966: 
194) note that identities are not only produced by “the interplay of organism, individual 
consciousness and social structure”, but they also react upon the social structure. As will 
be noted in the next section, social constructionism holds that nations are not primordial, 
perennial or ahistorical. This means that they are subject to dynamic evolution, and this 
likewise moulds the identities that are based on these elements. Indeed, as Berger & 
Luckmann (ibid.: 195) put it, identity “emerges from the dialectic between individual and 
society.” As such, identity resembles concepts such as ethnicity: Huang et al. (1994: 7, 
12) point out that ethnicity changes in tandem with sociocultural conditions, and indeed 
in the case of Taiwan, it is a “continuously evolving historical process”. One example of 
this dynamism of identity is the way Taiwan’s development has been conceptualised. 
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Taiwanese history can be seen as a series of “becomings”, as illustrated by the titles of 
notable works describing it: consider Tonio Andrade’s How Taiwan Became Chinese 
(2007) and Leo Ching’s Becoming “Japanese” (2001). Accordingly, one can find several 
recent theses on the contemporary period bearing the title Becoming Taiwanese (e.g. 
Turley 2015; Chen 2013; Wu 2007). These becomings are practical examples of the 
dynamism of identity formation. Using Searle’s conceptualisation, they represent points 
in time when the collective acceptance of the community’s institutional facts breaks down 
and a new version arises. Identities are thereby shaped by the constructions of reality.  
For the purposes of this study, identity can thus be defined as the dynamic 
experience of sameness and otherness. Consequently, national identity is simply such an 
experience when it is grounded in the idea of nationhood. This concept is explored further 
in the following sections.  
 
2.1.2 The social construction of nationhood 
 
Searle (1996: 117) paints a bleak picture of moments when institutional facts are rejected 
and institutions break down: he describes the national identity crises of the 1990s in places 
such as Bosnia, Canada, the former Czechoslovakia and Turkey, where national unity 
seemingly collapsed into ethnic tribalism. By contrast, he then describes other examples 
where national unity was, more or less artificially, maintained during times of crisis: for 
example, Charles de Gaulle’s rhetoric of honour and his insistence that an independent 
French government continued to exist during World War II (ibid.: 118). Another example, 
one of invention rather than artificial retention, is the drafting of the American 
Declaration of Independence in 1776: 
 
There was no institutional structure […] whereby a group of the King’s subjects in a 
British Crown Colony could create their independence by a performative speech act. But 
the Founding Fathers acted as if their meeting in Philadelphia was a context C such that 
by performing a certain declarative speech act X they created an institutional fact of 
independence Y. They got away with this, that is, they created and sustained acceptance 
of the institutional fact because of local community support and military force, 
culminating in Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown. (Ibid.: 118–9.) 
 
And so, a nation was born through social construction. In the beginning of this chapter, 
Taiwan was characterised as a particularly suitable subject for constructionist analysis 
due to its relatively short recorded history and lack of a naturally dominant, age-old 
mythology. The same could then be said about the United States, another frontier region 
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where indigenous populations were superseded by new, institutionalised foreign 
governance.5 
   In Searle’s analysis, one of the fundamental building blocks of institutional facts 
is language. He argues that in order to have institutional facts, a society must have 
language that constitutes “linguistic elements of the facts within that very institution.” 
(Ibid.: 59–60.) This was evident in the example of the United States, where independence 
was constructed through a speech act. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that language is 
also front and centre in one of the most influential treatises on the origin of nations, 
namely Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983). Anderson suggests that 
modern nationalism emerged in Europe after the socioeconomic changes and scientific 
discoveries of the industrial revolution led to the decline of the old world order of dynastic 
kingdoms. Languages had a key role in this process, as the rise of vernacular literacy and 
print-capitalism created “unified fields of communication” where people could 
understand others who shared their language and conversely could not communicate with 
those who did not. Thus, “imagined communities”, i.e. nations, were formed around these 
vernacular languages, first unconsciously and later deliberately as the process became 
established. (Anderson, 1983: 44–6.) Combining Anderson’s premise to Searle’s, 
language becomes not only the mode but also the frame of national identity construction: 
it is the tool by which national consciousness is communicated to a group of people who 
share that tool. 
 In line with the above conceptualisation, Anderson (ibid.: 6) defines nation itself 
as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign.” In an earlier study, Seton-Watson (1977: 1) gives a somewhat similar 
definition: “A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a 
sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness.” The relevant distinction 
between these definitions is Anderson’s emphasis on the constructionist idea that nations 
are “imagined”. The commonalities described by Seton-Watson would thus not be 
inherent categories with clear borders; their classification depends on imagined 
boundaries. 
 The concept of imagined communities is relevant here not only because of the 
notion of nations emerging as social constructs based on industrial progress, but also since 
it extends to the field of imperialism. Since the Middle Ages, much of the world had been 
organised into empires that ruled over extensive heterogeneous areas inhabited by various 
                                               
5 Taiwan’s equivalent to the Native Americans are its Austronesian indigenous people that inhabited the 
island before the arrival of European colonisers and Chinese settlers in the 17th century. 
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different peoples. As these peoples began to foster their own national identities, 
constructed around their vernacular lexicons, the empires became understandably 
anxious. The natural product of nationalism was the demand for autonomy for the 
imagined community, and this risked the collapse of the imperial order. According to 
Anderson (1983: 86), the imperial response was “official nationalism”, an attempt to 
construct a notion that all imperial subjects belonged to the realm of a single unifying 
national identity as defined by the metropole. Anderson borrows this concept from Seton-
Watson (1977: 148), who describes it as a doctrine that replaced the old idea of “dynastic 
loyalty as the basis of legitimacy of government.” Anderson (1983: 86) describes this as 
“stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire” and 
gives Czarist Russification as the most obvious example. More concretely, he presents 
official nationalism as “an anticipatory strategy adopted by dominant groups which are 
threatened with marginalization or exclusion from an emerging nationally imagined 
community” (ibid.: 101). In Searle’s terms, what Anderson describes here is the fading 
acceptance of the institutional order of the empire, and the subsequent attempt to regain 
that acceptance through the imposition of official nationalism. 
 Based on the above, it could be said that nations are constructed through the 
contestation of popular and official forces. In Europe, the official version was a reaction 
to the popular. In Asia, however, this process was reversed: it was the spread of official 
nationalism through imperialism that prompted a popular reaction. As Anderson (ibid.: 
139) explains, the “last wave” of nationalisms in colonial Asia and Africa originated as a 
response to global imperialism, which was the result of industrial capitalism. Other 
scholars have noted not only the impetus provided by unjust colonial rule, but the 
paradoxical manner in which imperialism itself supported the rise of nationalism in the 
colonies. Hobsbawm (1987: 78) points out that empires themselves provided the platform 
for anti-imperialism, as it was the Western-educated colonial elites who first began to 
form resistance after acquiring national awareness through education and experiences in 
the West. It was the colonial motherland itself that acted as “a catalyst in nurturing 
nationalist movements amongst its colonised elites” (Heylen 2005: 502). Indeed, as noted 
by Komagome (2006: 142), “even Gandhi, before he took to his spinning wheel in simple, 
traditional clothes, had walked around the city of London in Western dress.” 
 Asia’s own example of imperialism and official nationalism was Japan. Anderson 
(1983: 95) suggests that Japan’s version of official nationalism, first employed to assist 
the consolidation of the Meiji government in the late 19th century, was “rather 
consciously” modelled after that of Prussia-Germany. This is no surprise, since the 
21/117 
success of the Meiji Restoration rested on the assimilation of Western concepts to shield 
Japan from imperialist aggression. When Japan itself then followed the Western example 
by launching imperialist expansion, its official nationalism became most apparent with 
the Japanification policies pursued in its colonies not only in Korea, Taiwan and 
Manchuria, but also in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines. (Ibid.: 98–9.) This strategy 
bears obvious resemblance to the assimilation policies of Czarist Russia mentioned 
earlier, suggesting that the basic processes of imperialism and official nationalism have 
operated similarly across the globe.6 Hence, the Japanification of Taiwan is a historical 
period of obvious importance to this study, and it will be discussed further in chapter 3. 
 The above passages constitute a brief account of the social construction of 
nationhood. It was mentioned earlier that the constructionist perspective finds its opposite 
in realism, which holds that reality exists independently. In terms of nations, the realist 
perspective manifests in primordialism and perennialism: the idea that nations are 
grounded in primordial conditions and arise from time immemorial. (Smith 2000: 2.) 
Significantly, the PRC’s claim for Taiwan mentioned in the introduction is more or less 
a textbook case of primordialist nationalism: it rests on the notion that Taiwan has been 
part of the Chinese nation since ancient times. Correspondingly, the ROC’s claim of the 
mainland is a mirror image of this notion. However, as Smith (ibid.: 3) notes, modernist 
theories have become the mainstream, and while they consist of different perspectives, 
they all share the core idea that nations, nationalism, and the international system of 
nation-states are relatively modern phenomena and products of modern conditions. 
Smith’s (ibid.: 4, 15–16) examples of these modern conditions include those mentioned 
by Anderson: capitalism, industrialism, imperialism and vernacular mobilisation. On a 
more general level, this leads to the same observation about nations that was made about 
identity in the previous section: nations are dynamically evolving entities shaped by the 
structure of the society around them. Consequently, as Smith (ibid.: 13) puts it, 
“nationalism does not cease after the attainment of independence, but is continually 
renewed as men and women seek to achieve their visions of nationhood.” 
 In summary, and in the context of this study, modern nations could thus be called 
dynamic, socially constructed political communities that are continuously redefined in 
                                               
6 The concept of official nationalism and Anderson’s notion of “stretching the skin of the nation over the 
body of the empire” could also be used to describe modern China: the PRC has retained most of the frontier 
regions that were annexed to China through the conquests of the Qing empire. To legitimate its claim for 
this ethno-culturally heterogeneous area that includes for example Tibet and Xinjiang, the PRC has 
promoted a definition of China as a “united multi-ethnic nation” (e.g. People’s Daily 2017). Officially, the 
ROC also maintains a similar or even wider claim to frontier regions, even counting Mongolia into Chinese 
territory. 
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the crossfire of popular, official, domestic and foreign forces. This section has hereby 
answered the question of how nations are made; the next and final section of this chapter 
will go on to look at what they are made of. 
 
2.1.3 The ingredients of a nation: Ethnic and civic dimensions 
 
Seton-Watson (1977: 6–7) makes a distinction between “old” and “new” nations. Old 
nations are those that had a historically acquired national identity even before the 
emergence of nationalism, whereas new nations acquired the two simultaneously. In 
Smith’s (2000: 12) conceptualisation, the old nations do not possess a “national” quality, 
but they are instead a form of historical precursor communities, or ethnies: named human 
populations with “a common myth of descent, shared historical memories, one or more 
elements of common culture, a link with an historic territory, and a measure of solidarity, 
at least among the elites.” Thus, the distinction between old, “original” nations and new, 
“invented” nations disappears. This view suggests, in line with the overall constructionist 
view set out in the previous section, that “nation” is a modern construct arising from 
modern social structure. However, it also contends that many, if not most, nations are 
based on pre-existing ethnic ties (ibid.: 13). 
 Since the idea of old and new nations obfuscates the modern origins of the concept 
of a nation, a more relevant categorisation is perhaps one of ethnic and civic nations. 
Smith (ibid.: 16) notes that most people today live in “civic-territorial” or “ethnic-
genealogical” nations. The former assigns nationhood through birth and residence, 
territorial citizenship, and a unified legal system and public culture, while the latter 
emphasises origin myths, vernacular languages and customs, religion and native history. 
Crucially, however, these categories are not mutually exclusive: many nations are some 
form of mix between the two. Thus, these categories can be seen as two ends on a 
spectrum, and nations can move between them over time. (Ibid.: 17.) This suggests the 
same inherent dynamism that in previous sections was identified as a key attribute of 
social constructs. Seton-Watson (1977: 4) mentions a somewhat similar categorisation in 
the form of “cultural nations” united by cultural bonds such as language, religion or 
mythology, and “political nations” that also have a legal state structure. 
 The above perspectives put a great deal of emphasis on ethnicity as the raw 
material of nation-building. However, the constructionist viewpoint suggests that 
ethnicity itself is also a social construct. Huang et al. (1994: 7) define ethnicity as “a 
sociocultural construction used to categorize people who interact within the same 
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sociopolitical arena into different groups.” Thus, ethnicity is also subject to change in 
tandem with changes in the surrounding sociocultural conditions. In a similar manner, 
Pieterse (1997: 366) describes ethnicity as an “empty container” that is “fluid, protean 
and hydraheaded”. Indeed, just as in the study of nations, primordialist/essentialist 
perspectives have drawn criticism and given way to a constructionist view on ethnicity. 
This leads Pieterse (ibid.: 369) to criticise Smith’s idea of the ethnic origins of nations, 
because such a view does not take into account the changing nature of ethnicity itself. 
Furthermore, Pieterse (ibid.) asserts that nation-formation often precedes ethnic 
identification. He points to postcolonial and multi-national states where state-led national 
integration provokes ethnic mobilisation. This corresponds to Seton-Watson’s and 
Anderson’s notion of official nationalism: a top-down effort in social construction. 
Pieterse (ibid.: 371) also points out that the top-down imposition of ethnicity rests on a 
process of “othering”, whereby the dominant group determines the borders of ethnic 
groups. This, in essence, is the basic function of identity formation mentioned earlier: a 
delineation based on sameness and otherness. From a constructionist perspective, 
ethnicity and nationhood are thus structurally somewhat similar.  
 As mentioned, the alternative to an ethnic nation is a civic or political nation that 
rests on markers such as birth, residence, citizenship, law, and public culture. Schubert 
(2004: 535) talks about “state identity” that is rooted in peoples’ identification with the 
sovereign state. This type of identification is therefore grounded in the attributes of the 
state as manifested in its political and legal systems. The nation is thus constructed 
through the currently existing character of the governing system. Needless to say, such 
systems are likewise subject to change: in the case of Taiwan, this is readily observable 
in the process of democratisation that fundamentally transformed the civic and political 
structures and indeed the character of the state itself. 
 
Table 1: Dimensions of nationhood and national identity. 
Ethnic/cultural dimension Civic/political/state dimension 
 
• Myths of origin 
• Vernacular language 
• Customs and traditions 
• Religion 
• Native history 
 
 
• Birth and residence 
• Citizenship 
• Sovereignty 
• Legal system 
• Political system 




 Based on the points above, the building blocks of nationhood and national identity 
can be broadly divided into the ethnic/cultural and the civic/political/state dimensions. 
These dimensions and their respective elements are presented in table 1 (previous page). 
This classification and list of attributes is not intended to be categorical or exhaustive, but 
rather to provide a general overview based on the scholarship reviewed in this section. 
Further, the two main dimensions need not be mutually exclusive or static. For the 
purposes of this study, I will subsequently condense these two dimensions into the 
concepts of ethnic identity and civic identity, where ethnic identity includes the cultural 
dimension and civic identity includes the political and state dimensions. 
 
2.2 Interdependence in international relations 
 
While the previous sections have dealt with the nature and construction of nations, I will 
now look at how they function together in the international system. As noted, nations can 
be viewed as social constructs that evolve dynamically according to prevailing social 
structures. However, the character of nations is not moulded only by the interactions of 
their internal attributes. Indeed, it is often the interaction with other nations that produces 
more readily visible changes, and this is particularly true as we proceed from the early 
modern period toward the latter half of the 20th century and beyond. In the case of Taiwan, 
this is immediately evident in the existential threat and the economic perks posed by 
China. As noted in the introduction, cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China 
were first characterised by the threat of military conflict during the Cold War era, but 
have since become increasingly centred on socioeconomic integration within the context 
of a global market economy. This is a worldwide development that suggests a new “post-
nationalist” world order in which the borders of clearly delineated national communities 
again become fluid. Just as nationalism was enabled by regionally unified fields of 
communication, modern internationalisation builds upon the rise of instant global 
communication. In order to analyse this situation, this chapter will introduce the concept 
of interdependence in international relations. 
 
2.2.1 Complex interdependence 
 
The concept of interdependence was popularised by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 
their 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The authors present interdependence as an 
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alternative for the previously dominant realist perspective. According to the authors, 
realism assumes a world where states act as coherent units with issues organised in clear 
hierarchies and military power relations taking a central role. By contrast, they argue for 
a perspective in which societies interact through various different channels and the 
communicated issues are not organised in a neat hierarchy. This multifaceted 
interconnectedness also discourages the use of military force as the various interests of 
societies have become so intertwined. The authors call this complex interdependence: the 
complexity arises from the presence of multiple actors and contact channels that 
complicate international relations beyond mere state-to-state action. This emphasises the 
role of bureaucrats, non-governmental and international actors, and multinational 
companies. (Keohane & Nye 2012: 20–25.) 
 Under complex interdependence, military power and the use of force thus become 
less useful for the advancement of state interests. Consequently, states may shift to using 
economic power to try and secure their goals (ibid.: 26). As Tanner (2007: 11) points out, 
economic pressure is usually used by large countries against smaller ones as an alternative 
to other measures considered too harsh, dangerous or otherwise inappropriate. The 
prevailing view is that this is what happened in China: with the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms in the 1980s and the decline of ideological communism after the death of Mao 
Zedong, China’s economic power assumed a more central role as a method of influence. 
According to Kastner (2014: 981), the conventional wisdom is that China’s economic rise 
has increased its global political influence and made other Asian countries reluctant to 
balance against it for fear of losing the economic advantage. Ravindran (2012: 125) 
suggests that China’s use of this economic leverage has increased in recent years, as 
demonstrated by Southeast Asian examples such as Vietnam and The Philippines. With 
China assuming an ever more central role in the global arena, this influence is also 
increasingly transcending the regional level and becoming global. Recently, China’s use 
of economic leverage for political purposes was suggested in Greece, which blocked a 
joint European Union (EU) statement on China’s human rights violations after securing 
significant Chinese trade and investment (Cumming-Bruce & Sengupta 2017). Such 
reports point to China’s rising economic clout as a source of political power in the global 
web of economic interdependence. However, this type of economic statecraft may run 
into various problems under complex interdependence. A potential key problem is 
politicisation, defined by Keohane & Nye (2012: 28) as “agitation and controversy over 
an issue that tend to raise it to the top of the agenda”. This can happen through state 
initiative, but it can also be a bottom-up process when unsatisfied, domestic non-state 
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groups politicise issues and thus force the state to take them into consideration (ibid.). 
 Complex interdependence thus emphasises the multiplicity of channels of 
influence, highlighting the significance of non-state actors. This interplay of state and 
non-state actors echoes the way nationalism was conceptualised as a contestation between 
official and popular forces, suggesting a globalised version of this contest in the modern 
age. The concept of complex interdependence was originally formulated before the 
information age and globalisation, and Keohane & Nye (ibid.: 218) note that these new 
processes have since had a profound impact on the function of the channels of influence. 
Transnational flows of contact and information have been expanded by the internet age, 
so that the institutional control of NGOs and international organisations has given way to 
an even more diffuse constellation of non-state actors. The most recent example is social 
media, which has been noted as an important channel in the organisation, coordination 
and transnational cooperation of social movements such as Hong Kong’s Umbrella 
Movement in 2014 and the Arab Spring in 2011 (e.g. Lin 2016; Lee et al. 2015; Hänska 
Ahy 2014; AlSayyad & Guvenc 2015). This focus on the interconnectedness of the global 
community reflects Anderson’s theory of the origins of nationalism: communicative 
media have a key role in both processes. Today’s social media and digital instant 
messaging are the 21st century equivalent of the print publications that served as the 
original platform for nationalism. Thus, while complex interdependence can be a 
powerful tool of state influence, it can also spark a counterreaction by fostering the 
regional, transnational, and global networking of opposition. In a way, the contemporary 
world thus replicates the old power struggle of official and popular forces on a global 
level. 
 
2.2.2 Asymmetric interdependence across the Taiwan Strait 
 
When states and societies are connected through an interdependent relationship, a key 
factor in their power relations is the level of asymmetry in their interdependence. 
Asymmetric interdependence means that one party is significantly more dependent on the 
other, giving the other party more leverage and influence. This has been repeatedly noted 
in the case of China and Taiwan as their economies have become intertwined and China 
becoming the dominant party (Tanner 2007: 97; Wong 2005: 55). Consequently, there 
have been fears of China using the asymmetric economic relationship to influence Taiwan 
and draw it closer to reunification. Indeed, China itself has openly stated that it uses the 
economic relationship precisely in this manner (Chu 2004: 257).  
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 The roots of cross-Strait economic integration go back to the early 1990s: the 
United States had long been the main destination for Taiwan’s exports, but its share 
declined considerably from the late 1980s onwards while an increasing amount of exports 
went to Hong Kong. A similar shift could be observed in tourism during the same period. 
(Wei 1997: 9-10.) This was due to the absence of direct trade links with rising China: 
Hong Kong was used as gateway to the mainland for Taiwanese goods and people (Ibid.; 
Rosen & Wang 2011: 9). The increasing economic interaction reflected the recalibration 
of China’s Taiwan policy after the onset of the reform era in the 1980s. As noted earlier, 
economic growth had become China’s main objective, and this dictated the maintaining 
of peaceful relations in the region to foster economic development (Chu 2004: 247). The 
shift in economic relations continued throughout the 1990s, so that in 2004, China had 
become Taiwan’s biggest export market. In 2005, China overtook Japan as Taiwan’s 
largest overall trading partner. (Chiu & Sun 2009: 414.)  
 China’s increasing importance as Taiwan’s trading partner has been enabled by 
the relaxation of trade restrictions. Before 1997, Taiwan had a total ban of direct trade 
links with China, necessitating the trade routing through Hong Kong mentioned earlier. 
Gradual relaxations made between 1997 and 2004 made direct shipping of goods 
possible, with normalised air transport of cargo and passengers agreed in 2008–9. (Rosen 
& Wang 2011: 17.) 2008 was a significant year as it saw the opening of the “three links” 
between Taiwan and China: direct flights, shipping and postal relations. Another 
important catalyst for closer economic ties was the accession of both China and Taiwan 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001–2002. Table 2 (next page) shows the 
development of cross-Strait trade relations in the 2000s, with a notable asymmetry 
emerging by 2015 when Taiwan’s exports to China were almost 26% and imports 19% 
of its total amounts. Simultaneously, China’s corresponding figures have not grown, with 
imports from Taiwan at 8.53% and exports below 2% of its total figures in 2015.  
Another key trend has been the development of Taiwan’s foreign direct 
investment (FDI). As Taiwan’s economy has matured, outbound investment has exceeded 
inbound investment since 1997, and China has consistently and overwhelmingly been the 
largest recipient of Taiwan’s FDI: at its peak in 2010, 84% of Taiwan’s foreign 
investment went to China. (Wilson 2014.) The opening of the three links also boosted 
Chinese tourism to Taiwan: the number of Chinese tourists in Taiwan went from 300,000 
in 2008 to over 4 million in 2015 (table 3, next page). 
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Table 2: Taiwan-China trade imbalance, 2001–2015. 
Year 
Exports (% of total exports) Imports (% of total imports) 
Taiwan to China China to Taiwan Taiwan from China China from Taiwan 
2015 25.73 1.97 19.08 8.53 
2014 26.47 1.98 17.48 7.76 
2013 27.01 1.84 15.59 8.02 
2012 26.98 1.8 14.94 7.27 
2011 27.24 1.85 15.31 7.16 
2010 28.04 1.88 14.15 8.29 
2009 26.67 1.71 13.83 8.52 
2008 26.16 1.81 12.92 9.12 
2007 25.29 1.92 12.65 10.57 
2006 23.19 2.14 12.07 11.00 
2005 22.05 2.17 10.87 11.32 
2004 20.00 2.28 9.85 11.54 
2003 15.34 2.05 8.52 11.96 
2002 7.87 2.02 6.99 12.89 
2001 3.97 1.88 5.45 11.23 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China; Ministry of Finance of the Republic 
of China. 
 
Table 3: Mainland Chinese tourists in Taiwan, 2008–2016* 
Year 
Tourist arrivals to Taiwan from mainland China 
Number Share of all tourists (%) 
2016 3,511,734 33 
2015 4,184,102 40 
2014 3,987,152 40 
2013 2,874,702 36 
2012 2,586,428 35 
2011 1,784,185 29 
2010 1,630,735 29 
2009 972,123 22 
2008 329,204 9 
* Data on mainland Chinese tourists begins from 2008. 





 The significant recent relaxations in cross-Strait ties have been the fruits of KMT 
president Ma Ying-jeou’s administration (2008–2016). Owing to the KMT’s pro-China 
and pro-unification stances, the Ma administration brought unprecedented political 
rapprochement to complement the economic  integration that had been well underway 
since the 1990s. The rapprochement owes to the fact that the KMT, unlike the DPP, 
accepts and advocates the so-called 1992 Consensus (九二共識, Jiǔ'èr gòngshì) as the 
basis of Cross-Strait Relations, a stance that China requires for any meaningful dialogue 
to take place. The 1992 Consensus refers to a supposed understanding between the two 
sides of the Strait that both are part of a “One China” but disagree on its meaning.7  
 Ma wasted no time in initiating rapprochement on the basis of the consensus: the 
three links were opened almost immediately after he had assumed office, and shortly 
thereafter, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) resumed formal negotiations that had been 
frozen for ten years (Zhao & Liu 2010: 191). The new diplomacy brought results, as the 
Ma administration made a landmark move with the signing of the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, paving the way for a comprehensive free trade 
agreement between Taiwan and China. According to Rosen & Wang (2011: 1), the 
framework agreement had more than just economic implications, particularly for China, 
who saw it as “drawing Taiwan closer in sociological terms, [and thus had] a logic 
independent of commercial considerations”. Zhao & Liu (2010: 197) further point out 
Beijing’s increasing reliance on economic means, rather than political or military 
pressure, to promote integration with Taiwan. Beijing’s cultivation of business 
opportunities for Taiwanese companies has led Taiwanese businessmen to put pressure 
on Taiwan’s government to allow deeper cross-Strait integration. As Wei (2015: 89) 
notes, “cross-Strait economic exchanges have produced a powerful alliance of KMT 
politicians and Taiwanese businesspeople, especially since the signing of the ECFA”. 
Critics have raised concerns over this phenomenon, labelling it as a “Trojan horse” that 
serves Beijing’s interests (ibid.). Since it was noted that China has openly stated its 
intentions to use economic statecraft as a political tool, such concerns seem justified. 
                                               
7 According to Wei (2015: 78), the term “1992 Consensus” was coined by Su Chi, KMT politician and 
chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, in 2000. It refers to a supposed tacit understanding 
between China and Taiwan about the notion of “One China” that emerged from talks held between the two 
parties in 1992. The actual results of the 1992 talks had been ambiguous and unclear, and Su argued that 
the term is useful because it enables the PRC, the KMT and the DPP to all adhere to a supposed consensus 
while leaving room for different interpretations. However, the DPP rejected the term, opining that no 
consensus had been reached, while the KMT and the PRC adopted it. The 1992 Consensus has subsequently 
been used as a basis of cross-Strait diplomacy between the PRC and the KMT, while the DPP’s rejection 
of the term has led to difficulties in its dealings with the mainland. (ibid.: 77–82.) 
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 The emergence of this asymmetrically interdependent relationship has led to 
significant socio-political reactions that will be examined in chapter 4 in relation to 
Taiwanese national identity. Before that, the next chapter will introduce the research 
design and fieldwork process of this study in more detail. 
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3 Research design and fieldwork 
 
This chapter presents the qualitative research design built upon the theoretical 
background introduced in the previous chapter. It is divided into two parts: section 3.1 
introduces the methodological approach of the study, and section 3.2 contains an 
overview of the actual fieldwork process. The results of the research on secondary and 




As mentioned in the introduction, Taiwanese national identity is one of the key issues in 
contemporary Taiwanese society, and as such, it has already been studied extensively. 
However, a considerable amount of the existing research deals with historiography or 
quantitative analysis. The prominence of survey research is apparent not only in 
academia, but also in the number of different national polls that measure the 
interconnected aspects of national identity, party support and opinions on independence 
and unification. Hence, there is an abundance of nationally representative statistical data 
analysis available. However, this means that much of the research focuses on measuring 
variables with labels such as “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” without necessarily examining 
their meanings. In light of all the data available, it is now easy to say that most Taiwanese 
have adopted a localist identity and therefore also resist unification with China. However, 
it is not as easy to determine why and how this has happened and what it practically means 
to be “Taiwanese”. This study argues that the latter perspectives are necessary for a 
comprehensive understanding of the national identity question. For that purpose, a 
qualitative focus is needed to complement the broader but more superficial quantitative 
data. According to Rubin & Rubin (2004: 3), qualitative interviewing is particularly 
suitable for “describing social and political processes, that is, how and why things 
change”. Combined with the observation that national identity is a dynamically evolving 
process, this suggests that a qualitative interviewing strategy is well suited to this topic. 
However, adopting a qualitative strategy means that the results and conclusions do not 
yield generalisable or nationally representative results. Therefore, the results should be 
examined in their wider context to see how they correspond to macro-level tendencies. In 
the case of Taiwan, there are ample resources for contextualisation due to the volume of 
historiography and national-level survey data on the identity question. Thus, this study 
aims to create a “snapshot” of national identity formation in contemporary Taiwan by 
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looking in detail at a small sample of informants from a narrow focus group, locating that 
group within the wider framework of the Taiwanese community, and examining how the 
group compares to national-level developments. In practise, this means that this study 
will include an analysis of existing research on the history and contemporary 
developments of national identity in Taiwan (chapter 4) and a subsequent analysis of 
primary interview data (chapter 5). 
 As the review of literature and survey data in chapter 4 rests on secondary sources, 
the contents of this chapter will instead focus mostly on the methodological aspects of 
primary data collection used for the analysis in chapter 5: qualitative interviewing and 
data analysis via coding and qualitative content analysis. 
 
 3.1.1 Qualitative interviews with Third Force supporters 
 
For the selected method to be successful, the sampling frame for the interviewees in this 
study should ideally be relevant to the question of national identity and the recent socio-
political developments in Taiwan. As noted in the previous chapter, one of the most 
visible processes related to national identity and cross-Strait relations in recent years has 
been the succession of social movements culminating in the Sunflower Movement and 
the emergence of new Third Force political parties. The Third Force parties are a 
contemporary political reflection of the social undercurrents that have moulded 
Taiwanese society in the 2000s. As a group, they are also relatively small and clearly 
defined. For these reasons, supporters of Third Force parties were identified as a suitable 
focus. The original focus only included the NPP, but for practical reasons this was later 
expanded to also include the SDP (see section 3.2.1). Due to this narrowly defined 
sampling frame, the interview results can be taken as indicative (but not properly 
representative) of general characteristics among Third Force supporters. To complement 
this, it was also decided that the data should include a representative from within the Third 
Force parties themselves. This way, the supporters’ perspective could be compared to that 
of an “insider”. This combination allows the creation of a rough model of national identity 
among Third Force supporters, and the subsequent comparison of this model to the 
existing general conceptualisations of Taiwanese and Chinese identities presented earlier. 
For the selection of the interview sample, this study employed purposive sampling 
and snowballing. The sampling is purposive in that it relies on a subjective personal 
assessment of the suitability of the sample. In practice, this amounts to selecting 
interviewees based on their party support or voting behaviour: people who support Third 
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Force parties and/or have voted for them in the 2016 election. The qualitative focus means 
that the representativeness of the sample is not the main focus, but the suitability of the 
interviewees will be judged on a case-by-case basis in order to include “typical” 
representatives of Third Force supporters. A key strategy in locating interviews was 
snowballing: widening the pool of contacts through existing contacts and colleagues. May 
(2011: 101) notes that snowball sampling is suited for elusive or widely distributed 
populations, which makes it suitable for finding supporters of minor political parties. 
There will admittedly be an element of “convenience sampling” in this process. Rapley 
(2014: 55) describes convenience sampling as the “least analytically strong option”. In its 
purest form, it means selecting a sample in the easiest possible manner and prioritising 
convenience over validity. Due to limited time and resources and the somewhat elusive 
nature of the sampling frame, there will necessarily be an element of “taking what one 
can find” in this study. However, I have attempted to mitigate the negative effects of this 
by the careful evaluation of each interviewee and an overall analysis of the final sample 
(see chapters 3.2 and 5). 
 For the formulation of the actual interviewing strategy, the starting point was 
grounded in the general observations about national identity presented in chapter 2.1 and 
the specific features of Taiwanese national identity explored further in chapter 4. National 
identity was defined as a dynamically evolving social construct, both generally and with 
regard to the constant changes observed throughout Taiwan’s history. Moreover, 
dynamism, fluidity and subjectivity characterise not only national identity, but also the 
ethnic and civic attributes that form its basis. Thus, the selection of the interview strategy 
was based on its suitability for the above features. This led to a model that takes its main 
inspiration from Rubin & Rubin’s (2004) concept of “responsive interviewing”. As the 
authors state, the term suggests that “qualitative interviewing is a dynamic and iterative 
process, not a set of tools to be applied mechanically” (ibid.: 15). Hence, a dynamic model 
designed for a dynamic target. 
 Rubin & Rubin (ibid.: 20–23) make a comparison between positivist and 
interpretive constructionist research approaches. The positivist approach imitates natural 
sciences by employing surveys and statistical methods that ask and quantify a standard 
set of questions. The interpretive constructionist approach, by contrast, employs 
observation and in-depth interviewing. It focuses on “how people view an object or event 
and the meaning that they attribute to it” (ibid.: 27). Thus, constructionists attempt to find 
out how the interviewees view the world and what the shared meanings are within a 
group. The authors argue that for many research problems, this approach is better than a 
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rigid positivist model, and thus it also guides their model of responsive interviewing. This 
emphasis on subjective perceptions, understanding, and shared meanings corresponds to 
the attributes of national identity mentioned earlier, making this model well suited for this 
study. Conversely, Rubin & Rubin’s description of the positivist approach resembles my 
earlier critique of a dominant quantitative focus in studies on national identity: such 
paradigms usually operate on a surface level, unable to capture meanings and 
interpretations. 
 Based on the above, Rubin & Rubin (ibid.: 36) construct their model of responsive 
interviewing by emphasising subjectivity and self-reflection for both interviewee and 
interviewer and the overall importance of deep rather than broad information. Since the 
model and the target are dynamic, so are the research questions: they can evolve based 
on the results of the interview, and the researcher must thus be ready to modify them 
when appropriate. Significantly, the authors note that individual members of a group are 
able to describe its common practices, beliefs and values, and thus, by locating 
“encultured informants”, the researcher can obtain general knowledge about the group 
through key individuals (ibid.: 66). In this study, the inclusion of a Third Force politician 
could be seen as representing an encultured informant. Similarly, the deep focus on people 
with a strong Taiwanese identity means that the interviewees could be expected to be 
particularly “encultured” about the meaning of identifying as Taiwanese. Emphasis on 
encultured informants is also one way of reducing the problems of convenience sampling. 
 In terms of structure, the interview design was influenced by the ethnic/civic 
categorisation of national identity. A particular source of influence was Chen Rou-lan’s 
(2012) categorisation of Taiwanese identity into primordial and political aspects. In the 
interview plan, this conceptualisation was approached from a slightly different angle, so 
that the two main elements are the personal and socio-political dimensions. Thus, the 
interview outline (see appendix 1) was designed to roughly have two parts where the first 
part focuses on personal self-reflection and the second part on social, political and 
economic aspects. This classification also served as the basis for the subsequent 
construction of the coding frame. In general, the first part of the interview outline takes 
cues from the theoretical background presented in chapter 2.1 while the second part 
includes the notion of complex interdependence discussed in chapter 2.2. 
 Qualitative interviewing is frequently divided into categories based on the 
structural rigidity of the interviews. The three main categories in this division are the 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews (Rugg and Petre 2007: 138). May 
(2011: 132) adds the group interview as a fourth main category. Similar categorisations 
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exist with different names, for example Gall, Gall & Borg’s threefold model of informal 
conversational interview, interview guide approach and standardised open-ended 
interview (Turner 2010: 754). This study took the semi-structured “midway” model 
where the interview had a structure and outline (see appendix 1), but this could be 
modified and deviated from as necessary. This was deemed appropriate since the 
conceptual mapping benefited from the freedom to ask in-depth follow-ups and move 
around in the structural frame, but the underlying theoretical approach necessitated a 
corresponding structure and it was also expected that a guiding structure would be helpful 
in the analysis phase and in keeping the interview on track. 
 
 3.1.2 Instant messaging in qualitative research 
 
Research interviews are traditionally conducted face-to-face, and this was the primary 
method in this study as well. However, it was anticipated that the elusiveness of the target 
group might lead to situations where meeting face-to-face would be impractical or 
impossible. In such cases, e-mail and instant messaging (IM) via social media platforms 
(e.g. Facebook Messenger or LINE) were deemed as potential alternatives. A key benefit 
of IM over e-mail is that it would preserve the interactive real-time component and thus 
the dynamic nature of face-to-face interviews. In anticipation for this, it was necessary to 
review some research dealing with the use of IM in qualitative research to establish its 
potential benefits and limitations. 
 Dimond et al. (2012) have compared the use of IM to other interviewing methods. 
They use an illustrative example of an instructor taking a phone interview transcript and 
an IM interview transcript and spreading both out in the classroom. As one would assume, 
the phone transcript was notably longer than the IM transcript, the implication being that 
the phone interview contained more data. (Ibid.: 277.) However, the authors note that 
length does not necessarily equal more or better data: their research compared phone and 
IM interviews and while phone transcripts were indeed longer, it was also clear that they 
contained more repetition. By coding the transcripts, the authors determined that the 
phone transcripts did not contain substantially more unique data than the IM transcripts. 
(Ibid.: 280.) In terms of pros and cons, they concluded that a key benefit of IM 
interviewing is that it eliminates the time-consuming transcription phase, but it may be 
problematic if the IM software is not familiar for the interviewees (ibid.). For this study, 
the benefit of skipping the transcription phase was particularly significant due to language 
challenges when interviewing Taiwanese people in Mandarin. Furthermore, IM 
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applications are ubiquitous in today’s society, particularly with young people in East 
Asian countries. Since it was expected that most of the interviewees would be young and 
very familiar with IM software, there were no significant concerns over the use of IM in 
interviewing. Kazmer & Xie (2008: 273–5) also find IM a valid method in qualitative 
research, stressing that the important thing is not necessarily the medium itself, but the 
interviewee’s comfort with, or preference for, the medium. Since IM is often the preferred 
communication method for the current generation, and with smartphone use being 
prevalent in East Asian societies, there were no obstacles for the use of IM in the research 
interviews if necessary. 
 
 3.1.3 Content analysis and coding 
 
As the research questions of this study deal with the meaning, characteristics and 
formation of Taiwanese national identity, they require a method of analysis that facilitates 
answers to those questions. For this purpose, I will employ a loosely defined content 
analysis. Schreier (2012: 1) defines qualitative content analysis (QCA) as “a method for 
systematically describing the meaning of qualitative material [...] by classifying material 
as instances of the categories of a coding frame.” Thus, content analysis is suitable when 
the researcher is required to interpret the data and construct meaning (ibid.: 2). This is in 
line with the interpretive constructionist interviewing approach described in the previous 
section, and it also resembles Flick’s (2014: 5) more general definition of qualitative data 
analysis: 
  
“Qualitative data analysis is the classification and interpretation of linguistic (or visual) 
material to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of 
meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it.” 
 
Both Schreier (2012: 3–4) and Flick (2014: 5) note that qualitative analysis as inherently 
descriptive: as Flick (ibid.) notes, its aim is “to describe a phenomenon in some or greater 
detail.” This emphasis on description, interpretation and meaning makes QCA suitable 
for analysing national identity; as mentioned in the previous section, the aim of this study 
is to discover the deeper meanings and characteristics behind superficial labels. An 
important distinction between qualitative and quantitative content analysis is that in the 
latter, the coding frame is usually standardised and static. However, in qualitative 
research, it must be flexible and adaptable to fit the non-uniform qualitative material 
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(Schreier 2012.: 7). This points to a data-driven approach, and thus, the final coding frame 
of this study was not clearly formulated before the coding phase itself. 
 It should be noted that qualitative content analysis is not well known as a distinct 
method because of the dominance of its quantitative alternative. According to Schreier 
(ibid.: 14), this has led to content analysis being equated with other methods such as 
discourse analysis or conversation analysis, or to other methods being developed that 
more or less correspond to content analysis such as thematic coding or qualitative media 
analysis. This study will not concern itself with nomenclature; regardless of the name of 
the method, what matters is that it is used to describe, interpret and construct meanings 
from data obtained by qualitative interviews. 
 The practical procedure for content analysis involves the coding of the data into 
content categories, thereby condensing it and reducing its complexity (Flick 2014: 11). 
For this, I will use the NVivo qualitative data analysis software.8 The NVivo software is 
designed for organising and analysing qualitative data; it provides an interactive software 
tool to help the coding process. Thus, after the recorded interview material has been 
transcribed, the transcripts are uploaded into NVivo, and a coding frame will be 
constructed in the software. Schreier (2014: 174) describes the coding frame as the “heart” 
of qualitative content analysis. It consists of arranging the data into categories and 
subcategories that form the basis of the analysis. The actual coding process and the 
construction of the coding frame for this study will be presented in more detail in section 
3.2.3, and the finished coding frame is presented in appendix 3. 
 
 3.1.4 Pilot study 
 
An opportunity to conduct a pilot study for this thesis presented itself through the Textual 
Analysis and Interviewing course organised at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the 
University of Turku in spring 2016. The pilot study was realised as part of a course project 
on interview methodology in collaboration with another course participant. This was 
deemed a suitable way of testing the intended approach of qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with Taiwanese interviewees, and it also provided valuable background data 
on Taiwanese peoples’ views on national identity. Thus, while the pilot study interviews 
are not directly comparable to the primary research data of the interviews carried out with 
                                               
8 Details of the NVivo software are available on the homepage of QSR International: 
http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo. 
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Third Force supporters, they are nevertheless usable data that will be referred to in 
relevant occasions. 
 Since the pilot study was to be carried out in Finland, the sampling frame for the 
interviewees was formulated around Taiwanese people living in Finland. Within this 
frame, interviewees were selected by purposive sampling and snowballing. As noted 
earlier, snowballing is suitable for elusive populations, which was useful in the pilot study 
as well, since the number of Taiwanese people in Finland is rather small and hard to 
approach without some “inside” contacts. With the selected sampling methods, finding 
interviewees proved rather easy. Social network applications and the Internet played a 
key role in the process, since all interviewees were approached through Facebook or 
WhatsApp, the most intuitive modes of communication among today’s young generation. 
All scheduling and preparation with the interviewees was then carried out via these online 
channels. The interview procedure itself was remarkably smooth in all three cases. The 
Taiwanese interviewees were highly motivated and interested in the topic, so they were 
eager to provide a large amount of data. There were no cancellations or need for 
rescheduling, and all three interviewees arrived promptly a few minutes before the 
designated time. After the interviews had been conducted, they were transcribed in 
preparation for content and discourse analysis. The transcription was one of the most 
laborious parts of the project: transcribing one interview took a full working day. Once 
the transcripts were ready, they were analysed in order to identify content categories that 
were then combined to form dominant discourses in identity formation. The coding of the 
categories and the formation of the discourses was done in an “old-school” manner with 
pen and paper, without the assistance of computer software such as NVivo. 
 In terms of results, the limited analysis of the pilot study produced two findings 
of particular interest: the diversity of people identifying as Taiwanese and the dynamic 
nature of identity formation. The three interviewees all had different ethnic backgrounds, 
and they reflected on their national identity in different ways, but all emphasised an 
overarching sense of being Taiwanese. This pointed to a Taiwanese identity that was not 
grounded in ethnic aspects. However, this identity was not static: all three described their 
identity as having changed over time, particularly as they began travelling and spending 
time abroad and/or coming to contact with Chinese people. These core findings were 
taken into account in the planning of the actual study, and they are also reflected in the 




 3.2 Fieldwork process 
 
This section is a description of the actual qualitative research process that was carried out 
based on the research design presented in the previous chapter and the results and 
experiences of the pilot study. The bulk of the research took place during an exchange 
semester in Taiwan, after which the coding and analysis were done in Finland. I spent the 
fall semester of 2016 as an exchange student at National Chengchi University (NCCU) 
in Taipei and conducted the interviews towards the end of the semester. Prior to that, I 
studied at NCCU and prepared for the interviews by carrying out some supplementary 
research and observation. This was done to familiarise myself with the Taiwanese society 
through first-hand experience and to gain insight into current social issues in Taiwan. 
Gaining as much background information as possible during the semester was an 
important preparatory measure that contributed to the final formulation of the interview 
framework. This schedule was consciously selected with the understanding that the later 
the interviews were begun, the less time there would be for them. Rather than begin 
interviewing with an incomplete design, I wanted to ensure I was adequately familiar with 
the subject matter and Taiwanese society. Another reason for delaying the start of the 
interviews was to develop my language skills by studying Mandarin at NCCU. In 
retrospect, this was an extremely important decision because the semester provided a 
considerable amount of vocabulary related to Taiwan’s social and political life that 
proved crucial in the interview situations. 
 
 3.2.1 Supplementary research and observation in Taiwan 
 
While the main primary data for this study consists of the qualitative interviews, I 
gathered background data by other, deliberate but less systematic methods while in 
Taiwan. These aspects are not included in the actual coding process, but they are taken 
into account in the final analysis phase. These were in addition to the research on 
secondary sources, done mostly in Finland, that forms the basis of chapter 4. 
 To complement the review of secondary sources, I made extensive use of the 
NCCU libraries, as they naturally have a much more comprehensive collection of 
literature on Taiwan than what is available in Finland. In addition to reviewing literature, 
I consulted Taiwan’s two main English-language newspapers, Taipei Times and China 
Post, to keep up to date on current issues. This was particularly helpful in following the 
activities of the NPP in Taiwan’s legislature. Most significantly, I was able to attend the 
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2016 International Conference on Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study held at 
the Election Study Center of NCCU on 30 October 2016.9 It provided the opportunity to 
hear the observations of Taiwanese researchers themselves on many of the issues this 
study touches upon. Conference papers and presentations by Ho et al. (2016) and Huang 
(2016) were among the most significant, and they are cited in relevant parts of this thesis. 
 I gathered background data by non-systematic observation whenever an 
opportunity presented itself. I photographed scenes extensively, but did not take 
fieldnotes. Much of this was related to various forms of protest activities: for example, a 
demonstration at NCCU against the KMT’s legacy of White Terror, and pro-
independence street demonstrations in Taipei and Taichung. A visit to Taiwan’s 
Presidential Office and its exhibitions provided valuable information on the government’s 
perspective on social movements. The most prominent movement during my stay in 
Taiwan consisted of the pro- and anti-marriage equality protests that began with Taipei’s 
LGBT Pride event in October and continued throughout the fall. These culminated in a 
marriage equality protest on the International Human Rights Day on 10 December 2016 
when a large crowd gathered in front of the Presidential Office to demand legalisation of 
same-sex marriage. The general observation from the above was that demonstrations and 
protests are very frequent in contemporary Taiwan, and they are able to amass a 
significant number of participants. 
 A key takeaway from the experience of staying in Taiwan was the importance of 
informal contacts. This is something that is often emphasised particularly in relation to 
fieldwork in China: in East Asian societies, the cultivation of personal ties can often open 
doors that would otherwise stay shut. This was already observed with the snowballing 
strategy in the pilot study, and it became an important tool in the search for interviewees 
in Taiwan as well. Thus, the time spent in Taiwan before starting the interviews also 
enabled the development of relationships and rapport. 
 
 3.2.1 Interviewing in Taiwan 
 
Active preparation for interviews began in December 2016 after I had spent three months 
in Taiwan. As per the research design, I started with snowballing, i.e. asking for local 
contacts if they knew people who were supporters of Third Force parties. As mentioned 
earlier, my original focus was only on the NPP, since it was the most popular and most 
                                               
9 Conference details and agenda are available online at http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=39. 
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successful of the Third Force parties. However, as I was looking for interviewees and 
having conversations about the focus of my research, I encountered people who supported 
the SDP. At the time, I was not very familiar with the background of the SDP, but I 
quickly learned that both parties originated from the same organisation but had split due 
to differing opinions (see section 4.1.4). Since both parties emerged from the same 
organisation and were established following the Sunflower Movement, I decided to 
include also supporters of the SDP in my sample. This shift in focus could arguably be 
considered an example of convenience sampling, since a partial reason was the fear that 
I would run out of time before finding enough NPP supporters. However, I also felt that 
since the focus of my research was not the NPP itself, but rather the political manifestation 
of Taiwanese identity in the wake of the Sunflower Movement, the inclusion of the SDP 
did not fundamentally alter the nature of the research or compromise the validity of the 
sample. This notion was supported by reports suggesting that the split was based on 
disagreements over practical matters, not on fundamental policy differences (see section 
4.1.4). 
 After this expansion of focus, I began finding more SDP supporters. This was 
initially surprising, because the NPP was nationally much more popular and had fared 
much better in the 2016 election. I determined that the reason for SDP overrepresentation 
in my interview contacts was probably due to geographical bias. I was a university student 
in Taipei, and therefore many of my initial contacts were likewise university students in 
Taipei. The SDP’s party list popularity was highest in Taipei, and over half of its district 
votes came from Taipei (see table 7 on page 76). Out of the SDP’s total district votes in 
Taipei, 43% went to party founder Fan Yun, an associate professor of sociology at NTU 
who was particularly popular among students. This meant that I was likely to encounter 
more SDP supporters due to my location. I would have thus been able to increase my total 
sample by interviewing more SDP supporters, but I decided to prioritise the search for 
NPP supporters so that the much smaller and less popular party would not become 
dominant in the sample. This was a purposive strategy as described earlier: I relied on my 
personal judgement in compiling the sample. The final sample included five NPP 
supporters, five SDP supporters, and one person whose party support was split between 
the two (see interviewee details in appendix 2). 
 The practical process of contacting interviewees and scheduling interviews 
happened very similarly to the pilot study: communication was done exclusively via two 
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IM applications, LINE10 and Facebook Messenger. The use of IM was found to be the 
fastest, most efficient, and most natural form of communication with the interviewees. 
The interviewees were provided with the details about the research beforehand via these 
IM applications; they were informed about the anonymous nature of the interviews and 
asked for permission to record the interviews. This part of the process was virtually 
identical to the pilot study. 
As I began conducting interviews, it became apparent that the pilot study had 
represented a kind of “laboratory environment” where I had been able to control the 
process much more than “in the field”. This manifested particularly in the selection of 
interview locations: in Finland, my familiarity with the surroundings and the available 
options had made it easier to select ideal interview locations, such as library meeting 
rooms. In Taiwan, with a tighter schedule and a foreign environment, I had to settle with 
less ideal locations (see table 4). Towards the end of my stay in Taiwan, I also had to 
work increasingly according to the interviewees’ preferences and availability, as people 
were busy in the days before the Lunar New Year holiday in late January 2017.  
 
Table 4: Interview locations. 
Method Location No. of interviews 
Face-to-face 
Café  6 
Friend's apartment 3 
Author's apartment 1 
Online 
Instant messaging 1 
E-mail 1 
 
As shown in table 4, most of the interviews were done in cafés, as they were 
usually the most convenient option available. The downside of this was the background 
noise that had a negative effect on the quality of recordings. By contrast, a few interviews 
were done in a friend’s apartment where the silent environment noticeably improved 
recording quality. Since the location was a friend’s private apartment, the friend (who had 
helped find the interviewees) was present for the setup of each interview so that the 
interviewees did not have to meet an unknown interviewer for the first time in a private 
                                               
10 LINE, developed by a Japanese subsidiary of the Korean Naver Corporation, is the most popular IM 
application in Taiwan. Based on my personal observations, young Taiwanese conduct their instant 
messaging almost exclusively via LINE. The use of WeChat, the most popular IM application in China, 
appears virtually non-existent in Taiwan. 
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location. One interview was conducted in my own apartment in central Taipei without an 
intermediary person. In this occasion, I had met with the interviewee beforehand in a 
public place, and the interviewee was comfortable with doing the interview in my 
apartment. 
As noted earlier in the methodology chapter, I anticipated that I might conduct 
some interviews over instant messaging. I ended up planning two such interviews: one 
with an NPP supporter living in Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan and one with an SDP 
supporter living in Hsinchu on the western coast between Taipei and Taichung. I had to 
cancel the Hsinchu interview since I was ultimately unable to contact the interviewee 
through social media. I was thus left with one interview over instant messaging. This was 
done in Facebook Messenger over the course of several days, as the interviewee suggested 
such flexible approach due to her busy schedule. This may have led to more superficial 
answers due to the fragmentation of the process, but I found that I was able to ask the 
prepared questions and necessary follow-ups much like in the face-to-face interviews, the 
main difference being the longer timespan. The experience made me confident that if 
something went wrong with the scheduled face-to-face interviews, or if I was unable to 
gather enough data while in Taiwan, I could increase the sample with IM interviews even 
after returning to Finland. 
The pilot study interviews had all been done in English, but for the interviews in 
Taiwan, I had prepared to use mostly Mandarin. In the end, nine interviews (including 
the e-mail interview with Freddy Lim) were done in Mandarin and three in English. For 
the English interviews, the choice of language was partly to mitigate the effects of 
background noise in the café and partly because the interviewees’ English skill was good 
enough to make the interview significantly easier in English. Since the aim of the 
interviews was not specifically to study rhetoric or discourse, and the analysis was to have 
a descriptive focus, the use of different languages was deemed acceptable. I had 
considered the extensive use of Mandarin in the interviews the most challenging aspect 
of the research design in light of my skill level. Thus, one of the most rewarding aspects 
of the project as a whole was that I was ultimately able to conduct the interviews in 
Mandarin without significant problems. A key factor in this, as noted in the previous 
section, was that I had the opportunity to develop my language skills and learn relevant 
vocabulary while studying in Taipei. Nevertheless, the coding of the data later presented 
some problems and suggested that the Mandarin interviews contained less data than the 
English ones. 
The final element in the interview process was the interview with an NPP 
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legislator. I had initially hoped to interview either founding member Freddy Lim or 
current chairman Huang Kuo-chang, as these two had become the most prominent 
representatives of the Third Force. Towards the end of my stay in Taiwan, the opportunity 
to conduct an interview with Freddy Lim presented itself through a local friend who had 
work-related contacts to Taiwanese politicians. However, at that time, Lim was visiting 
the US as part of a Taiwanese delegation attending President Donald Trump’s 
inauguration. This meant that there was no time to conduct the interview in person while 
I was in Taiwan. It was therefore agreed that I would send the questions by e-mail, and 
Lim would record the answers that would then be sent back to me. Due to the one-off 
nature of the e-mail interview, I asked a Taiwanese person to translate the questions from 
English to Chinese to ensure there were no errors or ambiguities in the language. The 
same person also reviewed the language of the initial e-mail due to the more official 
nature of the correspondence. I received the answers promptly after sending the questions 
in March 2017. 
I gained 11 interviewees relying solely on the snowballing strategy. Together with 
the planned legislator interview, this gave me a total of 12 interviewees, which was within 
the originally planned 10–15 bracket. Thus, I decided not to pursue other channels for 
more interviewees, as my time in Taiwan was coming to an end. My experience with the 
IM interview suggested that if any of the interviews was subsequently deemed unusable, 
I could conduct replacement interviews via IM while in Finland. This was ultimately not 
necessary, and I was able to use all interviewees conducted in Taiwan.  
 
 3.2.3 Building a coding frame with NVivo 
 
After all data had been gathered in March 2017, I began transcribing the interviews in 
preparation of the coding phase. One significant departure from the pilot study design 
was the decision to use the NVivo software for the coding of the data. This was done in 
order to make the analysis phase more systematic. With only three interviews, the pilot 
study data had been relatively easy to handle without any external tools. However, with 
a larger sample and especially with the majority of it transcribed in Chinese characters, 
the use of NVivo made the process easier. For example, if I encountered problems reading 
some characters, I could copy and paste them to a dictionary application straight from the 
transcript that was uploaded in NVivo. 
 The transcription of the Mandarin language recordings was the most challenging 
and time-consuming phase of the entire research. In the interview situations, there had 
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occasionally been Mandarin words and expressions that I did not fully understand, but I 
had understood the general message. However, some of these instances became 
problematic in the transcription phase as they required a lot of time and sometimes 
dictionary work to decipher. This problem was exacerbated by the unavoidable 
background noise in many of the interviews. There were instances where it was not 
possible to make out everything that was said in the recording. However, none of these 
amounted to entire questions or sections of the interview, so I was able to get the 
necessary data without having to discard any main elements of the interviews. I could 
have recruited a native Mandarin speaker to do some or all of the transcription, but I chose 
to do it by myself, both to reacquaint myself with the data and to practice my Mandarin. 
Nevertheless, I acknowledge that some data is inevitably lost due to the language barrier. 
This was reflected in the NVivo coding frame itself, as the Mandarin language interviews 
ended up having a slightly smaller number of nodes than the English ones. On average, 
the English language interviews had 39 nodes, and Mandarin interviews had 34. The 
single IM interview also had 34 nodes, suggesting that the different interview method 
yielded a comparable amount of data to the face-to-face Mandarin interviews. 
 As noted earlier, the coding frame was not pre-prepared before the coding process 
itself. However, it was designed to follow the two main dimensions of the interview 
outline: the personal and the socio-political. These two dimensions were thus taken as the 
main content categories in the coding frame. The primary content analysis phase then 
involved the creation of sub-categories within these two main categories to see what 
elements featured in the construction of national identity among the interviewees. These 
sub-categories were built upon the specific answers and themes of the interviews. The 
resulting coding frame had a four-level structure in which levels 2–4 were created based 
on the interview data (see coding frame in appendix 3). 
 The results of the qualitative primary research described above are presented later 
in chapter 5. Before that, chapter 4 will employ secondary research to examine the 
historical and socio-political background of the development of Taiwanese identity. 
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4 The national identity question in Taiwan 
 
This chapter examines the national identity question in Taiwan from the perspectives of 
the theories presented in chapter 2. Section 4.1 reviews literature on the history and 
development of national identity in Taiwan, focusing on the interplay of popular, official, 
domestic and foreign forces. Section 4.2 then looks at the contemporary socio-political 
order as a result of this development. The historical starting point may seem distant, but 
that distance is merely temporal; this history is frequently invoked by both Taiwan and 
China when debating the current status of Taiwan and its people, and as subsequent 
sections will demonstrate, the recurring themes of foreign domination and self-
determination remain at the forefront of the current debates. 
 
4.1 The origins of Taiwanese national identity 
 
Taiwanese history is often organised into periods according to the various regime changes 
on the island. This categorisation produces five distinct periods: the Dutch colonial period 
(1624–1662), the Ming loyalist Koxinga period (1662–1683), the Qing period (1683–
1895), the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), and the ROC period (1945–). The 
Dutch colonisers were the first to bring organised governance to Taiwan, but the island 
had a significant indigenous population of Austronesian people estimated to have 
inhabited the island for several thousand years. Today, these indigenous people constitute 
approximately 2% of Taiwan’s population. This study will make occasional reference to 
the significance of the indigenous people to contemporary Taiwanese identity, but the 
historical overview in this section will mainly focus on the Sinification and Japanification 
of Taiwan in the early modern and modern periods. 
 As mentioned earlier, the PRC justifies its demands for unification by stating that 
Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since time immemorial. Similar historical 
arguments are routinely employed by the PRC to legitimise other territorial claims as 
well, the most prominent recent example being the South China Sea. Officially, the ROC 
maintains similar or even greater territorial claims on the basis that it is the legitimate 
government of China. These notions of primordial unity are squarely rooted in the idea 
of the perennial nation discussed and critiqued in chapter 2. It is no surprise, then, that a 
constructionist perspective entails an inherently sceptical approach to such claims. 
Accordingly, the following sections may appear to emphasise disunity between China 
and Taiwan. In connection to this, the reader may also notice the prevalence of Western 
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and modern Taiwanese sources and a certain amount of references to the work of Japanese 
scholars in the following sections. The corresponding lack of mainland Chinese sources 
is a result of two factors: firstly, serious mainland Chinese scholarship in the English 
language on this topic appears comparatively scarce, and secondly, the contentious nature 
of the Taiwan issue and the challenges of impartial scholarship in the political 
environment of the PRC discourage reliance on such sources. 11  In short, the 
constructionist perspective necessarily gravitates toward sources that eschew 
primordialism. Nevertheless, this chapter is not intended to rebuke the very real historical 
relationship between Taiwan and China – it is instead designed as an overview of how 
the nature and development of that connection have played into the emergence of a 
distinct Taiwanese identity. 
 
4.1.1 Ball of mud: Taiwan as an imperial periphery 
 
Scholars have frequently pondered where to locate the roots of a distinct Taiwanese 
identity. Most agree that the correct place is in the Japanese colonial period (Wachman 
1994: 93–4; Dawley 2009: 445–6; Chang 2003: 27), which makes sense given the various 
facets of modernity it enabled (see next section). However, Taiwan may have already 
possessed conditions for a psychological sense of separation at the dawn of the 20th 
century. While Taiwan has historically fallen under the Chinese sphere of influence, 
studies on the island’s early modern history have noted how loosely it was integrated into 
the Chinese mainland. According to Willis Jr. (1999: 85), Taiwan during the Ming 
dynasty (1368–1644) was “on the outer edge of Chinese consciousness and activity”. This 
is hardly surprising, because as Anderson (1983: 19–20) points out, old dynastic 
kingdoms such as China operated through a centre-periphery relation rather than as 
                                               
11 Politically loaded scholarship may be particularly problematic in relation to the history of China’s frontier 
regions, which include Taiwan. According to Millward (1996: 119), the primary aims of frontier 
historiography in the PRC, as defined by its Frontier Research Center, include “protecting sovereignty over 
national territory, handling relations with neighboring countries and strengthening the unity of domestic 
nationalities”. An article cited by Millward defines this agenda more concretely: “to make widely known 
the traditional patriotism of the Chinese (Zhonghua) nationalities”, “"to strengthen the spirit of Chinese 
nationalities to save the nation from subjugation”, and to “protect the integrity of our territory”, among 
other things (ibid.). Based on an analysis of such sources, Millward (ibid.) concludes that the above 
guidelines are generally accepted in Chinese frontier scholarship. A practical example is how scholarly 
materials must uniformly call the conquest of frontier regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang “unification” 
rather than “conquest”, because the latter would imply that these regions were not always part of China 
(ibid.: 120). Most recently, academic integrity in the PRC has been called into question by reports about 
the government’s manipulation of historical archives (Bland 2017) and censorship on contentious topics 
(including Taiwan) that extends increasingly to foreign academic publishers (Hernández 2017). 
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countries with clear borders. Nation-states in the modern sense did not exist, and 
accordingly, the concept of “nation” (民族, mínzú) would not appear in the Chinese 
lexicon before the end of the 19th century (Hughes 1997: 3). In the place of a Chinese 
nation there existed a fluid sense of Sinocentrism that fluctuated in a constellation of 
tribute and vassalage around an imperial core. Heaven was high and the emperor far away. 
Moreover, among the vague borderlands of Ming China, Taiwan was also marginalised 
by the geographical reality of being an island. In the early modern period, it held 
significance mostly as a waypoint for East Asian commerce. However, the Ming dynasty 
was famously averse to private overseas trade, and thus actively discouraged it through 
sea ban policies (海禁, hǎijìn) from the 14th century onwards (Finlay 2008: 334–5).12 It 
makes sense, then, that the Ming dynasty itself agreed to the Dutch colonisation of Taiwan 
in 1624, as the island was low on the emperor’s list of priorities (Willis Jr. 1999: 88). 
Consequently, it was the Dutch, not the Chinese, that established the first administrative 
body on the island, thereby acting as a catalyst for Taiwan’s Sinification as they began 
importing workforce from the mainland to plough their fields (Andrade 2007: 188). 
 The island factor can work as a separating feature not only from the mainland 
perspective but also from that of the island itself. Wachman (1994: 92) notes that 
geographical separation may have contributed to a sense of distinct identity in Taiwan 
already before the Japanese colonial period. Lowenthal (1994: 22) gives a similar 
example from Britain, which has famously imagined itself as an Atlantic island rather 
than a natural part of the European community. The Taiwan Strait is five times wider than 
the meagre 33 kilometres of the Dover Strait between England and France, so it is not 
surprising that it should contribute to a sense of isolation. The significance of geography 
has also been discussed with regard to Japan: Takeuchi (1994: 105) argues that physical 
isolation produced certain features of Japanese nationalism already before its formal 
introduction through the Meiji Restoration. These examples suggest that before the age 
of imagined communities, identities were often demarcated by physical boundaries that 
                                               
12 In Fujian, the province from which most of Taiwan’s Chinese population would later arrive, the Yongle 
Emperor (r. 1402–1424) even ordered the people to modify their ocean-going vessels so that they could 
only be used in rivers (Finlay 2008: 335). Though the Ming was particularly famous for the great maritime 
expeditions of admiral Zheng He, Andrade (2007: 3) notes that they were “an anomaly in a dynasty that in 
other ways closed itself off from the seas.” 
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required no imagination.13 
 Within this early non-national context, Taiwan became an explicit part of China 
after the Manchu conquest on the mainland had overthrown the Ming Dynasty in 1644 
and quelled the resistance of Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) in Taiwan in 
1683. Zheng’s forces had expelled the Dutch in 1662 and briefly held Taiwan as their 
base, trying to mount resistance to the emergent Qing dynasty. After the resistance was 
defeated and Taiwan was incorporated into the Qing empire, there were few signs of 
increased interest for the island among the new dynasty. Taiwan was described as a “ball 
of mud” (Shih & Jones 2014: 3), and the emperor himself wanted to abandon the island 
and evacuate the Chinese population to the mainland. He was ultimately persuaded to 
keep the island to prevent it from again becoming a pirate-infested base for insurgency. 
(Andrade 2007: 260; Shepherd 1999: 108–9.)14 This seemingly reluctant incorporation of 
Taiwan into China as a prefecture of Fujian province led to a passive approach to 
governance: for fear of renewed rebellions, the Qing issued quarantine policies, travel 
restrictions and harsh immigration rules that discouraged Chinese migration to Taiwan. 
Moreover, for financial reasons, the Qing never strived to bring the entire island under its 
control, and large parts remained indigenous territory (Eskildsen 2005: 286). John D. 
Clark (1896: 5, 13) wrote shortly after Japan’s acquisition of Taiwan that “China had 
never expanded its power to the mountains where the aborigines dwelled” and the Chinese 
themselves had “marked out on a map” the limit to which their sovereignty on the island 
extended. Thus, Qing policy in Taiwan was generally characterised by weak state power 
and has been described accordingly as “negative and minimalist” (Willis Jr. 1999: 102). 
The Japanese, after eventually gaining control over Taiwan, would in turn describe Qing 
governance as “supine” (Takekoshi 1907: 75). It was not only the style of government 
that led to weak integration, but also the lateness of Taiwan’s incorporation into China. 
According to Phillips (1999: 304), this meant that Taiwan’s ties to the central government 
and Confucian culture were comparatively weak. Martin (1994: 43) notes that Qing-era 
Taiwan was “uniquely isolated from metropolitan authorities by both distance and water”, 
                                               
13 Further evidence of the role of geographical isolation is provided by Kinmen and Matsu, two small island 
groups that remain under ROC control but are located only a few miles from the Chinese coast. Due to their 
geographical proximity to the mainland, these islands have retained much more contact with China. The 
mainland is visible from Kinmen, and there have been cross-Strait swimming competitions between the 
islands and Fujian province. Even at the height of Cold War tensions, fishermen from Kinmen would row 
their boats to the mainland side, where they blended in with the locals. (Keim 2016b.) Accordingly, the 
people on the islands overwhelmingly support the KMT, and pan-Green parties have had difficulties 
establishing a presence there. This suggests that closer links to the mainland have enabled the islands to 
preserve a sense of Chinese identity. 
14 The Kangxi Emperor’s (r. 1661–1722) original stance on Taiwan was that “taking it is no gain; not taking 
it is no loss” (Shih & Jones 2014: 3). 
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again emphasising the island factor and the peripheral location. Eskildsen (2005: 286) 
suggests that the weakness of Qing integration meant that by the mid-19th century, the 
Chinese in Taiwan had come to identify more with the island than with their mainland 
places of origin. 
 The above points do not denote the existence of a national identity in Taiwan prior 
to the Japanese colonial period. This is simply because no concept of nationalism had yet 
entered the collective consciousness in the region. What can be said, however, is that 
Taiwan was rather loosely connected to the mainland and that this may have made it 
comparatively susceptible to the dual process of top-down Japanisation and bottom-up 
Taiwanisation in the subsequent colonial period. In terms of national identity, then, 
Taiwan was a tabula rasa: the community of the nation was as yet unimagined and 
unnamed. Again, this does not mean Taiwan was not Chinese; it was an unquestionable 
part of the Qing empire and its population had become predominantly Chinese. But as 
this study argues, identities are dynamic and thus subject to change. Nationalism would 
become the foremost ideology driving such a change in the 20th century. 
 
4.1.2 The Japanese colonial period and the dawn of nations 
 
The 19th century saw both China and Japan facing the threat of alien rule as the doctrine 
of imperialism drove Western powers to acquire colonies around the world. By the latter 
half of the century, both countries were seeking ways to resist Western imperialism 
through reform and modernisation. China launched the Tongzhi Restoration in 1862 and 
Japan had its Meiji Restoration in 1868. These reform programmes were similar in 
content but different in outcome – China failed while Japan succeeded. Dreyer (2015: 50–
53) catalogues the shortcomings of the Tongzhi Restoration: from railroads, steamships 
and telegraphs to Western-style education reform, the project rejected or undermined its 
own efforts whenever they seemed to conflict with the state ideology of Confucianism. 
Precious time was wasted in the Qing court trying to concoct a functional synthesis of 
Confucian tradition and Western modernity. Conversely, Japan was able to recalibrate its 
society by borrowing from the West as necessary. Thus, while China weakened and 
became a victim of colonisation, Japan became a coloniser itself. That Japan embraced 
colonialism with modernisation is no surprise, because colonialism at the time was “part 
and parcel with modernity itself” (Ching 2001: 11). For Japan, the acquisition of colonies 
was thus a test for achieving great power status, and it was considered not only acceptable 
but indeed desirable. This is evident in the words of historian Takekoshi Yosaburō, who 
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chronicled Japan’s colonial project in Taiwan in the early 20th century: “I cannot but 
rejoice that we, Japanese, have passed our first examination as a colonizing nation so 
creditably.” (Takekoshi 1907: 11.) 
 The ultimate demonstration of Japan’s success was thus the acquisition of Taiwan 
as its first colony after the victorious Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5. In retrospect, the 
timing of this transition holds great significance. As suggested earlier, Taiwan was a 
tabula rasa in terms of national identity. It moved under Japanese rule just as new 
Western concepts were being transported to the East by capitalist and imperialist 
expansion. Among the most significant of these concepts was, of course, nationalism. 
Like colonialism, nationalism was an integral part of modernity. As illustrated in chapter 
2, the idea of nationhood rose from the onslaught of industrial capitalism in Europe and 
moved to Asia through imperialism. Since both nationalism and imperialism were 
products of modernity, the former was spread around the world by the latter. In East Asia, 
the proxy for this modernisation was often Japan. Accordingly, it was not only the 
Taiwanese that were exposed to modernity through Japan; the intellectuals of mainland 
China were also soaking up new Western theories through their eastern neighbour. It was 
in Tokyo that Sun Yat-sen, the quintessential Chinese nationalist, set the base for his 
revolutionary alliance (同盟會 , Tóngménghuì) that would eventually spearhead the 
overthrowing of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Sun appropriated the modern vocabulary that 
was spreading in East Asia: he used the Chinese term for “nationalism” (民族主義, mínzú 
zhǔyì) for the first time in 1904, after the term itself had been introduced in the Chinese 
language in 1901 (Yahuda 2000: 27). 15  These elements would be distilled into the 
formation of the KMT that was founded in 1911 as the successor of the Tongmenghui. It 
is no surprise, then, that the KMT became known as the Chinese Nationalist Party in 
English. 
 From the early 1900s onwards, increasing amounts of Taiwanese went to Japan 
to pursue higher education as opportunities in the colony itself were non-existent. It was 
there, in the universities of the imperial metropole, that a new Taiwanese intelligentsia 
began to form around the imported concepts of Western modernity. This led to the 
establishment of new associations and print publications to advocate new ideas of 
liberalism. (Lamley 1999: 230–231.) This, in turn, gave rise to the Taiwanese New 
                                               
15 The word mínzú for “nation” is a Chinese translation of the Japanese minzoku. Victor H. Mair, professor 
of Chinese language and literature at the University of Pennsylvania, has assembled “a large amount of 
material concerning the absence of mínzú / minzoku 民族 as a lexical item corresponding to ‘nation’ in 
China before it was introduced from Meiji [1868-1912] Japan.” (Mair 2015.) This further supports the 
constructionist theory of the modern origin of nations. 
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Culture Movement (新文化運動, Xīn wénhuà yùndòng) that focused on promoting new 
democratic values. It had its counterpart in the mainland where the May Fourth 
Movement (五四運動, Wǔsì yùndòng) was paving the way for nationalism in the ROC that 
had been established in 1912. (Chang 1999: 269.) The developments in colonised Taiwan 
correspond to the general paradox of imperialism noted earlier: in overseas colonies, it 
was the official nationalism of the empire that prompted the rise of its popular alternative. 
By simultaneously subjugating native populations and providing them with access to 
modern learning and concepts, the empires gave their colonial subjects both the motive 
and the means to seek self-determination. 
 In Taiwan, this development built upon and spread through an emergent public 
sphere. This process was very similar to the one described by Anderson in Europe: it 
manifested in the proliferation of print publications distributed to a vernacularly literate 
audience. According to Fujii (2006: 70–71), a proper public sphere emerged in Taiwan 
during the 1930s as Japan’s assimilation policies expanded vernacular Japanese literacy. 
In 1941, 57% of Taiwanese were literate in Japanese, compared with a literacy rate (in 
Chinese) of less than 10% at the end of the Qing dynasty (ibid.: 67). Moreover, the 
development of a public sphere was complemented by the physical framework of 
communications and infrastructure: a postal system, telegraph, telephones, roads and 
railroads. These features were in their infancy at the end of the 19th century, and it was 
only with their aggressive expansion during the Japanese colonial period that a physical 
framework for a public sphere began to evolve. As mentioned earlier, similar 
developments were taking place in China at the same time: channels and networks were 
being created through which nationalism could be spread to the newly imagined nation. 
Emergent modernity provided the East Asian societies with the ideas, terminology, 
channels, and physical structures required for the construction of national communities. 
Thus, in terms of the formation of a Taiwanese identity, the significance of the Japanese 
colonial period was in that it separated Taiwan from China before its modernisation. The 
important observation therefore seems to be this: despite having belonged to the Qing 
empire, Taiwan was no longer part of China during the influential period of the early 20th 
century when concepts such as nationalism, liberalism and democracy first entered public 
discourse in the region. 
 None of this suggests that a clear Taiwanese identity formed during the colonial 
period. What these developments entail is rather the emergence of a proto-nationalist 
modern consciousness that would only later lend itself to the creation of a clearly 
articulated national identity. Yet, there are practical examples from the colonial period 
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suggesting a form of national awareness. Consider, for example, the explicit demands for 
self-determination: from the 1920s onwards, the Movement for the Establishment of a 
Taiwanese Parliament submitted several petitions to the colonial authorities demanding 
the establishment of a parliament in Taiwan (Lai et al. 1991: 24). Tellingly, the Japanese 
saw it as a nationalist uprising potentially even seeking independence through secession 
(Ching 2001: 57–58). According to Hughes (2000: 65), such movements sowed the 
“seeds of democracy” in Taiwan already during the colonial period. Lai et al. (1991: 19) 
make a noteworthy point regarding the colonial period and national identity, using the 
story of young Taiwanese intellectual Peng Ming-min as an example. The authors suggest 
that Peng was inspired by the philosophy of Joseph Ernest Renan, who concluded that 
“modern nationhood is based not on a shared language, culture, or ethnic origin but a 
‘shared sense of destiny’” (ibid.: 20). This points to a nationalism that looks to the future 
instead of the past, and to the modern community instead of ethnic nativity. Accordingly, 
the new worldview adopted by Taiwanese intellectuals was one of individualism and 
liberalism, but significantly, they did not call for the abandoning of Chinese culture (ibid.: 
23). This suggests that the intellectuals of the colonial period separated the goals of their 
nationalism from their ethnic Chinese heritage. 
 Above, we thus have the first concrete articulations of the ideas of “self-
determination” and “democracy”, the two concepts around which the notion of a distinct 
Taiwanese identity would later be constructed. Following John R. Searle’s terminology 
presented in chapter 2, these could be the precursors of the “constitutive rules” required 
for a commonly accepted social construction. The contestation between self-
determination and Japanese dominance represents the crossfire of popular, official, 
domestic and foreign forces in which national identities rise according to the definition 
laid out in chapter 2. Consequently, it would be the continued denial of self-determination 
under the ROC that finally ignited this new national identity in Taiwan. 
 
4.1.3 Re-Sinification and ethnic dichotomisation under KMT 
rule 
 
The previous sections described the conditions for the formation of Taiwanese identity 
that emerged during the Qing and Japanese periods. When Japan lost World War II in 
1945, Taiwan moved under ROC control, and it was this period that concretised the 
emergence of Taiwanese identity and saw a shift from calls of self-determination to overt 
demands of independence. Existing scholarship agrees that the pivotal event in this 
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process was the February 28 Incident (二二八事件, Èr'èrbā Shìjiàn)16 in 1947 (Dawley 
2009: 448–9; Chang 2003: 42–3). The incident itself involved a scuffle between an illegal 
cigarette vendor and the police, during which a bystander was shot and killed by the 
police. This led to violent protests and an anti-government uprising that was quelled by 
the KMT in a brutal crackdown in March that year. The incident was followed by a 
contentious period of “White Terror” (白色恐怖, Báisè kǒngbù) and martial law that would 
only be lifted in 1987. 
 The February 28 Incident built upon the volatile situation that had evolved in 
Taiwan after its return to China following Japan’s defeat in World War II. The situation 
in mainland China had been chaotic after the ROC was established, as the KMT, headed 
by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek since 1928, first battled rival warlords and then the 
emergent Communists and the invading Japanese. The civil war against Mao Zedong’s 
CCP intensified when Japan was defeated, and this provided the troublesome context for 
Taiwan’s cession to the ROC in 1945. The Taiwanese initially welcomed the mainlanders 
as liberators, but the KMT was preoccupied with the civil war on the mainland and could 
only spare marginal attention to Taiwan (Wachman 1994: 98; Chang 1994: 106). Having 
enjoyed the status of a “model colony” under Japanese rule, Taiwan again fell towards 
the bottom of the central government’s list of priorities. During the Qing era, peripheral 
status had made Taiwan a restive society characterised by unrest: sub-ethnic conflict17 
and anti-government insurrections had been frequent throughout that period (Shepherd 
1999: 113–128; Takekoshi 1907: 69–70). The early ROC period saw echoes of this 
history; one concrete problem in this regard was the lack of sufficient police and military 
forces in Taiwan to maintain social harmony (Lai et al. 1991: 89). Further trouble was 
created by the gap between the realities of KMT and Japanese rule: Taiwan’s living 
standards, including education, sanitation, economic and industrial conditions, and 
infrastructure, had all exceeded those of mainland China during the colonial period 
(Phillips 1999: 280; Lai et al. 1991: 26).18 In this regard, despite the notion of liberation, 
                                               
16 Both sides have preferred to use the word ”incident” (事件, shìjiàn) to minimise negative connotations. 
Lai et al. (1991: 8) argue that this veils the true nature of the event, and they favour the word “uprising” 
instead. They point out that the government and police forces lost control of Taiwan’s urban areas, and the 
nine largest cities were taken over by rebels. This paper recognises that the events constituted an uprising, 
but I have chosen to use the commonly used term for the sake of clarity. 
17 Although the pre-1945 Taiwanese would later become an ethnic group in themselves (benshengren), they 
consisted of various ethnic subgroups. The three major groups were the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou from 
Fujian and the Hakka from Guangdong province. There was substantial armed struggle between these 
groups in Taiwan during the Qing dynasty. The conflict subsided from the 1860s onwards as a wider sense 
of common identity began to prevail. (Jacobs, 2014: 54–6.) 
18 Lai et al. (1991: 26) suggest that by the late 1930s, Taiwan’s per capita income may have been nearly 
twice that of China. 
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the arrival of the KMT was a step backward for Taiwan. Moreover, according to Phillips 
(ibid.: 282), the Taiwanese came to notice that KMT rule lacked “honesty, competence, 
predictability and efficiency”. Compared to the Japanese, the Chinese mainlanders were 
seen as lawless, barbaric, corrupt, feudal and disorganised (Wachman 1994: 94–5; Chang 
1994: 106). These observations were similar to those made by the Japanese when they 
gained control over Taiwan: Takekoshi (1907: 293–4) described a culture of bribery and 
corruption and the ensuing barbarism and lack of moral fibre in Qing-era Taiwan. This 
was one of the ways in which the colonial period drove a wedge between Taiwan and the 
mainland: it seemingly elevated Taiwan to a position where its inhabitants came to see 
the Chinese as the Japanese had seen them half a century earlier. Prejudice and 
xenophobia may have factored in this sense of otherness, but it was also a logical reaction 
stemming from decades of socio-cultural separation. The result was a substantial first-
hand experience of otherness. Many Taiwanese had undoubtedly fostered their Chinese 
roots while awaiting to be reunified with the mainland, but the arrival of the mainlanders 
showed how the nostalgic longing was at odds with contemporary reality. As noted in 
chapter 2, the negative experience of otherness is a significant factor in the consolidation 
of identities. 
 The above factors contaminated the tense relationship between the Japanised 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders who were, in turn, understandably wary of lingering 
collaborationism. As a result, the Taiwanese and the mainlanders became divided into 
two opposing groups based on their time of arrival to the island: the Taiwanese who had 
arrived prior to 1945 (本省人, běnshěngrén, lit. “people from the province”) and those 
who arrived from the mainland in 1945–1951 (外省人, wàishěngrén, lit. “people from 
outside the province”) (Chang 1994: 93–4). In the prevailing social context of mutual 
animosity, these categories came to be regarded as ethnic groups in Taiwan despite 
significant differences in ethnic, cultural, or provincial origins within the groups 
themselves. Ironically, Taiwan’s indigenous people were not included in the běnshěngrén 
category despite being the original inhabitants of the island. (Ibid.: 104–5.)  
 Aside from the perceived ethnic differences between these groups, the main 
frustration among the běnshěngrén was the emerging wàishěngrén domination. Unhappy 
with this, the běnshěngrén continued their demands for wider self-government in 1946, 
citing the different situations between Taiwan and other provinces. In 1947, these 
demands were further combined with the grievances arising from the February 28 
Incident, and the KMT government interpreted this much like the Japanese had done with 
similar demands in the colonial period: as a separatist and revolutionary movement. The 
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result was turmoil and the imposition of martial law and a forced decolonisation project. 
(Phillips 1999: 292–5.) The KMT government then proceeded to implement forceful re-
Sinification efforts to eradicate Japanese influences and language. Schools began 
teaching Chinese history and geography based on the idea that the mainland was still 
ruled by the ROC (Li 2016: 2). Mandarin was made the new national language (國語, 
guóyǔ), which presented similar problems as the earlier Japanese assimilationist language 
policies. The original native language of most Taiwanese was not Mandarin, but 
Hokkien.19 Thus, replacing Japanese with Mandarin did not represent a “return” to the 
precolonial Chinese reality; instead, it was yet another campaign of top-down assimilation, 
inherently connected to the nationalist project of the KMT.  
 The above suggests that the KMT’s version of “official nationalism” closely 
resembles that of the Japanese and the Russian empires described by Seton-Watson and 
Anderson (chapter 2). These policies shared the same objective: to extinguish the nascent 
grassroots nationalisms that threatened the unity of the empire. All of this happened in 
the context of KMT and wàishěngrén domination that excluded the Taiwanese from 
virtually all decision-making. The number of běnshěngrén in the KMT’s Central 
Committee never exceeded 10% until 1976 (Wu 1994: 155). In society itself, the 
wàishěngrén were a clear elite minority, as over 80% of the population were běnshěngrén 
(Chang 1994: 94). It is thus not surprising that many in Taiwan now consider the period 
of KMT rule as yet another case of colonisation and the ROC as an illegitimate colonial 
government. Indeed, some scholars have also argued that the KMT party-state was simply 
another colonial government (see for example Jacobs 2014: 48). 
 The peculiarity of Taiwan’s re-Sinification under KMT rule was that it built upon 
an obsolete version of Chineseness. The ROC’s loss of the mainland meant that “the 
‘mainland’ culture that was introduced to the island was frozen in time” (Li 2016: 2). As 
time passed, this version of China became increasingly distant from the reality of the 
mainland. Since 1949, the PRC “had moved the national capital, redrawn and renamed 
provinces and cities, signed new border treaties with some seventeen countries, and built 
new motorways and railway lines, none of which made their way into the maps and 
geography textbooks used in Taiwan” (ibid.). This inconsistency of reality and narrative 
                                               
19 Most Taiwanese speak natively the Taiwanese variant of Hokkien (臺灣閩南語, Táiwān Mǐnnányǔ), a 
branch of the Southern Min dialect. In Taiwan, this language is usually referred to as simply “Taiwanese” 
(臺語, Táiyǔ or 臺灣話, Táiwānhuà). A linguistic debate exists around the relationships between Sinitic 
languages, much of it concentrated on whether the many Chinese “dialects” are, in fact, separate languages. 
This is due to the dialects being mutually unintelligible, which is true also for Hokkien and Mandarin. (See 
for example Mair 2003.) In Taiwan, the Hokkien/Mandarin debate is understandably an important aspect 
of the Taiwanese/Chinese identity issue. 
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was exacerbated by the KMT’s efforts to control information by e.g. banning mainland 
books in Taiwan. The result, according to Li (ibid.: 3), was the top-down creation of an 
“imaginary homeland”. As such, the KMT’s Sinification effort corresponds closely to the 
notion of official nationalism described in chapter 2. 
 The above points suggest that, just like the Japanese colonial administration, the 
KMT represented assimilationist minority rule by a group of foreign elites. Furthermore, 
the KMT government rivalled its predecessors in terms of the scale of oppression; the 
martial law imposed in 1949 would go on to last for 38 years, a world record at the time. 
Taiwanese reactions to KMT rule were also similar to the Japanese colonial period: under 
both regimes, the people had called for self-determination to have a voice in the 
development and administration of their home island. It seems that these demands were 
not secessionist in nature, but both the Japanese and the KMT dismissed them as such. 
For the KMT, such demands represented a particularly dire existential threat after it had 
lost the mainland and Taiwan was all it was left with. Consequently, official nationalism 
cracked down on its popular alternative, and the foreign trumped the domestic. However, 
the Taiwanese consciousness continued to simmer under the surface. 
 
4.2 Identity and politics in contemporary Taiwan 
 
By the 1970s, the complexities of the Japanese and KMT regimes had produced a rather 
peculiar ethnic dichotomy. A binary classification was constructed for Taiwan’s 
population based not on actual differences in ethnic heritage, but on a single dividing line 
in the time of arrival to the island. As such, this categorisation lends support for the 
constructionist premise. This notion is further complemented by the later developments 
in Taiwan’s history presented in the following sections. As soon as the political 
environment in Taiwan was liberalised, the ethnic dichotomy became the basic cleavage 
dividing the Taiwanese party system. This suggests that at its core, the dispute between 
the wàishěngrén and běnshěngrén may have always been more political than ethnic.  
 
4.2.1 Democratisation and political dichotomisation 
 
After 1949, the KMT initially managed to hold onto its dream of the mainland as it was 
internationally considered the legitimate government of China. However, the goal of 
retaking the mainland began to crumble in the early 1970s with the Sino-US 
rapprochement of the Nixon administration and the ROC’s expulsion from the United 
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Nations in favour of the PRC. This meant a loss of international legitimacy that 
marginalised the ROC and forced the KMT to begin focusing on Taiwan itself. Premier 
Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, began allowing more Taiwanese people to 
the administration from 1973 onwards and prepared for political change. Tucker (2009: 
63) suggests this was a strategy to earn more public and foreign support for the ROC 
while emphasising the illiberal nature of the PRC. Chang (1994: 99) presents this change 
as the beginning of the policy of “Taiwanisation” (本土化, běntǔhuà), although Chiang 
himself denied the existence of such a policy at the time because it would have implied 
the existence of a distinct Taiwanese identity. 
 The social cleavage between the wàishěngrén and běnshěngrén had emerged in 
the years following Taiwan’s cession to the ROC, but the KMT’s one-party rule and the 
martial law had prevented it from entering the political stage. However, just as the ROC’s 
loss of legitimacy led to increasing Taiwanisation within the KMT, it also provided an 
impetus for a Taiwanese opposition movement outside the party. Since the KMT was still 
an inherently wàishěngrén entity, the opposition naturally built upon the běnshěngrén 
population.  According to Wachman (1994: 135–136), the opposition took advantage of 
the KMT’s diminishing legitimacy and began to take a more constructive, restrained 
approach to politics in the 1970s. This led to a crucial juncture in Taiwan’s 
democratisation: the establishment of the Tangwai (黨外, Dǎngwài, lit. “outside the party”) 
movement in 1977 (ibid.). Although the KMT had kept national politics to itself, it 
allowed others to compete in local elections, and the Tangwai won impressive grassroots 
victories in the liberalising political climate of the late 1970s (Rubinstein 1999: 440). 
 The rise of the opposition movement in the 1970s built upon a similar process as 
the self-determination movement during the Japanese colonial period. Hughes (2000: 68) 
notes the articulation of a distinct Taiwanese identity in the 1970s through nativist 
literature similar to that of colonial Taiwan. This literary trend was complemented by 
opposition magazines set up by exiled dissidents around the same time (ibid.). Thus, just 
like earlier in the colonial period, nationalist ideas spread through a public sphere built 
around communicative media. In the colonial period, this was facilitated by a vernacular 
literacy in Japanese, but by the late 1970s this had been replaced by a Chinese literacy 
rate that exceeded 90%, meaning that the activists could publish in Chinese for an almost 
fully literate audience (Chang 2003: 50). Tsai (2003: 67) views this process through the 
theories of both Benedict Anderson and Jürgen Habermas: for Anderson, it was print-
capitalism that gave rise to nations, whereas Habermas views a literature sphere as a 
precondition for a political public sphere. In both accounts, communicative media is the 
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key element of social transformation. In the case of Taiwan, the nativist elements thus 
filtered from the literary scene to politics. 
 In a very concrete example of the public sphere facilitating political mobilisation, 
the Tangwai established the Formosa Magazine (美麗島 雜誌, Měilìdǎo zázhì) in 1979 and 
opened a “service office” for the magazine. In reality, the office served as the 
headquarters of the Tangwai, since the formal organisation of opposition parties was still 
banned by the KMT. From this office, the Tangwai activists began organising opposition 
activities, culminating in a rally held on 10 December 1979 to mark the International 
Human Rights Day. The event turned into a violent confrontation where many policemen 
were injured, and a substantial number of opposition leaders and supporters of the 
Formosa Magazine were jailed. (Ibid.: 73–4.) According to Wachman (1994: 140), it has 
been speculated that the authorities used the event as a trap for the opposition to gain a 
pretext for arresting their leaders. Now known as the Kaohsiung Incident (美麗島事件, 
Měilìdǎo shìjiàn), the event halted the opposition movement, but it arguably strengthened 
the opposition in the long run as supporters of the movement were elected into office in 
the 1980 and 1981 elections (Ibid.: 141; Tsai 2003: 76). 
 Tsai (ibid.: 76–7) notes that the Kaohsiung Incident galvanised the opposition 
public sphere, with political magazines and young writers communicating the ideals of 
democracy to the people. Taiwanese people’s right to self-determination again became 
the most prominent mobilising theme due to international and social support for the 
concept (ibid.: 77). Underlying the notion of self-determination were the vivid debates in 
the public sphere about the nature of a Taiwanese consciousness and Taiwan’s relation to 
China. In Tsai’s (ibid.: 80–1) analysis, the common denominator in these debates was the 
notion of a land-based identity built upon self-determination and social democracy. Again, 
this conceptualisation echoes the notion mentioned with regard to the intellectuals of the 
Japanese colonial period, whereby it was aspects other than ethnicity that were driving 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
 The rising tide of opposition forced Chiang Ching-kuo to initiate political reforms. 
Wachman (1994: 141–3) suggests that this was a strategy born out of necessity rather 
than will: had Chiang seen a possibility to continue suppression, he probably would have. 
Concessions to the opposition were thus intended to support the KMT’s feeble legitimacy. 
This led the KMT to begin the process of democratisation in 1986: civil liberties were 
introduced and the longstanding martial law was lifted in 1987. Opposition parties would 
soon be allowed, and the Tangwai reorganised itself into the Democratic Progressive 
Party in the fall of 1986, marking the first step from one-party rule towards a political 
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dichotomy. (Ibid.: 143–6.) 
 A significant consequence of the 1980s liberalisation was that it exposed the 
fictitious nature of the KMT’s official version of Chinese identity. With the lifting of the 
martial law, Taiwanese were again able to travel to the mainland, and they began noticing 
that the China they had learned about was not the one that actually existed (Li 2016: 5). 
This was yet another case of coming to first-hand contact with otherness that conflicted 
with the prevalent notion of Chineseness. In the 1940s, the Taiwanese had noted the 
otherness of the mainlanders who took over the island, and the KMT had responded by 
attempting to erase the difference through heavy-handed assimilation. Now, with the 
freedom to visit the mainland, the Taiwanese were again allowed to experience that 
otherness, and this fractured the official version of Chinese identity: “Once the longed-
for home is within reach, imagined worlds collapse, and the vitality and creativity born 
of the nostalgia and hunger of a generation of exiles is suddenly doused, reduced to little 
more than a distant memory.” (Li 2016: 11.) 
 Within this context, and in line with the themes of the literary debates that had 
laid ground for the emergence of political opposition, the party platform of the newly 
established DPP emphasised self-determination. According to Chang (1994: 96), the 
demand for self-determination referred implicitly to the běnshěngrén while portraying the 
KMT as “outsiders”. This was reflected in the support base of the KMT and the DPP: a 
clear majority of DPP supporters were of Taiwanese descent, while virtually all those of 
mainland origin supported the KMT (ibid.: 95; Wu 1994: 151). Thus, the stage was set 
for the politicisation of the identity question and the corresponding ethno-political 
dichotomisation. By the mid-90s, the běnshěngrén/wàishěngrén dichotomy had become 
“the main social cleavage upon which differences in political support and national identity 
are based” (Wu 1994: 151). Consequently, a key question in the democratising Taiwan 
of the 1990s was how democratisation would eventually affect this ethnic tension. Wu 
(ibid.: 167) notes that liberalisation overall seemed to exacerbate ethnic polarisation as it 
was now the wàishěngrén that began feeling threatened by the increasing Taiwanisation. 
However, Wu (ibid.: 152) also points out that many observers and some opposition 
leaders at the time suggested that the ethnic tension would diminish when the unjust 
wàishěngrén domination was replaced by more representative politics.  
 The quest for self-determination was concretised in the DPP’s stated goal of 
formal Taiwanese independence, which was their main agenda up until the 1996 elections. 
However, according to Hughes (2000: 72–3), this hard-line pro-independence stance did 
not resonate with the general public, leading to poor election results for the DPP. 
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Table 5: Power relations in Taiwanese politics after democratisation. 
Legislature President 
Term Largest party (seats) Majority (seats) Term Party (president) 
1992–1995* KMT (95/161) KMT (95/161) 
1996–
2000** 
KMT (Lee Teng-hui) 1995–1998 KMT (85/164) KMT (85/164) 
1998–2001 KMT (123/225) KMT (123/225) 
2001–2004 DPP (87/225) Pan-Blue (115/225) 2000–2004 DPP (Chen Shui-bian) 
2004–2008 DPP (89/225) Pan-Blue (114/225) 2004–2008 DPP (Chen Shui-bian) 
2008–2012 KMT (81/113) Pan-Blue (85/113) 2008–2012 KMT (Ma Ying-jeou) 
2012–2016 KMT (64/113) Pan-Blue (69/113) 2012–2016 KMT (Ma Ying-jeou) 
2016– DPP (68/113) DPP (68/113) 2016– DPP (Tsai Ing-wen) 
*   First direct legislative election in 1992. 
** First direct presidential election in 1996. 
 
Meanwhile, the KMT fared better due to its Taiwanisation and a more moderate policy 
of maintaining the status quo instead of campaigning actively for unification with China 
(ibid.: 73). The power relations of the two parties after democratisation are presented in 
table 5, showing that KMT managed to hold onto its legislative majority for a decade after 
democratisation, and even after that through a Pan-Blue coalition.20 These points suggest 
that the ethnic cleavage does not correspond directly to independence/unification stances, 
and indeed, Hughes (ibid.: 74) suggests that democratisation in the 1990s has moved 
Taiwan towards becoming a post-nationalist community that favours the ambiguous 
status quo. Consequently, by the turn of the millennium, Taiwan was also exhibiting a 
“post-nationalist” identity which represented an intermediate stance between the two 
extremes of Chinese and Taiwanese (ibid.: 77). Chang (2003: 53–4) presents a similar 
viewpoint, arguing that a pragmatic belief in economic prosperity and development has 
become the most agreed-upon aspect in Taiwan since the late 1990s. Thus, rather than 
subscribing to Chinese or Taiwanese nationalism, the Taiwanese, by and large, began to 
support a stable but ambiguous middle ground that promised continued development. 
Thus, the DPP started becoming competitive in elections once it adopted a more moderate 
stance on the independence issue. Similarly, the KMT was able to maintain its popularity 
after democratisation by moderating its stance on unification and increasing its efforts in 
Taiwanisation. The KMT’s Taiwanisation policy was personified in Lee Teng-hui, an 
                                               
20 The KMT/DPP dichotomy has meant that Taiwanese politics is often organised into two opposing camps, 
the Pan-Blue (the KMT and its allies) and Pan-Green (the DPP and its allies). The blue and green colours 
come from the insignia of the KMT and the DPP, respectively. Despite its name, the Pan-Green camp 
should not be confused with the global green movement of environmentalist parties. 
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ethnic běnshěngrén KMT member who became president after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death 
in 1988 and won Taiwan’s first direct presidential elections in 1996 (see table 5). 
 The above suggests that instead of a clear drive for Taiwanese nationalism and 
independence, democratisation produced some sort of a hybrid community balancing 
between Chinese heritage and contemporary Taiwanese reality. Several studies on the 
early 2000s situation (e.g. Huang et al. 2004; Chu 2004; Schubert 2004; Chen 2012) have 
noted this trend and suggest that the mainstream national identity was characterised by 
both Taiwanese and Chinese elements. As Chu (2004: 502) points out, the decline of the 
KMT’s notion of a Chinese identity did not appear to translate to a rise in a distinct 
Taiwanese identity, but rather a dual Taiwanese/Chinese identity. Chen (2012: 848) notes 
how much of the scholarship has treated this through the ethnic/civic categorisation 
presented in chapter 2: the Chinese side of identity stems from ethnic and cultural heritage, 
while the Taiwanese side is defined through politics and citizenship. This suggests that 
the ethnic dichotomy of wàishěngrén/běnshěngrén was indeed rather arbitrary, and has 
therefore given way to another duality: that of ethnic Chinese and civic Taiwanese 
identities. 
 
4.2.2 Taiwanese identity in the 21st century 
 
One sign of the Taiwanese identity question gaining prominence after democratisation is 
that developments in national identity and independence/unification opinions have been 
surveyed periodically since the early 1990s. The most substantial ongoing cross-sectional 
data is provided by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (ESC 
NCCU)21, which has surveyed national identity since 1992 and independence/unification 
stances since 1994. The dominant dual identity of the 1990s and early 2000s, suggested 
by the studies cited in the previous section, is also visible in the ESC NCCU data (figure 
1, next page). Between 1992 and 2005, the most popular option for national identity was 
“Both Taiwanese and Chinese”. However, the clearest trend throughout the survey data 
is the rise of Taiwanese identity from 17.6% in 1992 to 60.6% in 2014, and the 
simultaneous decline of Chinese identity from 25.5% to less than 4%. This means that 
while the percentage of people with a dual identity was relatively stable through the 1990s 
and early 2000s, the overall development was clearly towards a more distinct Taiwanese 
                                               
21 The ESC NCCU survey data is considered authoritative and has been cited in numerous studies (e.g. 
Chen 2015, Fell 2014, Liao at al. 2013, Wu 2005). This study relies mainly on the ESC NCCU data when 
looking at the development of Taiwanese identity. 
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identity. This data supports the point mentioned in the previous section about the artificial 
nature of the Chinese identity constructed during the KMT’s one-party rule: that identity 
has declined in tandem with the dismantling of the KMT’s party-state hegemony. 
 
Figure 1: Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan, 1992–2017. 
 
Source: ESC NCCU 2017. 
 
 The longstanding prominence of the dual identity has prompted studies that 
analyse the situation through the ethnic/civic categorisation. Chen (2012: 851–6) uses a 
duality of “primordial” and “political” dimensions, where the former includes factors 
such as ethnic identity, ethnic difference, ethnic pride, and shared fate, and the latter 
includes national status, self-determination, national survival, and shared experience. 
Schubert (2004: 537) notes that the Chinese identity in Taiwan is more connected to the 
ethnic (or primordial) aspects, while the Taiwanese identity stems from historical and 
political factors. According to Chen (2014: 541), KMT and DPP support in the 2010s still 
correlate respectively with Chinese and Taiwanese identities. The political dichotomy of 
the KMT and the DPP could thus be said to reflect the ethnic/civic duality: the KMT 
emphasises the Chinese ethnic heritage and thus advocates for political unification, while 
the DPP downplays the Chinese ethnic heritage and thus advocates for political self-
determination. Similarly, as noted in the previous section, the KMT usually commands 
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wàishěngrén support, while the běnshěngrén tend to support the DPP. However, these 
tendencies have become more subtle in the 2000s, and the peoples’ ambiguous dual 
identity and support of cross-Strait status quo have been reflected by the main parties’ 
moderate stances. Thus, in light of survey data and previous research, it could be said that 
a political convergence of sorts emerged around a hybrid identity in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  
 However, another key takeaway from the ESC NCCU data in figure 1 is the surge 
in Taiwanese identity that began in 2008 and was accompanied by a corresponding drop 
in the “Both” identity: Between 2007 and 2014, Taiwanese identity went from 43.7% to 
60.6% while the dual identity fell from 44.7% to 32.5%. Significantly, this happened 
simultaneously with the economic and political cross-Strait integration under a KMT 
government as discussed in chapter 2. The strengthening of Taiwanese identity peaked in 
2014 and has since reversed slightly, but Taiwanese identity remains clearly dominant. 
Table 6 shows a comparison of the latest ESC NCCU figures and two other recent surveys 
by the Taiwan Brain Trust (TBT) and the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), 
both of which show a similarly dominant Taiwanese identity. 
 
 
Table 6: Taiwanese/Chinese identity in recent surveys. 
Survey 
Identity, % 
Taiwanese Both Taiwanese and Chinese Chinese No response 
ESC NCCU 2017 56.0 36.6 3.8 3.6 
TBT 2016 60.4 33.5 4.1 2.0 
TPOF 2016 80.8 7.6 8.1 3.5 
Source: ESC NCCU 2017; TBT 2016; Yu & Wu 2016.  
 
 
The ESC NCCU survey has also measured stances toward unification and independence 
since 1994 (figure 2, next page). This data continues to show a clearer pragmatic 
ambiguity than the identity surveys, as the clear majority of Taiwanese still seem to favour 
the status quo without moving towards unification or independence. Yet, even in this data, 
the tables have clearly turned between 1994 and 2017. As figure 2 shows, a combined 20% 
had a pro-unification opinion in 1994 while a combined 11.1% were pro-independence, 
but today, the figures are 11,8% and 23,6% respectively. Notably, the number of 
respondents with no response has declined from over 20% to less than 10% during the 
same period. Interestingly, today’s pro-independence leaning becomes even more 
pronounced in surveys that omit the status quo option altogether and only present 
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unification and independence as options. The TBT included such a survey question in 
2016, and as a result, 60.5% of the respondents supported independence while 22.4% 
supported unification and 17,1% had no clear opinion (TBT 2016). This suggests that the 
broad support for status quo may actually mask a dominant pro-independence stance due 
to pragmatic concerns about the threat of conflict with China. 
  
Figure 2: Unification/independence stances in Taiwan, 1994–2017. 
 
Source: ESC NCCU 2017. 
  
 As demonstrated above, the recent figures suggest a clear consolidation of 
Taiwanese identity over Chinese and a pro-independence opinion over unification, and 
this has been observed in the most recent studies as well. As Dawley (2009: 450) asserts 
based on a review of recent scholarship, “an independence-oriented national identity” has 
become hegemonic “largely through literary and political movements in the last decades 
of the 20th century”. In addition to suggesting a dominant pro-independence identity, this 
notion supports the analyses cited in the previous section about the importance of the 
nativist literary movement and its influence on Taiwanese politics. Generational changes 
have also been noted as an important factor behind the identity shift and increasing 
support for independence. With the passing of the first generation of wàishěngrén and a 
new generation of Taiwanese youth taking its place, identity and political opinions 
naturally begin reflecting the Taiwanese perspective. (Liao et al. 2013; Huang 2016.) Liao 
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et al.’s (2013: 285–6) survey data analysis points to the importance of political events in 
identity change: periods of decline in Chinese identity have coincided with PRC actions 
that are viewed unfavourably in Taiwan, and such events have the strongest effect on 
younger and highly educated generations. Huang (2016) also notes the importance of 
education, as his results point to the influence of the new Taiwan-centric school 
curriculum implemented in 1999. 
 Despite the notable increase in Taiwanese identity, some recent studies still 
emphasise ambiguity. Yang (2016) suggests that Taiwanese attitudes toward cross-Strait 
relations are becoming “more and more ambivalent” because the rise in Taiwanese 
identity is counterbalanced by increasing economic and political integration. This results 
in a “tug of war” between identity and economic interest, where the latter keeps 
unification-oriented identities alive. Zhong’s (2016) survey analysis suggests that the 
dominant Taiwanese identity still contains a duality in which the Taiwanese have a 
separate state identity from the PRC but view themselves as part of the “Chinese nation” 
(中華民族, Zhōnghuá mínzú) due to common ”blood and culture” (ibid.: 341). Common 
to the above studies is the notion that the Chinese side of the identity issue is represented 
by the PRC and the mainland. Thus, as the ethnic Chinese focus on the wàishěngrén has 
faded domestically in Taiwan, the mainland itself has become the anchor of Chinese 
identity. To this effect, Zhong (ibid.) concludes that there is still no consensus on national 
identity in Taiwan since close to one third of Taiwanese do not object to being called 
“Chinese”.  
 The above notion of an overarching ethnic Chinese nation is similar to what Wei 
(1997) has suggested already two decades earlier. In this view, Taiwan and China should 
be viewed not as “divided states” but as a “multi-system nation”. Instead of a division 
into two political systems based on culture or ethnicity, they represent the coexistence of 
two political systems within a single nation: “one nation, two systems” (ibid.: 3). This 
conceptualisation bears obvious resemblance to China’s model of “One country, two 
systems” (一國兩制, Yīguó liǎngzhì) under which Hong Kong moved back to Chinese rule 
in 1997 and which China has offered to Taiwan as well. Indeed, the very discourse of 
“blood ties” uniting the Chinese and the Taiwanese is something the PRC has used as a 
basis for its demands for unification. In the 2015 meeting between the leaders of China 
and Taiwan, Chinese president Xi Jinping remarked that “no force can pull apart” the 
Chinese and the Taiwanese because “blood is thicker than water” (Connor 2015). In 
accordance with this view, Chinese official rhetoric frequently describes the Taiwanese 
as “compatriots” (同胞,tóngbāo). Link (2015) notes that the original Chinese term 
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actually comes closer to the meaning of “born of the same parents”. The PRC rhetoric 
thus puts significant emphasis on ethnicity as the basis of unification. 
 An important point regarding the studies of Zhong and Wei is that they employ 
the concept of “nation” in describing the link between China and Taiwan. Thus, the nation 
functions as an umbrella entity that can contain multiple states. This implies a hierarchy 
in which the Chinese nation is the topmost framework, and it is thus not surprising that 
such notions have been used to advocate for unification. However, as discussed, the 
concept of a nation is a modern Western import that only appeared in China at the dawn 
of the 20th century. Moreover, nations need not be based on ethnic communities; they can 
also be grounded in civic communities or form a combination of the two. The “Chinese 
nation” described by Zhong and Wei is thus a socially constructed community grounded 
in shared ethno-cultural heritage, but the connotation in the discourse seems to be that 
“ethnicity” and “nation” are synonymous. This is likely because the Chinese word for 
nation (mínzú) has also been used in the meaning of “ethnic group” or “ethnicity”. As 
Huang et al. (1994: 14–15) point out, one of the problems of discussing ethnicity in the 
Chinese context is that there is no direct equivalent for the term in Chinese, and the word 
mínzú has thus been used for this purpose. However, this blends the two concepts together 
and easily leads to a primordialist notion of an ethnic Chinese nation that serves as the 
basis of political claims. Rather than talk about a Chinese nation united by blood, it might 
thus be better to describe the Taiwanese simply as “ethnic Chinese”. 
 In addition to the ethnic/civic duality of national identity in contemporary Taiwan, 
recent research has also noted the curious parallel processes of increasing cross-Strait 
integration and strengthening Taiwanese identity (e.g. Lin 2007; Wu 2005; Chu 2004; 
Chu 1997). Deepening economic interdependence, as discussed in chapter 2, has occurred 
in tandem with the rejection of Chinese identity. This is significant because it goes against 
some of the earlier hypotheses of economic integration facilitating unification. For 
example, Wei (1997: 7) suggests that increasing trade and tourism form “linkage 
communities”: groups of people who have contacts with the other side and thus develop 
deeper mutual understanding. Consequently, as cross-Strait integration increases, such 
linkage communities would grow, “paving the way for a gradual and peaceful integration 
of the two Chinese societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait” (ibid.: 15). Chen (2014: 
543) gives a similar description of the situation in the 1990s, finding that economic 
integration “helped neutralise Taiwanese radical identity politics and encouraged the 
acceptance of a Chinese national identity”. However, this trend ended under DPP rule in 
the early 2000s, which Chen describes as “surprising”. Chen explains this with domestic 
68/117 
party politics, noting the DPP government’s emphasis on Taiwanese consciousness and 
Taiwan’s national status. (Ibid.) 
 The party politics explanation appears problematic in light of subsequent events. 
Following the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian as president in 2008, the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou 
initiated a surge in politico-economic rapprochement that created unprecedented trade 
and tourism opportunities while also bringing Taiwan closer to China politically. The 
logic employed by Wei and Chen would suggest that economic integration with a pro-
China KMT president would steer the Taiwanese toward a Chinese identity. This seems 
to have been president Ma’s intention as well, as he stated in the beginning of his term 
that he expected the rapprochement to foster cooperation across the Strait: 
 
When you have more trade, more investment, more contact – cultural, educational – 
particularly among the young people, when they make friends with their contemporaries 
on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, I’m sure friendship, you know, cooperation instead 
of hostility, will grow. I’m sure that the perception, you know, of the other side will 
change dramatically as a result. And this, exactly, is our purpose. (The New York Times 
2008.) 
 
Yet, in many ways, the opposite happened. As can be seen in the survey data presented 
earlier, the distinct Taiwanese identity started becoming dominant immediately after Ma 
Ying-jeou became president. By the end of Ma’s presidency in 2016, almost 60% of 
Taiwanese identified simply as “Taiwanese”, compared with 44% in the last year of Chen 
Shui-bian’s administration. Many factors are undoubtedly at play in this development, 
but it appears clear that deeper integration has failed to produce a more pro-China 
atmosphere. Instead, the dual processes of economic integration and rising Taiwanese 
identity collided to form a social movement that was squarely against Ma Ying-jeou, the 
KMT, and the notion of unification under a Chinese nation. It would go on to bring a 
transformation in the Taiwanese political landscape. 
 
4.1.3 The Sunflower Movement 
 
As noted earlier, the period of 2008–2016 was marked by Ma Ying-jeou’s administration 
seeking a significant increase in cross-Strait integration. Major steps were taken to this 
direction with the opening of the “three links” and the introduction of the ECFA and 
CSSTA trade agreements. Concerns over economic dependency jeopardising Taiwan’s 
sovereignty were voiced by the DPP and activists already in early 2010 when the ECFA 
was being drafted. The DPP called for a referendum on the trade agreement and accused 
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Ma’s administration of ignoring public opinion by proceeding without one (Mo & Chao 
2010). The ECFA was signed in June 2010 with Taiwanese NGOs criticising the lack of 
transparency in the government’s negotiations with China (Chao 2010). One of the first 
protests to directly target increasing economic integration with China was the 2012 Anti-
Media Monopoly Movement (反媒體壟斷運動 , Fǎn méitǐ lǒngduàn yùndòng) that 
protested against increasing Chinese control over Taiwan’s media businesses. According 
to Kaeding (2015: 211), it was a direct continuation of the 2008 Wild Strawberries 
Movement (野草莓運動, Yě cǎoméi yùndòng) that arose from protests during the first visit 
of a Chinese envoy to Taiwan after Ma Ying-jeou’s rapprochement policies began. The 
timing of these two movements suggests that concern over China’s economic leverage 
over Taiwan began mounting almost as soon as Ma Ying-jeou took office. It could thus 
be said that three parallel and interconnected processes began in 2008: politico-economic 
rapprochement in cross-Strait relations, public concern over increasing Chinese influence, 
and a notable surge in a distinct Taiwanese identity. 
 Further resistance rose on a larger scale with the signing of the CSSTA in July 
2013. Civic organisations once again staged protests over the lack of transparency and 
the perceived disadvantage to Taiwanese industries and national security (Chang 2013). 
A group of influential labour, gender, environmental, welfare, and human rights NGOs 
formed a coalition called the Democratic Front Against Cross-Strait Trade in Services 
Agreement (反黑箱服貿民主陣線, Fǎn hēixiāng fúmào mínzhǔ zhènxiàn) in July 2013. The 
group raised public awareness of the lack of transparency in the drafting of the CSSTA, 
calling the process a “black box” (黑箱, hēixiāng).22 Joining the resistance in September, 
a group of student activists established the Black Island Nation Youth Front (黑色島國青
年陣線, Hēisè dǎoguó qīngnián zhènxiàn). The movement was able to build upon the 
surge of student activism in Taiwan that had been initiated by the Wild Strawberries 
Movement (Ho 2015: 78.) According to Kaeding (2015: 211), the most important legacy 
of the Wild Strawberries Movement had been that it reintroduced questions of democracy 
and civil liberties in public debate and created a network of young activists that formed 
the basis for subsequent protest movements. 
 The Democratic Front and the Black Island Nation Youth Front put pressure on 
the government, and there were 20 public hearings on the CSSTA between July 2013 and 
March 2014. After that, the KMT resorted to questionable tactics by cutting corners in 
                                               
22  The “black box” concept is often used in Taiwan to describe opaque legislative procedures. Such 
activities were widely criticised in the SDP’s 2016 election platform: “Under the rule of the two big parties, 
Taiwanese politics is full of black box activities.” (SDP 2016.) 
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the review of the agreement and hastily declaring the CSSTA finished in the so-called 
“30-second incident” on 17 March 2014 (Ho 2015: 79). Surveys at the time showed 
widespread scepticism and anxiety about the impact of closer economic integration 
among the general public, and Ho (ibid.: 80) suggests that in addition to galvanising the 
DPP’s anti-CSSTA stance, the 30-second incident provided a singular event that drew 
public support for anti-CSSTA protests. 
 The activists were taken by surprise by the turn of events with the 30-second 
incident and quickly organised what Ho (ibid.: 81) calls a “guerrilla-style protest” that 
involved storming the Legislative Yuan in the evening of 18 March. Protesters climbed 
over the wall of the legislature compound and broke into the plenary chamber, mounting 
barricades and establishing a leadership structure for the group. A supporting crowd 
gathered outside, and the police were unable to remove the activists from the building. 
As the next day dawned, Taiwan’s legislature had been occupied by the protesters. (Ibid.: 
82.) Outside, the activist-led protests were now expanding into a wider social movement 
that would later get its name from the sunflowers used by the protesters as a symbol of 
hope. 
 The activists occupied the legislative chamber for 24 days between 18 March and 
10 April. Their specific goal was to pressure the KMT government to scrap the CSSTA 
altogether and enact a bill on the supervision of cross-Strait trade agreements. The 
occupation resulted in a stalemate that quickly began wearing out the activists and 
presenting logistical challenges. Ultimately, the occupation ended with muddled results 
when the activists agreed to leave the chamber after KMT’s Legislative Speaker Wang 
Jin-pyng promised that supervision laws for trade agreements would be passed before the 
CSSTA. (Ibid.: 89–92.) This created a rift within the KMT, as Wang had ostensibly acted 
without approval from party leadership. Thus, the most tangible successes of the 
movement were perhaps elsewhere than in direct political achievements. Kaeding (2015: 
211–2) suggests that the key to the success of the Sunflower Movement was that it learned 
from the experiences of the previous movements and thus managed to express the 
protesters’ concerns convincingly, gaining widespread public support. Ho (2015: 92) 
points out the movement’s more concrete achievements: despite indecisive results, it 
pushed the DPP from ambiguity to a clear anti-CSSTA stance and generated a split within 
the KMT. Ma Ying-jeou’s popularity plummeted during the remainder of his term, laying 
the ground for the eventual DPP landslide two years after the Sunflower Movement. 
However, perhaps the most notable success of the movement, and one that has thus far 
received comparatively little academic attention, was its evolution into a political force 
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that culminated in the emergence of new political parties challenging the KMT/DPP 
duality.  
 
4.1.4 From activism to politics: The Third Force 
 
The end of the Sunflower Movement was not the end of the wider activist movement. The 
succession of social movements had produced a group of experienced activist leaders who 
now began to look for new means of driving their agenda forward. One of the most 
significant outcomes of this was the establishment of the Taiwan Citizen Union (TCU; 公
民組合, Gōngmín zǔhé) in 2014 “to create a better and fairer society through political 
participation and reform”. Former DPP chairman Lin I-hsiung was a driving force behind 
the organisation but did not participate in its operations. The group also included 
prominent activists such as legal scholar Huang Kuo-chang and NTU associate professor 
Fan Yun. (Loa 2014; Lee & Hsu 2014.) 
 Although the former DPP chairman had a role in the founding of the TCU, the 
group would later make a point of distancing itself from the DPP. In August 2014, 
representatives of the group went to the US on a two-week trip to raise awareness and 
secure support for the movement. During the trip, they stressed that they were not 
affiliated with or backed by the DPP. The new group was thus positioned not only against 
the KMT, but also as an alternative to the DPP. Lin Fei-fan, a student activist and member 
of the TCU, said that the Sunflower Movement had grown out of disappointment with 
both large parties. The new group thus sought to break the entrenched KMT/DPP duality 
of Taiwanese politics. This was echoed by Huang Kuo-chang, who stated that “a third 
political force was emerging” in Taiwan. According to another student activist, Chen 
Wei-ting, this “third force” was needed because the DPP, as the traditional force of 
opposition, was losing ground and becoming too elitist. (Lowther 2014.) 
 The TCU’s original intention, stated in the summer of 2014, was to register as a 
political party to compete in the 2016 legislative election. Fan Yun noted that both the 
KMT and the DPP were incapable of internal reform, stating that “the only way to move 
Taiwan forward is to replace parties that are incapable of reforms”. (Lee & Hsu 2014.) 
Thus, while the TCU was obviously politically closer to the DPP than to the KMT, it 
nevertheless wanted to form a clearly separate political party that was not aligned with 
the traditional dichotomy. However, as often happens with emerging opposition forces, 
the TCU splintered due to political differences in early 2015. Rather than major 
differences in policies or ideology, the split was reportedly due to “irreconcilable 
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differences about inviting public participation” (Wen 2015c) and “differences over 
legislative nomination mechanisms” (Wen 2015b). This suggests that ideologically, and 
in terms of political goals, the two parties remained relatively similar. 
 The result of the TCU’s split was the formation of two new pro-independence 
parties: the New Power Party in January 2015 and the Social Democratic Party shortly 
after in February 2015. The NPP was founded by popular heavy metal musician and 
activist Freddy Lim and lawyer Lin Feng-jeng, while the SDP’s founding was led by Fan 
Yun. Huang Kuo-chang would later become the chairman of the NPP. Echoing the TCU’s 
notion of a “third force”, both parties presented themselves as an alternative to the two 
major political camps built around the KMT and the DPP. The NPP’s main goals included 
the normalisation of Taiwan’s status as a country, constitutional reform, improvement of 
civic and minority rights and equality, tax and pension reform, and environmental 
protection (Thinking Taiwan 2015). The SDP’s focus was on labour and employment 
issues and social equality, equality and minority rights, while also emphasising 
constitutional reform to better reflect Taiwan’s sovereign status (SDP 2016). SDP 
member Urda Yen noted that the two parties had “similar ideals” and thus welcomed the 
emergence of such parties in general. (Wen 2015a.) 
 By the spring and summer of 2015, both domestic and international media were 
referring to the “third force” that was emerging with the establishment of the NPP, the 
SDP, and other smaller new parties (e.g. The Economist 2015; Low 2015). The NPP and 
SDP began emerging as the two most prominent alternative parties. Nevertheless, there 
were doubts about the electoral fortunes of the new parties, and the possibility was raised 
that they would merge with the DPP. Notably, this type of merger was presented as a 
potential way for the DPP to broaden its appeal beyond the traditional ethnic běnshěngrén 
emphasis upon which the party was founded. (The Economist 2015.) This is one 
indication that the new parties represent a shift in national identity: one of the reasons for 
their rejection of the KMT/DPP dichotomy could be a declining support for the 
corresponding duality in national identity. Thus, if the Third Force positions itself as a 
critique of both old parties, one could logically assume that this alternative is also based 
on a new “third version” of national identity. 
 The establishment of the Third Force parties represented a notable shift in 
Taiwanese politics, because it was the first time that major electoral campaigns were 
initiated by alternative parties that were not splinters from the KMT or the DPP. 
According to Fell (2016: 43), previous alternative parties had relied on defectors from the 
two major parties and shared their main ideological stances. This means that they fell 
73/117 
within the Pan-Green/Pan-Blue dichotomy. Another difference in the leadup to the 2016 
election was that Third Force parties campaigned also in single member districts, whereas 
previously alternative parties had concentrated on the party list votes (ibid.: 42).23 This 
became a problem as the NPP’s Freddy Lim and the SDP’s Fan Yun initially ended up 
running in the same district in Taipei. In March 2015, almost immediately after Fan Yun 
had announced her campaign, Lim withdrew from the district and announced he would 
be running in another district instead. According to Lim, he wanted to avoid the 
possibility of other political forces benefitting from the disunity among the new parties 
arising from the lead figures of the NPP and the SDP going against each other in the same 
district. (Wen 2015b.) This points to a degree of political and strategic unity among the 
two parties despite their earlier split. 
 The election was held in January 2016, and the NPP gained 2.89% of the district 
votes and 6.11% of the party list votes, amounting to five legislative seats and making it 
the third largest party in the legislature. For the election, the SDP formed an alliance with 
Green Party Taiwan (GPT; 台灣綠黨, Táiwān lǜ dǎng)24, and their share was 1.7% of the 
district votes and 2.53% of the party list votes, which was not enough for any legislative 
seats (for a breakdown of the election results for the NPP and the GPT-SDP Alliance, see 
table 7 on page 76). The election results thus solidified the NPP’s position as the most 
visible torchbearer of the Third Force. While the impact of the Sunflower Movement had 
been noted before, the election result prompted more international post-election analyses 
about the significance of the Third Force and the youth vote in Taiwan (e.g. Hsu 2016; 
Keim 2016a). The NPP’s visibility grew both domestically and internationally after the 
election, and in a December 2016 poll by Taiwan Think Tank, it had become the most 
popular party among young and highly educated Taiwanese (Yeh & Hou 2016, the results 
of this poll are discussed more in chapter 5).  
 With its background in student activism and its support base firmly grounded in 
the young generation, the Third Force has thus become a torchbearer of the youth. This 
is significant, because Taiwanese youth have previously been characterised as politically 
apathetic. Rigger (2011: 117) cites several studies from the mid-2000s showing that the 
                                               
23 Taiwan has a hybrid electoral system. Out of a total 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan, 73 represent 
geographical single-member districts and 34 are filled through proportional representation. This means that 
voters cast two ballots: one for a single legislator in their own district and one national vote for the party of 
their choosing. The proportional seats are filled from a nationwide list of candidates based on the party 
vote. Additionally, 6 seats are reserved for indigenous candidates and filled separately. 
24 Taiwan’s Green Party was established already in 1996, but it is also considered a Third Force party in 
the sense that it’s separate from the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green coalitions, and its agenda is more aligned with 
the global green movement. The party has never won legislative seats. 
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majority of Taiwanese youth felt powerless to influence the state of Taiwan’s politics and 
saw politics as one of the issues that least concerned them. Further, in 2005, the 
Taiwanese in their twenties were more likely to reject all political parties than to support 
any of them (ibid.). This disengaged young generation has been colloquially referred to 
as the “Strawberry Tribe” as a sort of insult by older generations: a strawberry is beautiful 
to look at, but easily damaged and quick to rot (ibid.: 120). Rigger’s own research 
suggests that this disengagement is not due to the youth being “weak” or “rotten”, but 
because they are extremely frustrated with Taiwan’s dichotomous political landscape in 
which everything revolves around cross-Strait relations. The politicisation of the 
China/Taiwan struggle permeates the entire society so that other, more relevant issues are 
side-lined in politics. As a result, the youth had become “stunningly cynical” about the 
state of Taiwan’s politics in the 2000s and had no confidence in Taiwan’s political leaders. 
(Rigger 2011: 125–133.) With the above in mind, the Sunflower Movement and the Third 
Force appear to have been exactly what the youth were calling for: a new political force 




The preceding sections have presented historical and socio-political frameworks upon 
which the following primary research builds. Certain recurring themes run through these 
sections. Firstly, nationalism appears as an interplay of official and popular forces, both 
in Europe and in Asia. Imperialism and colonialism bring another element to this contest 
by pitting the domestic against the foreign. The Japanese colonial period and the ROC 
martial law period lodged Taiwan in the middle of this struggle, and it was from the 
complexities of this process that Taiwanese national identity emerged. The key objective 
driving the formation of this identity was self-determination, and the persistent denial of 
this goal exacerbated the ensuing tensions between the ruling regime and the populace.  
The result was a society characterised by an ethno-political dichotomy of the 
official/foreign wàishěngrén/KMT and the popular/domestic běnshěngrén/DPP. The 
subsequent decades of bipolar antagonism alienated the new generation from politics, 
sparking a demand for a third political force that operates outside this dichotomy. The 
following chapter presents the results of the primary research of this study, aiming to 
illuminate the characteristics of national identity amidst this new political phenomenon.
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5 Results and analysis 
 
This chapter presents the results of the primary research in two sections, each of which 
has two subsections. This structure reflects the levels of the coding frame (see appendix 
3) so that sections 5.1 and 5.2 correspond to level 1 and their respective subsections 
correspond to level 2. The relevant topics included in levels 3 and 4 of the coding frame 
are then discussed in these sections. Thus, in the coding frame, levels 0 and 1 present the 
“empty label” of Taiwanese identity, and levels 2 to 4 are thus the “content” of that label 
as indicated by the interview results. Based on the combined results presented in this 
chapter, a basic model of national identity among Third Force supporters is presented in 
the concluding chapter 6. 
 Details of the interviewees and interview data are presented in appendix 2. Before 
going into the thematic categories of identity formation, a few general remarks on the 
data are in order. Most of the interviewees lived in Taipei at the time of interviewing, 
which means there is very little geographic variation. By looking at the hometowns of the 
interviewees, the sample becomes more geographically diverse: interviewees come from 
Taipei, New Taipei City, Taoyuan, Taichung, and Tainan. Most had moved to Taipei for 
work or higher education. No major conclusions can be drawn from this geographical 
distribution, but it should be noted that all interviewees come from big cities or urban 
centres in Taiwan’s western coast. In 2016, these regions generally voted for the DPP 
candidate Tsai Ing-wen in the presidential election and for Pan-Green or Third Force 
parties in the legislative election. In general, the urban western parts of Taiwan lean 
towards liberal and Pan-Green politics, whereas the less urban eastern parts lean towards 
conservative and Pan-Blue politics. The interviewees could thus be described as more or 
less typical educated young urban liberals from western Taiwan. Furthermore, when 
comparing the interviewees’ hometowns to the regional distribution of votes for the NPP 
and the DPT-SDP Alliance (table 7, next page), it appears the interviewees come from 
regions where support for Third Force parties was strongest. For example, almost all the 
parties’ regional candidates competed in the big western cities, and these regions were 
also generally near the top in the proportional party list votes.25  
 Another noteworthy point is the age of the interviewees. Everyone was under 40 
years old, and all except two were in the 20–29 age bracket. This point was brought up  
                                               
25 The one planned interview that had to be cancelled would have been with an interviewee living in 
Hsinchu. Table 7 (next page) shows that relative support for the NPP and the GPT-SDP Alliance was also 
high in Hsinchu City. 
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Table 7: Votes for the NPP and the GPT-SDP Alliance in the 2016 legislative election by region. 
Region NPP votes GPT-SDP Alliance votes 
 
Regional % Party list % Regional % Party list % 
Total 351,244 2.94 744,315 6.11 203,658 1.7 308,106 2.53 
Taipei City 94,896 6.59 89,291 6.12 129,581 9.01 48,852 3.35 
New Taipei City 85,638 4.13 131,052 6.18 31,096 1.49 52,957 2.49 
Taoyuan City 8,062 0.78 58,369 5.47 23,176 2.23 34,639 3.25 
Taichung City 93,451 6.58 104,865 7.32 N/A N/A 33,466 2.33 
Tainan City 6,754 0.69 63,172 6.39 9,075 0.93 24,709 0.25 
Kaohsiung City 15,664 1.06 92,323 6.15 N/A N/A 37,604 0.25 
Hsinchu County N/A N/A 15,547 5.87 N/A N/A 6,796 2.56 
Miaoli County N/A N/A 14,653 5.18 N/A N/A 5,253 1.85 
Changhua County 3,229 0.49 41,762 6.33 N/A N/A 13,034 1.97 
Nantou County N/A N/A 13,759 5.39 N/A N/A 5,237 2.05 
Yunlin County 7,241 2.13 18,132 5.33 N/A N/A 5,279 1.55 
Chiayi County N/A N/A 14,212 5.17 N/A N/A 4,206 1.53 
Pingtung County N/A N/A 20,635 4.65 N/A N/A 8,404 1.89 
Yilan County N/A N/A 13,960 6.05 10,730 4.78 6,002 0.26 
Hualien County N/A N/A 6,277 4.12 N/A N/A 3,338 2.19 
Taitung County N/A N/A 3,518 3.69 N/A N/A 1,956 2.05 
Penghu County N/A N/A 1,361 3.24 N/A N/A 614 1.46 
Keelung City N/A N/A 11,652 6.05 N/A N/A 4,454 2.31 
Hsinchu City 36,309 16.56 19,170 8.69 N/A N/A 6,574 2.98 
Chiayi City N/A N/A 9,484 6.86 N/A N/A 3,459 0.25 
Kinmen County N/A N/A 1,008 2.78 N/A N/A 1,142 3.15 
Lienchiang County N/A N/A 113 2.55 N/A N/A 131 2.95 
 Source: Central Election Commission, Taiwan. 
 
by one interviewee who asked about the age distribution and expressed concern that the 
sample was not representative since everyone was young. However, since the sample is 
not meant to reflect the general population, this is not an issue; more relevant is how it 
compares to the general profile of Third Force supporters. These parties are generally 
most popular among young people, and according to a poll by Taiwan Think Tank 
conducted in December 2016, the NPP had become the most popular party among the 
20–29 age group (Yeh & Hou 2016). This suggests that the interviewees’ age reflects a 
general trend among Third Force supporters. 
As a final general note on the profile of the interviewees, the sample seems to 
reflect a typical Third Force supporter also in terms of educational background. 
According to the Taiwan Think Tank poll, the NPP was the most popular party among 
people with a bachelor’s degree or higher (ibid.). Seven out of eleven interviewees fall 
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into this category, and among the remaining four, all but one were currently studying for 
a bachelor’s degree in university. Based on this and the other general observations above, 
the batch of interviewees appears to be a fairly accurate representation of typical Third 
Force voters: young, urban, and highly educated. Thus, while this study is qualitative by 
design, the conclusions can be taken as indicative of typical characteristics of identity 
construction among Third Force voters. 
 It should be stressed that the categorisation in the coding frame and in the 
following sections is not exclusive; a different focus would likely highlight different 
aspects. Similarly, the resulting model of national identity in the concluding chapter is 
not exhaustive, and does not attempt to describe the totality of national identity formation 
among Third Force supporters. What it aims to highlight are the broad commonalities 
that, based on the analysis in the sections below, serve as major building blocks for this 
identity. 
 
5.1 Reflections on Taiwanese identity in personal life 
 
The following two sections present the results of the interview data regarding national 
identity in the interviewees’ personal life. Section 5.1.1 focuses on the interviewees’ 
notions of their own background and the elements that influence the construction of their 
personal identity. A key focus is on the interplay of ethnic and civic dimensions, as these 
were earlier identified as the two main frameworks upon which national identities are 
constructed. Section 5.1.2 then builds upon the notion of identity as a dynamic experience 
by looking at how the interviewees’ Taiwanese identity has changed and evolved over 
time and what factors are behind this change. 
 
5.1.1 Unambiguously diverse: Identity and ethnic background 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, ethnicity has traditionally been one of the most 
prominent aspects informing national identity construction in Taiwan. The identity 
struggle has been characterised by the diametrically opposed groups of wàishěngrén and 
běnshěngrén, and a similar duality of civic/political identity versus ethnic/cultural 
identity. In this regard, the foremost finding of the interview analysis was that such a 
struggle does not seem to exist among Third Force supporters. The very first indication 
of this is that when asked if they identified as Taiwanese, Chinese or both, all interviewees 
answered “Taiwanese” without any hesitation. Certain studies cited in chapter 4 
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suggested that there is still notable ambiguity in how Taiwanese people identify, but 
among these Third Force supporters, there is no sign of such ambiguity. This was also the 
case with NPP legislator Freddy Lim, who stated: “Of course, I see myself as Taiwanese 
and not Chinese.” All three pilot study interviewees had also affirmed their Taiwanese 
identity in a similarly unambiguous manner despite not being Third Force supporters.  
 The reason for the interviewees’ unambiguous affirmation of Taiwanese identity 
relates to the way they understand national identity in general. In terms of what makes 
Taiwan different from China, all interviewees clearly emphasised civic and political 
values: Taiwan’s democratic institutions, personal and political freedoms, and human 
rights emerged as the main elements setting Taiwan apart from China. Conversely, 
China’s lack of these features meant that the interviewees were reluctant to be associated 
with it. This reflects the importance of the notion of otherness in identity construction, as 
it is the negation of the other that fortifies the identity built on sameness. However, this 
civic emphasis does not lead to a rejection of common ethno-cultural heritage. When 
asked about similarities between Taiwan and China, the interviewees mentioned almost 
exclusively aspects related to ethnic or cultural background: same language, same 
religions, same Confucian cultural values. Thus, despite their assertive Taiwanese 
identity, the interviewees fully acknowledged their Chinese heritage. This notably 
resembles the views of Taiwanese intellectuals during the Japanese colonial period 
discussed earlier: while they did not reject their Chinese culture and ethnicity, these were 
not the features upon which they built their sense of national identity. Hence, while the 
Third Force supporters noted their ethno-cultural Chinese roots, they usually had much 
more to say about differences than similarities, and the shared ethno-cultural heritage was 
not seen as a justification for a unified national unit: 
 
Author: What sort of things make Taiwanese people different from Chinese people? In 
any terms? 
Interviewee #9: Your thoughts towards your rights and your freedom. Like, I remember 
at the time of the Sunflower Movement, some of my Chinese classmates, they might say 
things that I thought were totally nonsense. They might say like ‘you Taiwanese just want 
to fight for your own rights every day, but you just give up your country’s economy’. 
Like, they are always fighting for money [laughs] and following success, but we always 
fight for something really abstract like rights and freedoms. But they don’t see that as 
really valuable. They just think it’s useless, you don’t have to be free, you don’t have to 
have so many rights, you just have to be rich, then you are successful. 
[…] 
Author: What about similarities, do you think that there are some parts where Taiwan 
and China are similar? 
Interviewee #9: I think our attitude towards family, I think it’s pretty much the same, we 
79/117 
all think that family is important. We have to take good care of our parents. Something 
like that, it’s like a very old Mandarin culture. I think it’s not only in China and Taiwan, 
many Asian countries have the same, like Singapore, Hong Kong. 
 
 This group of people thus appears to have moved away from a sense of identity 
where ethnicity plays an important part. Instead, they understand national identity first 
and foremost through shared civic values. The fact that China does not share Taiwan’s 
civic values therefore results in a clear distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese 
identities and a reluctance to associate with the latter. This notion is supported by the way 
some interviewees pointed out Taiwan’s multi-ethnic character. In this view, the 
Taiwanese community does not only consist of the wàishěngrén/běnshěngrén dichotomy, 
but also includes indigenous and immigrant ethnicities as equal parts of the community. 
This point was also made by Freddy Lim when he described the meaning of being 
Taiwanese:  
 
Lim: The significance of identifying as Taiwanese, I think this is quite a simple identity. 
Taiwan has a population of 23 million, so it is the identity of this community. It's the 
feeling of identifying with this community of 23 million people. […] Of course, among 
these 23 million, there are many different kinds of people: some identify as Chinese, some 
are from Vietnam, some are from Thailand, or from all around the world. So, while they 
are Taiwanese, at the same time they also feel they are Vietnamese or Chinese or from 
some other place. I think this is normal. The main point is that they are all part of this 
community of 23 million people. 
 
The Taiwanese identity of this group can thus be understood as a type of overarching 
civic identity grounded in the characteristics of the community that has formed in Taiwan. 
It is therefore important to differentiate this Taiwanese civic identity from an ethnic 
běnshěngrén identity. Ethno-cultural identity is best understood as a sub-feature inside 
this Taiwanese umbrella identity, and it can comprise an unlimited plurality of ethnicities 
and cultures so long as they fall under the main civic identity that is Taiwanese. This is 
also perhaps one way in which this sense of identity distinguishes the Third Force from 
the DPP, since the latter has traditionally advocated běnshěngrén interests and served as 
one of two sides in the dichotomous ethnic identity struggle. 
 Ethnic diversity is also evident in some of the interviewees’ backgrounds: while 
most are běnshěngrén, Interviewee #10 is a third generation wàishěngrén whose 
grandparents emigrated from mainland China with the KMT in the 1940s. The maternal 
grandmother of Interviewee #3 is also wàishěngrén. Interviewee #6, on the other hand, 
has a boyfriend who is indigenous, and this has influenced her notions of identity and her 
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voting behaviour. She gave her party vote to the NPP despite being politically more 
inclined towards the GPT, because her favourite candidate Kawlo Iyun Pacidal, who is a 
member of the indigenous Amis group, was on the NPP party list. Interviewee #11 has a 
mixed background: his family from the father’s side is běnshěngrén, while his maternal 
grandfather is a wàishěngrén from Beijing and his maternal grandmother is a member of 
the indigenous Kavalan group. These examples illustrate how the Taiwanese identity of 
Third Force supporters allows for ethno-cultural heterogeneity, and insofar as this 
national identity is understood as a form of modern Taiwanese nationalism, it is not the 
type of antagonistic ethno-nationalism that has traditionally characterised the conflict 
between wàishěngrén and běnshěngrén. A similar heterogeneity in ethnic background 
characterised the pilot study interviewees who also all identified as Taiwanese: out of 
three interviewees, one was běnshěngrén, one was wàishěngrén, and one was half-
indigenous (Atayal). In many ways, this is entirely natural: a long history of coexistence 
and intermarriage has blurred the lines of ethnic identities, making them less significant 
to the current generation. People with different ethno-cultural backgrounds are thus united 
by their shared civic experience in the Taiwanese community. 
 In relation to the above observations, the civic character of this Taiwanese identity 
is also apparent in the way it relates to the notion of Chinese identity. For previous 
generations in Taiwan, Chinese identity has traditionally been associated with the 
wàishěngrén that came from the mainland with the KMT. This connection enabled the 
ethnic conflict that arose after the February 28 Incident, but it also enabled the 
perpetuation of a Chinese identity in Taiwan, since this Chineseness was grounded in the 
pre-1949 reality of the mainland instead of the new Chinese reality of the PRC. As noted 
earlier in this study, the hegemonic Chinese political identity in Taiwan began to fall apart 
with the ROC’s loss of legitimacy from the 1970s onwards, as the surrounding world 
accepted that the PRC, not the ROC, was the new China. Hence, for the current generation 
in Taiwan, the pre-1949 Chinese reality holds virtually no significance. The China they 
observe across the Taiwan Strait is not the China that the wàishěngrén left behind. 
Significantly, the PRC is not only different in name from the old China and the ROC; it 
has developed upon a fundamentally different civic and political framework. Thus, for 
these Third Force supporters, China equals the PRC, and from this perspective, it is easy 
for them to identify unambiguously as Taiwanese. This is evident in the way Freddy Lim 
explains his Taiwanese identity: “The reason is very simple: I am not a citizen of the 
People's Republic of China, therefore I am not Chinese.” 
 In summary, the foundation of the national identity of these Third Force 
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supporters is best described as a Taiwanese civic identity that can contain a variety of 
ethno-cultural sub-identities. For these people, civic and political values are more 
important than ethno-cultural elements as a basis of national identity construction. This 
identity bears resemblance to that of the colonial era intellectuals. As noted earlier, their 
nationalism seemed to have a civic character in that it was grounded in the modern liberal 
theories of democratic self-determination rather than Chinese ethnicity and culture. 
Looking at these parallels, the bipolar struggle of the wàishěngrén and běnshěngrén 
seems little more than a detour into ethnic tribalism in the overall pursuit of civic 
nationalism. In this civic focus, the PRC now functions as the primary contrast to Taiwan: 
it is the significant other against which Taiwaneseness is measured. The following section 
deals with the notions of this otherness and the dynamic nature of identity formation. 
 
5.1.2 Becoming Taiwanese: Dynamic identity construction 
 
The constructivist premise of this study is that national identities are dynamic, and 
therefore subject to continuous renegotiation and recalibration. In Taiwan’s case, much 
of this dynamism is rooted in how China and the Chinese are perceived. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, the social construction of identities can happen through top-down or 
bottom-up processes, and the resulting identity is often a combination of these. This is 
also the case with the national identity of Third Force supporters: the interviewees are 
millennials who grew up with vague notions about Taiwan and China based more on 
textbooks and official dogma than experienced reality. However, globalisation and cross-
Strait integration through the emergence of interdependence have enabled the 
juxtaposition of this earlier official version with bottom-up personal experience. 
 The interviewees were asked whether their sense of identity discussed in the 
previous section has changed over time. They were also asked about their perceptions of 
China and the Chinese, and whether these had changed over time. Regarding identity 
change, all interviewees have always had at least some sense of being Taiwanese, but 
their descriptions of their earlier notions of identity reveal a sense of ambiguous hybridity: 
a Chinese ethno-cultural heritage mixed with the practical experience of a Taiwanese 
community within the political framework of the ROC: 
 
Author: Has [your Taiwanese identity] always been like this or has it changed over time? 
Interviewee #5: I feel like it has changed, because before I didn’t really understand what 
the word Chinese means in Taiwan. When I was little, I felt like maybe we are culturally 
Chinese, but then after learning about the history, about ROC and PRC and Taiwan, that’s 
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when I started to feel like maybe we are ethnically Chinese or culturally related, but then 
it’s still different. So, that’s when I started to feel like ‘no, I’m only Taiwanese’. 
 
These descriptions of earlier notions closely resemble the “both Taiwanese and Chinese” 
version of national identity: a competing mixture of ethno-cultural Chineseness and 
Taiwanese civic identity. This contributed to a sense of confusion that made national 
identity hard to define unambiguously. In addition to the Chinese heritage, confusion was 
created by the complicated political entity of the exiled ROC upholding the notion that 
the people were actually living in China. A key contributing factor in this, as mentioned 
by several interviewees, was education. The Chinese background and the ROC were 
elements that their early education emphasised: 
 
Interviewee #2: Of course, in the past, the textbooks talked about the history of the 
Republic of China and so on, so I identified as a citizen of the ROC. But afterwards, when 
I read more about the history, I realised the citizens of the ROC were actually the people 
who had come from the mainland. The Taiwanese people were brainwashed by the ROC, 
and there was the White Terror. We had to resist the communist mainland, so we had to 
be ROC citizens. But actually, before the Mainlanders came, there were a lot of people 
that had come to Taiwan earlier, during the Qing and Ming dynasties. 
 
 
 This notion of brainwash echoes the idea of an artificially constructed “imaginary 
homeland” discussed earlier. As one would expect, the ROC perspective and the sense of 
being Chinese had been even stronger for Interviewee #10 due to her wàishěngrén 
background. She describes clearly how her self-identification has changed from 
predominantly Chinese to Taiwanese: 
 
Interviewee #10: It’s been shifting. Because we are educated like we are all Chinese, like 
華人 (huárén). So, based on our background and education, we are considered part of 
China, because of everything we study – we study like ancient poems and stuff like that. 
And especially since my parents are both from China, I actually have some kind of grave 
that I can go to [in China]. And the professors are from China. So, I’m educated like I’m 
proud of being Chinese. But I would say it’s for political reasons, because Taiwan is 
called the Republic of China, so it’s like we are the puppets of China, like they forced the 
whole world to choose between ROC and China, the legal China. So, this kind of identity 
makes people confused whether you are Chinese or Taiwanese. 
 
 
As noted earlier, the percentage of people identifying as Chinese began falling with 
democratisation and the policy of Taiwanisation in the 1990s. However, in the decade 
after Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election in 1996, Chinese identity continued 
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to manifest strongly in the form of dual Chinese/Taiwanese self-identification. Based on 
the interviewees’ reflections, it would seem that education was a key factor in this: the 
notion of Chineseness lingered due in part to earlier education emphasis. This notion is 
indirectly supported by findings about the role of education in the evolution of support 
for Taiwan’s independence: according to Huang (2016), the new Taiwan-centric high-
school curriculum adopted in 1999 has played a part in the rising support for 
independence. This suggests that it has also contributed to the strengthening Taiwanese 
identity. All of this suggests that education is one of the fundamental tools for the 
construction and maintenance of official nationalism. 
  Another factor influencing the interviewees’ evolving identity construction is the 
experience of Chinese otherness. In the previous section, it was noted that the 
interviewees clearly observed the difference between China and Taiwan in civic and 
political aspects. Some of this perception of otherness comes from actual encounters with 
Chinese people. This was apparent in the comments of Interviewee #9 in the previous 
section: for her, conversations with Chinese classmates demonstrated the differences in 
values. The Chinese seemed to only care about money while the Taiwanese care about 
rights and freedoms. Since democratisation, the Taiwanese have had increasing 
opportunities for such encounters, particularly after the expansion of cross-Strait 
exchanges during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency. This puts the textbook version of 
Chineseness to the test: if the Taiwanese do not identify with the Chinese people they 
encounter, they are likely to reject the notion of themselves as Chinese. Yet, for Ma Ying-
jeou, the reasoning behind cross-Strait integration seems to have been that it would bring 
the two sides closer and, in a way, heal a divide. As noted earlier, Ma was expecting the 
perception of the other side to change dramatically with deeper integration: it seems he 
was hoping for a sense of unity. However, in many ways, the opposite has happened: the 
singular Taiwanese identity and support for independence have grown since 2008, and 
disappointment with Ma’s tenure led to the Sunflower Movement, the emergence of the 
Third Force, and the landslide victory of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP. Reflecting this, some 
of the interviewees’ comments stand in stark contrast with what Ma was trying to achieve. 
Interviewee #2 took a long pause when asked to describe his overall perception of Chinese 
people: 
 
Interviewee #2: Hmm… [long pause] 
Author: You can say whatever. 
Interviewee #2: Can I say bad things? 
Author: Yes, if that’s what comes to your mind. 
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Interviewee #2: I feel 厭惡的 (yànwùde). 
Author: 厭惡的 means? 
Interviewee #2: Disgusted [laughs]. Because when they come to Taiwan, they are so 
noisy and messy. They have no standards. It makes me feel bad. 
 
Such comments bring echoes of the past. As discussed earlier in chapter 4, after the 
Japanese colonial period, the Taiwanese noted the “backwardness” of the wàishěngrén 
compared to the society and customs that had developed in Taiwan. The differences in 
manners, customs and behaviour contributed to the subsequent conflict between the 
běnshěngrén and wàishěngrén. For today’s generation, this conflict has faded as the 
wàishěngrén have integrated into Taiwanese society. However, the sense of otherness 
was recalibrated and replicated in the 1980s when Taiwanese were again allowed to travel 
to the mainland and see its reality first-hand. The Chinese people of the PRC thus 
occupied the position held earlier by the wàishěngrén: the significant other. Now, just as 
in the 1980s, the further relaxation of travel restrictions contributes to the sense of 
otherness between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. The opening of the “three links” in 
2008 has brought a notable surge in Chinese tourists to Taiwan, making it ever easier for 
the Taiwanese to come into contact with the otherness of the Chinese. 
 Despite the above observation, it is important to point out that in general, the 
interviewees were not hostile towards the Chinese as a group of people. Many stressed 
that the PRC and the Chinese government are not the same as the Chinese people, and 
negative feelings towards the state do not equal hatred for its people. Indeed, many 
interviewees have Chinese friends. There is no reason why friendship and cooperation 
cannot exist between people with different world views from different sociocultural 
settings. Nevertheless, observing such differences appears to have played a part in how 
the interviewees’ Taiwanese identity has strengthened in tandem with closer cross-Strait 
relations. 
 In summary, the Taiwanese identity of these Third Force supporters is indeed a 
dynamic one, changing and becoming clearer over time. Based on the interviewees’ 
answers, key reasons for this change include education, political changes and personal 
experiences of otherness. This implies that the interplay of official and popular elements 
has been significant in identity formation. Thus, while it is clear that the current 
generation feel in many ways “naturally” Taiwanese from early age, it also seems that 
certain specific events and developments during their lifetime have been influential in the 
construction of a more Taiwan-centric national identity. Some of these developments are 
examined further in the next section. 
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5.2 Reflections on Taiwanese identity in politics and society 
 
The following two sections move from personal attributes to socio-political attitudes and 
describe how the interviewees’ opinions on Taiwanese society and politics are informed 
by their Taiwanese identity. Section 5.2.1 deals with notions of Taiwan’s place and status 
in the modern world that is characterised by interdependence and globalisation. Section 
5.2.2 then looks at how the Third Force fits into Taiwan’s domestic political scene and 
how the interviewees’ Taiwanese identity is reflected in the policies of the Third Force 
parties.  
 
5.2.1 Expanding the horizon: The internationalisation of 
interdependence 
 
One of the most prominent recurring themes in the interviews was Taiwan’s position in 
the international community. This is not only or even primarily limited to diplomatic 
status or official international recognition for the state; it deals with the wider notion of 
Taiwan’s place in the world as a society and community. Here, as with the aspects 
discussed in the previous sections, the Third Force represents a diversification of foci that 
attempts to move away from a status defined by relations with China. 
 A concrete indication of this focus is the desire for the normalisation of Taiwan’s 
international status, most obviously reflected in the advocacy of Taiwan’s independence. 
Unsurprisingly, all interviewees supported the notion that Taiwan should become an 
independent country. However, they had concerns about the feasibility of this goal. Their 
answers to the question of independence could be summarised as “I want Taiwan to be 
independent, but…” The reason for hesitation was the pragmatic acknowledgement of the 
threat of China: military conflict was seen as a likely result of a declaration of 
independence. These views are in line with the attitudes of the general public. As noted 
earlier, most Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo with neither independence nor 
unification. However, in surveys that omit the status quo option and force to choose 
between independence or unification, a clear majority favours independence. This 
suggests that the views of the Third Force supporters reflect the overall pragmatism 
among the Taiwanese: independence is desirable, but unfeasible under current conditions. 
 Another reason for the reluctance to advocate formal independence seems to be 
that the Taiwanese themselves already consider Taiwan a de facto independent country. 
This is evident in the statements of both the NPP and the SDP: in his interview answers, 
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Freddy Lim described Taiwan as a “practically independent country”, while the SDP’s 
2016 election platform states that “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country” 
(SDP 2016). From this pragmatic perspective, a formal declaration of independence is 
not that necessary since Taiwan is already independent, and a declaration would only 
increase the threat of conflict with China. 
 A major reason behind the desire for independence among the interviewees was 
the dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the ROC, already mentioned in the previous 
section. Thus, in practice, independence would mean abolishing the ROC in favour of a 
new state with a new name. This would sever the link to China by discarding the notion 
of a still-existing Republic of China, ideally opening the way for international 
recognition: 
 
Interviewee #3: I think a lot of problems arise from the four words, 中華民國 (Zhōnghuá 
Mínguó, Republic of China). So ideally, we would not be called Republic of China. It 
wouldn’t matter whether we are called “Taiwan” or something else as long as it’s not 
Republic of China, since that’s the root of the problem. The best option would of course 
be to have a new country that others can then recognise, but I think this is very difficult. 
Author: So it would be best to have a new independent country, but it’s not possible? 
Interviewee #3: We can’t do it, so for now we should maintain status quo. 
 
 
Similar views are also evident in the society at large. During my time in Taiwan, I 
witnessed pro-independence demonstrations in prominent locations such as Taipei’s 
Ximending district and the Taichung train station. Significantly, these campaigns did not 
target China, but were instead squarely aimed at the ROC. The protesters’ banners 
included slogans such as “Taiwan is not ROC!” and “Repeal the ROC Colonial Regime. 
Terminate four centuries of Alien Domination.” (figure 3, next page).26 This rhetoric 
echoes the demands for self-determination that have been a recurring theme in Taiwan 
since the Japanese colonial period. In this view, the ROC is simply another colonial 
apparatus that continues to suppress the agency of the Taiwanese people. 
 A practical manifestation of the desire to redefine Taiwan’s international status is 
the way in which supporters of independence have begun to customise their ROC 
passports. In 2015, a pro-independence activist designed a set of stickers that Taiwanese 
people can attach to their passports. The stickers replace the text “中華民國 Republic of 
China” with “台灣國  Republic of Taiwan” and the ROC emblem with one of six 
alternative figures. Passport modifications were initially penalised by the Taiwanese 
                                               
26 Demonstrations in Ximending, Taipei, 11.9.2016 and Taichung train station, Taichung, 4.12.2016. 
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Figure 3: Pro-independence campaigner in Taichung (photo by author). 
 
 
government, but the punishments were withdrawn in April 2016. (Allen 2016.) When 
asked about her reason for supporting the NPP, one of the interviewees presented the 
passport sticker issue as an example of the NPP’s commitment to Taiwanese identity: 
 
Interviewee #5: I feel like this party really cares about national identity, more so than the 
DPP. Because we have these Republic of Taiwan stickers for passports […] I feel like 
NPP is the one that really pushed the Foreign Ministry because they used to warn people 
with that kind of sticker on their passports, they kind of threatened them to take it off, but 
then the NPP really pushed really hard… 
Author: So that people could keep those stickers in their passports? 
Interviewee #5: Yeah, but then Freddy [Lim] reminded that you might encounter 
problems if you enter another country.  
Author: So this was something that – much of it was the NPP’s influence? 
Interviewee #5: Yeah, maybe some DPP, but I don't feel like in general DPP cares about 
this matter that much. 
 
The passport stickers appear to have become an important symbol of Taiwanese identity 
for the younger generation. At the NCCU’s student club fair in October 2016, I talked to 
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a representative of the university’s political club27 and was given a set of these stickers. 
Later, I met a student who proudly showcased the stickers on his passport. He had not 
experienced problems travelling with the stickers in Europe, but when travelling to Japan, 
he was stopped at the Kansai International Airport and taken to a room where an airport 
official asked him to remove the stickers. He was only allowed to enter the country once 
the stickers were removed. A movement has now grown around the stickers and the 
experiences of their use in travel – they have a dedicated website with the title 台灣國護
照貼紙運動, (Táiwān hùzhào tiēzhǐ yùndòng, Taiwan Passport Sticker Movement), and 
the website’s Facebook page had almost 40,000 followers at the time of writing.28 
 Since the primary function of a passport is to serve as a travel document, the 
sticker issue is more than just a symbolic affirmation of Taiwanese identity. It can be 
viewed as a practical response to the practical problems Taiwanese people face when they 
travel abroad and need to explain that the Republic of China is not “China”. Several 
interviewees described having this problem: 
 
Interviewee #7: People will think that I am – in customs, they will think that I am Chinese, 
and because of that they think I need a visa. This is in countries where Taiwanese can 
travel visa-free, but because the passport says “Republic of China”, they think I’m 
Chinese and ask why I don’t have a visa. 
Author: So do you think there are a lot of people in foreign countries who don’t know 
this difference between China and Taiwan? 
Interviewee #7: Yes, definitely. 
 
 
Interviewees #3, #5, #9 and #10 all described similar practical issues when travelling 
abroad. Some also mentioned problems when filling their home country in official 
documentation that do not include Taiwan as an option or list it as “Taiwan, Province of 
China”.29 These experiences correspond to the overall results of the pilot study interviews 
that were conducted with Taiwanese studying abroad: the problematic nature of 
Taiwanese identity and international status is highlighted by experiences of living or 
                                               
27 NCCU’s Wild Fire student club (政大野火陣線, Zhèngdà yěhuǒ zhènxiàn) is an active and influential 
political actor in the university’s community. NCCU was originally established by the KMT, and Chiang Kai-
shek served as its first principal. The Wild Fire club has actively campaigned for the removal of symbols of the 
university’s past links with the KMT, such as the university’s anthem and statues of Chiang Kai-shek. In 2017, 
these goals were realised as NCCU decided to modify its anthem and passed a motion to remove the statues. 
Representatives of the Wild Fire club were present at the university staff meeting regarding these issues and 
communicated the deliberations through their Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/NCCUWildFire/). 
28 http://tps-taiwanpassportsticker.com; https://www.facebook.com/TaiwanPassportSticker.   
29 In official documentation, Taiwan is frequently listed as “Taiwan, Province of China” because the United 
Nations uses this designation, and thus it is also used in the ISO 3166 standard for country codes 
(https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:code:3166:TW).  
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travelling in other countries. The notion of living in a “Republic of China” is easier to 
maintain inside Taiwan, but when people travel abroad, they unavoidably encounter the 
troubled reality. Domestically, the Taiwanese can often brush aside the dilemma by 
maintaining a vague notion of a dual identity, but the international system of nation-states 
does not accommodate such ambiguity. When forced to choose, the Taiwanese are 
increasingly assertive about their Taiwanese identity, and the passport stickers are one 
way of signalling this. This practical action can be seen as the real-world equivalent of 
the survey data discussed earlier: while the Taiwanese overwhelmingly support the status 
quo in unification/independence surveys, the majority will choose independence if there 
is no status quo option. 
 
Table 8: Interviewees’ international mobility 
Interviewee Studied or lived abroad Visited China Travelled elsewhere 
1 United States, Europe – Yes 
2 – Yes Yes 
3 United States – Yes 
4 – Yes Yes 
5 United Kingdom Yes Yes 
6 United States Yes Yes 
7 – Yes Yes 
8 United States Yes Yes 
9 United States, Sweden Yes Yes 
10 Finland – Yes 
11 – Yes Yes 
 
 The above observations become significant when considered together with the 
fact that the current generation is more internationally mobile than ever. This is evident 
in the travel profile of the interviewees (table 8): all of them have travelled abroad, almost 
all of them have visited China, and over half of them have studied or lived abroad. This 
means they have all personally experienced Taiwan’s international status, and most of 
them have also personally experienced the reality of the PRC. This travel experience 
corresponds to the general profile of the interviewees, since urban, well-educated liberals 
can also be expected to be “world citizens”. It also reflects the increasingly interdependent 
character of the modern world in which multiple actors interact across state borders. 
Interestingly, all but one of the interviewees who studied abroad had done so in the United 
States. This is perhaps not surprising given the historical alliance between the US and 
Taiwan, but it might also make these people’s world views more susceptible to the 
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American notions of democracy and civil liberties. 
 The US connection is also apparent in the activities of Third Force activists and 
politicians. As noted earlier, the activists toured the US in 2014 to promote the Sunflower 
Movement. Incidentally, my interview with Freddy Lim in 2017 was also affected by the 
focus on the US; Lim was part of the Taiwanese delegation attending President Donald 
Trump’s inauguration in January 2017, making it impossible to conduct the interview in 
person while I was in Taiwan. Lim is arguably the most internationally visible promoter 
of the Third Force. In May 2017, prominent US newspaper The New York Times (Qin 
2017) published an extensive profile on Lim in which NPP chairman Huang Kuo-chang 
emphasised Lim’s charismatic appeal and role as a messenger of the party. 
 Global mobility such as described above is a result of the processes of complex 
interdependence and globalisation that have enabled the international flow of capital, 
goods and people. However, as discussed earlier, this has also led to asymmetric 
economic interdependence between Taiwan and China. Since the fear of overdependence 
on China was a key factor in the Sunflower Movement and the emergence of the Third 
Force, the interviewees were also asked about their opinion on economic integration. 
Again, as with other issues, they emphasised a diverse and international focus. They did 
not reject economic integration per se, but advocated a more balanced economic policy 
that would not over-emphasise potentially harmful cross-Strait trade and investment: 
 
Author: In general, what do you think about these closer economic relations? 
Interviewee #11: I think it’s good, but you should not put all the eggs in the same basket. 
So I think Ma Ying-jeou didn’t really look to other countries, he put too much emphasis 
on China. So that means we were more controlled by China during this time, and that’s 
more dangerous. 
Author: What about now, with Tsai Ing-wen? 
Interviewee #11: I think she has a different approach, she is focusing more on ASEAN 
countries, she has this New Southbound Policy […] but it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t 




All interviewees expressed some degree of dissatisfaction towards Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-
Strait policies, but many also noted that cross-Strait relations during Ma’s period were 
peaceful. Many pointed out that economic integration in itself was not bad, but 
overreliance should be avoided: interviewees #2, #10 and #11 even used the same 
metaphor, warning of the dangers of “putting all eggs in the same basket” (把雞蛋放在同
一個籃子裡, bǎ jīdàn fàng zài tóng yīgè lánzi lǐ). As noted by interviewee #11, President 
Tsai Ing-wen has initiated a new policy that corresponds to the desire for more balanced 
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economic relations. At the time of writing, it is difficult to estimate whether the New 
Southbound Policy (新南向政策, Xīn nán xiàng zhèngcè)30 will succeed in balancing 
Taiwan’s economic relations, but it does suggest that the Tsai administration 
acknowledges the potential perils of asymmetric interdependence and the resulting public 
discontent. Freddy Lim also cautioned against the problems of economic integration with 
China, presenting an example of what has already happened as a result of closer ties: 
 
Lim: I think cross-Strait economic integration has affected political freedom. As the 
economic integration between Taiwan and China becomes closer, for example in the 
entertainment industry, whether it’s music or films, we get self-censorship of opinions. 
There is no suppression in Taiwan itself, but because the economic integration with China 
is so close, you must self-censor to be able to access the Chinese market. This affects 
Taiwan because our most important core value is democracy. I think it goes without 
saying that one has to be very careful and cautious with economic integration. 
 
Lim also emphasised a point that the other interviewees did not raise, namely the 
importance of proper regulation to protect vulnerable local industries when opening free 
trade not just with China, but with any trading partner. 
 The Sunflower Movement and resistance to increasing Chinese influence in 
Taiwan resemble another timely case: Hong Kong. Like Taiwan, Hong Kong has recently 
seen a succession of protest movements aimed against seemingly increasing mainland 
control that compromises Hong Kong’s autonomy and political freedom. Consequently, 
the current generation of activists and pro-democracy legislators in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have begun to forge closer ties and cooperation. During my time in Taiwan, there 
were two high-profile visits of Hong Kong localist legislators to Taipei. In October 2016, 
two pro-independence legislators, Baggio Leung and Yau Wai-ching, visited a seminar 
organised by the Graduate Student Association of the NTU. In January 2017, a group of 
Hong Kong activists and legislators, including leading pro-democracy activists Joshua 
Wong and Nathan Law, visited a seminar held by the NPP.31 Such exchanges reflect the 
focus on internationalisation as the Third Force seeks to establish cooperative 
transnational networks to further its cause. This was also the interpretation of Chinese 
                                               
30  The policy “calls for the development of comprehensive relations with ASEAN, South Asia, and 
Australia and New Zealand, while promoting regional exchanges and collaborations” (New Southbound 
Policy Portal, http://nspp.mofa.gov.tw/nsppe/index.php). 
31 Video recordings of the NPP seminar with Hong Kong activists and legislators are available on the NPP’s 





state media, as the People’s Daily condemned the visit of Leung and Yau as collusion 
between Hong Kong and Taiwanese separatists (Lau, 2016).32 According to Freddy Lim, 
both Hong Kong and Taiwan can indeed learn from mutual exchanges, but the NPP’s 
international focus extends beyond just Hong Kong: 
 
Lim: […] over the past year or so, the NPP has also been in touch with lawmakers from 
many other countries such as Germany, Sweden, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the United 
States, and Canada. It’s not just Hong Kong. From the NPP’s point of view, Hong Kong 
is very important, but I think Taiwan can gain insight from the politics of all other 
countries. So we are continuously welcoming exchanges with others. 
 
The interviewees’ opinions on Hong Kong were somewhat different. While they all 
acknowledged that both Taiwan and Hong Kong face a similar threat of growing mainland 
hegemony, many were quick to note the difference between the two cases: Hong Kong is 
already under Chinese control, while Taiwan is de facto sovereign and independent. Thus, 
for these Third Force supporters, the most pertinent function of Hong Kong is that of a 
cautionary example. Interviewee #3 mentioned an ominous local saying that “today’s 
Hong Kong is tomorrow’s Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣 , jīnrì Xiānggǎng, míngrì 
Táiwān), while interviewee #10 said that “Hong Kong is the best example of what 
happens if you accept China’s policy of One Country, Two Systems.”  
 The overriding theme of internationalisation observed in this section is similar to 
the notion of civic identity discussed earlier. In both themes, the dominant focus is a desire 
to replace dichotomous relationships with diversity and pluralism. In foreign relations, 
this is evident in the attempts to diversify Taiwan’s regional economic relations and move 
away from asymmetric cross-Strait interdependence. With regard to transnational 
political networks, it is apparent in the NPP’s active campaigning not just with Hong 
Kong, but with the US and several other countries. Finally, it can be seen in the actual 
global mobility of the Third Force supporters who have travelled and lived around the 
world. Thus, for these Third Force supporters, a strong sense of Taiwanese national 
identity does not denote nationalist isolationism or economic protectionism, but rather the 
opposite: balanced and multipolar global integration. In the next and final section of this 
analysis, I will look at how the multipolar focus manifests in Taiwan’s domestic politics. 
 
 
                                               
32 The People’s Daily called the Hong Kong legislators “malignant tumours” and accused them of “jumping 
around like crazy clowns” (Lau, 2016). 
93/117 
5.2.2 Tactics of loyalty: The Third Force in domestic politics 
 
As noted earlier, the very name “Third Force” signals an attempt to introduce a political 
alternative to the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps. However, it was also noted that the 
NPP in particular has been collaborating with the DPP in certain areas. I therefore sought 
to clarify the position of the Third Force in Taiwanese politics by asking the supporters 
why they support the NPP and SDP and whether they see these parties as a distinct third 
political camp. 
 The foremost conclusion from this part of the interviews was that party support in 
Taiwan is difficult to measure. This observation is in line with previous research that has 
found Taiwanese politics to be characterised by weak party loyalty. For example, Mattlin 
(2011: 80) notes that party loyalty in Taiwan is often “dependent on incumbency or the 
prospect of gaining power”. When it seems that a party will not do well in an election, it 
often begins losing members and supporters to others. Thus, classifying people as 
“supporters” of a certain party can be imprecise. This issue is aggravated by the hybrid 
electoral system where voters cast two ballots, one for a district candidate and one for a 
party. The above factors became evident when the interviewees were asked about their 
reasons for supporting Third Force parties (table 9, next page). Because of the qualitative 
focus of this study, interviewees were sought based on a loose definition of party support. 
In this case, “supporters” were defined as people who had given either a district vote or a 
party vote to the NPP or SDP, or people who currently identified themselves as supporters 
of these parties. This produced a rather heterogeneous sample that would be problematic 
in a quantitative study. For example, interviewees #10 and #11 gave their district vote to 
the NPP due to a lack of other suitable candidates rather than based on active support. 
Their party votes went to the SDP and DPP, although interviewee #11 was indecisive 
about his NPP/DPP support at the time of the interview.  
 The above suggests that the party list vote would be more indicative of actual 
support, but a similar problem appeared there as well: despite otherwise supporting the 
GPT, interviewee #6 voted for the NPP because her favourite candidate was on the NPP 
party list. This highlights another aspect of weak party loyalty also identified in previous 
research: within Taiwanese political parties, loyalty often depends on vertical personal 
relations rather than commitment to party ideology, which leads to opportunistic 
behaviour (ibid.). This might also apply to voters in that they may gravitate more towards 
individual politicians than a party platform. This is evident in how several NPP supporters 
based their support on a specific person. For interviewee #6, it was Kawlo Iyun Pacidal, 
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Table 9: Interviewees’ reasons for supporting Third Force parties. 
Interviewee Party support Reasons for support 
1 NPP Sunflower Movement, connection with youth 
2 SDP Social policies 
3 SDP Minority rights, new alternative 
4 SDP New alternative 
5 NPP New alternative, individual politician 
6 NPP Individual politician, indigenous rights 
7 SDP Social policies 
8 SDP New alternative, labour policies 
9 NPP Sunflower Movement, individual politician 
10 NPP/SDP District vote 
11 NPP District vote, individual politician 
 
whereas interviewee #9 mentioned Huang Kuo-chang and interviewees #5 and #11 
mentioned Freddy Lim (table 9). 
 Interestingly, as shown in table 9, the SDP supporters did not mention individual 
politicians and seemed more supportive of the party platform itself. The reasons they 
mentioned included more concrete political factors such as the SDP’s focus on social and 
labour policies and minority rights. The small sample size means that no general 
conclusions can be made about this difference between NPP and SDP supporters. 
However, since the NPP supporters appeared more vague and indecisive, sometimes 
being torn between the NPP and DPP, this supports the notion that the NPP is closer to 
the pan-Green camp while the SDP represents a clearer “third force”. More importantly, 
two of the NPP supporters said that in their opinion the NPP belonged to the pan-Green 
camp, whereas one SDP supporter said that the SDP was “totally” separate from the pan-
Blue/pan-Green dichotomy. Others generally felt the NPP and SDP were a distinct third 
camp but some noted that they shared some broad political stances with the pan-Green 
camp. Together, the above results support the notion that the NPP is somewhat closer to 
the DPP. Freddy Lim was also asked about the NPP’s pan-Green connection. He 
acknowledged that the NPP and DPP share the overall desire for Taiwan to become a 
normal country, but noted that they have different ideas about specific policies. Regarding 




Lim: Taiwan's pan-Green/pan-Blue division is different from the rightist/leftist spectrum 
of other countries, and it has been like this for a very long time. I think the pan-Blue/pan-
Green division in Taiwan is somewhat arbitrary. For example, we might think of the pan-
Blue camp as one united faction, but if you look at the KMT, there are a lot of legislators 
from local factions who strongly oppose the current party leader's statements about 
unification with China. Similarly, one might say the pan-Green camp is pro-
independence, but that is not necessarily the case. If you look at the DPP now, there are 
people who would like to give up the notion of independence and wouldn't want to deal 
with the issue of national identity […] For the NPP, I personally don't like to describe it 
according to this traditional division. Our own main colours are yellow and black. 
 
 
Lim thus seems dismissive about the whole concept of two diametrically opposed blocks 
and emphasises the NPP’s role on its own terms. The party’s own colours are a good 
example, since they can be an effective symbol in distancing it from the dichotomy. This 
is reflected in the comments of interviewee #1: 
 
Author: How is the NPP different from the KMT and DPP? 
Interviewee #1: They are not really political figures. 
Author: So are they ordinary people who became politicians? 
Interviewee #1: They were elected because of the Sunflower Movement, not because 
they originally wanted to be elected as politicians, but because they wanted a change. So 
they ran in the legislative elections. 
Author: In Taiwan, there are these green and blue political camps. What about the NPP? 
Interviewee #1: It’s yellow. 
 
 
 Another aspect supporting the notion of a distinct political camp is how several 
interviewees explicitly emphasised the Third Force as a new alternative and/or a result of 
the Sunflower Movement (table 9). These interviewees talked about their frustration with 
the two “old” parties and their inability to address the younger generation: 
 
Author: Why do you support the SDP? 
Interviewee #4: Because it’s new. Our generation is bored with the blue and green camps, 
the two big parties. […] We don’t really have confidence in the blue and green camps, 
we don’t like them, so we are naturally looking for small new parties. So if there is a new 
party that seems good, it will definitely get our support. 
 
 
Similarly, interviewee #5 noted that even before the Sunflower Movement, there was “a 
widespread idea that both parties suck”, but people could only choose the “less awful” 
alternative. According to interviewee #10, the dominant dichotomy represented “two 
rotten apples” and people had been forced to choose the “less rotten” one. This 
disillusionment with the Pan-Blue/Pan-Green dichotomy is in line with previous research 
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on the apathetic “Strawberry Tribe” of Taiwanese youth discussed earlier. However, the 
Sunflower Movement and the Third Force seem to have provided these people with a new 
option that emphasises their perspective. This also corresponds to the comments made by 
the Sunflower Movement activists about providing a new alternative to the old dichotomy. 
The Sunflower activists’ frequent emphasis on the young generation was also reflected in 
the interviewees’ comments, confirming the notion of the Third Force as a political camp 
being particularly attractive to the youth. 
 The notion of the old pan-Blue/pan-Green dichotomy as “boring” and “rotten” 
reflects another key point behind Third Force support. As noted throughout this study, 
the defining features of the old dichotomy are the existential battles of ethnicity and 
identity and the resulting independence/unification debate. However, as shown in table 9, 
these aspects do not appear among the primary reasons for Third Force support among 
the interviewees. This is particularly evident among the SDP supporters, most of whom 
emphasised “normal” domestic policy issues such as environmental issues, sustainability, 
pacifism, women’s rights, workers’ rights, social justice, and marriage equality. Although 
these issues did not feature as directly in the NPP supporters’ answers, Freddy Lim 
mentioned a very similar list when asked why it was necessary to establish a new party 
in 2015: 
 
Lim: If you look at the context of the recent social movements in Taiwan, the DPP cannot 
always keep up with the voice of the people. Even though the NPP is somewhat close to 
the DPP in issues like national identity and democratic reform, there are currently many 
other issues such as marriage equality, labour rights, indigenous people’s rights, 
environmental protection, and many others where we have different opinions. In these 
issues, I think many young people and opinion leaders in recent social movements do not 
directly support the DPP. The NPP was basically founded for this reason. 
 
 
The NPP has actively fostered its connection with the youth when these issues enter 
public discourse. During my stay in Taiwan in the autumn and winter 2016–17, the most 
prominent and visible social movement was the campaign to legalise same-sex marriage. 
This timing might also explain why several interviewees and Freddy Lim himself listed 
marriage equality as one of the main social issues. The movement started gaining traction 
before the annual Taipei Pride parade in October when a same-sex marriage bill was 
introduced in the Legislative Yuan. A succession of pro- and anti-demonstrations 
followed throughout the fall, culminating in a large demonstration in front of Taipei’s 
Presidential Office on 10 December with over 100,000 people demanding the legalisation 
of same-sex marriage. This issue was particularly important to the youth: I personally 
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witnessed young people protesting over the autumn in various locations such as the 
NCCU and NTU campuses and central Taichung. The NPP was notably present in both 
the Taipei Pride parade and the December demonstration (figure 4). In the latter, all 
political parties with legislative seats had representatives addressing the crowd, but the 
NPP had all five of their legislators take the stage to voice their support for same-sex 
marriage.33 
 




 The focus on “normal” political issues instead of the ubiquitous Taiwan/China 
question supports the notion that the current generation in Taiwan consider themselves 
“naturally” Taiwanese and are thus alienated from the historical conflict of the “old” 
parties. Just as the ethnic conflict between the běnshěngrén and wàishěngrén became 
redundant after democratisation, the persistent KMT/DPP dichotomy revolves around 
                                               
33 Personal observations at the Taipei Pride on 29 October 2016 and the marriage equality protest on 10 
December 2016. The latter was held on the International Human Rights Day, which was also the date of the 
1979 rally by the Tangwai opposition movement that led to the Kaohsiung Incident (see section 4.2.1). This 
suggests that the concept of human rights holds particular significance to the Taiwanese opposition. The 
debate over same-sex marriage continued throughout the spring, and in May 2017, Taiwan’s Constitutional 
Court ruled that the ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, advising the Legislative Yuan to amend 
laws accordingly. The ruling was considered a step toward Taiwan becoming the first country in Asia to 
legalise same-sex marriage. (e.g. Horton, 2017a.) 
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issues that many among today’s generation consider obsolete. This leaves a vacuum that 
new parties can exploit if their platforms correspond to the desires of the current 
generation. The supporters’ perspectives correspond to the agendas of the NPP and the 
SDP and to the comments of Freddy Lim, suggesting that the Third Force forms a socio-
political entity grounded in the aforementioned aspects. Nevertheless, the interviewees’ 
party loyalty does not seem particularly strong, and their voting behaviour seems rather 
flexible. 
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6 Conclusion: A dichotomy dismantled 
 
The results presented in the preceding chapters reveal a recurrent theme in the various 
dimensions of national identity among Third Force supporters: diversity. It appears as an 
emphasis on the plurality of ethnic identities in a Taiwanese community built upon shared 
civic values. Similarly, it can be found in the desire for balanced and multipolar global 
interaction in the spheres of international relations and economic interdependence. 
Finally, it is evident in the attempt to diversify Taiwan’s domestic politics through the 
introduction of new alternative parties. In each case, this focus on diversity functions as 
an antidote to prevailing dichotomies: it seeks to dismantle and replace the interconnected 
dualities of běnshěngrén/wàishěngrén, Taiwan/China, independence/unification, and 
DPP/KMT.  
 The motivation behind this drive for diversity is the age-old desire for self-
determination. It stems from the cyclical history of foreign domination that has prevented 
the Taiwanese from assuming agency in the development of their society. Even after 
democratisation, Taiwan continues to be bound by its relationship with China, and this 
relationship permeates every action of those who wield power. Furthermore, the PRC’s 
increasing attempts to draw Taiwan closer by economic and political stratagems create 
alarming echoes of history. The scenario of unification under the PRC would reprise the 
reality of the Japanese and KMT regimes, heralding the top-down imposition of an 
official nationalism that yet again halts the Taiwanese quest for self-determination. In 
such a scenario, Taiwan would be forced into the mould of a “Chinese nation” constructed 
and maintained by the PRC (and the KMT). Recent political developments in Hong Kong 
give the Taiwanese a particularly strong cautionary example of what might be at stake if 
such a unification was to occur. 
 For many, in the face of this challenge, the only logical counterreaction is the 
affirmation of a distinct Taiwanese identity. This identity is built around the community 
that has developed in Taiwan, and it sees otherness in the community across the Strait. 
However, the otherness of the “China” rejected by this Taiwanese identity is not that of 
the ethno-historical homeland, but rather what it has become under the PRC. Just as these 
people view civic values as the bedrock of the Taiwanese national community, they 
evaluate China according to its civic character. For them, it is not the “Chinese nation” 
but the PRC state that functions as the face of China. This also means that unification 
with today’s China would not be a historical “reunification”, since Taiwan has never been 
a part of the PRC. As noted in the introduction and subsequent chapters, the last time 
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Taiwan was under sustained mainland control was over 120 years ago, in the 19th century. 
There was no PRC, and from a constructionist perspective, there was no Chinese nation 
either. Taiwan was a distant frontier island ruled loosely and with marked indifference by 
the conquest empire of the Qing dynasty. For the Third Force, the ancient Chineseness of 
that empire may be duly noted, but it is a century and two revolutions away from the 
China of today. 
 Thus, the Third Force looks to the civic nature of the PRC for a definition of 
modern China. That society is met with aversion, for it represents everything Taiwan 
fought for decades to leave behind. The aversion is strengthened by the fact that most 
Third Force supporters are young people born during or shortly after the process of 
democratisation. They have grown up in a democratic country, but not one where liberty 
is old enough to be taken for granted. It is the loss of that liberty that they fear and resist. 
This resistance results in antipathy that might sometimes verge on xenophobia. There 
have been some reports about xenophobic and racist attitudes towards mainland Chinese 
in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. Some interviewees in this study admitted with some 
embarrassment to feelings such as “disgust” when confronted with the recent influx of 
Chinese tourists. Such reactions resemble those of the Taiwanese that observed the arrival 
of the wàishěngrén after 1945: disdain for the “backward barbarians” pillaging their 
island. But hateful rejection appears to be a marginal element in the overall contemporary 
phenomenon. The accounts of the interviewees centred mainly on China as a country and 
the PRC as a state, not on negative characteristics of the Chinese people. Furthermore, as 
noted earlier, the Third Force operates through a Taiwan-centric lens that de-emphasises 
China’s role by default. This means that most of the discontent of these parties and their 
supporters is aimed at Taiwan’s domestic politics: they view Taiwan as a sovereign entity, 
and the primary culprits for its predicament are found from within. 
 In this domestic focus, just as internationally, the Third Force emphasises civic 
aspects. Thus, the subject of criticism is not the arcane ethnic group of wàishěngrén, but 
the political relic of the ROC state. For the generation casting their ballots for the Third 
Force, the ROC has never existed outside the propaganda fantasies of 1990s schoolbooks. 
Therefore, even more preposterous than the PRC claiming Taiwan is the existence of a 
Republic of China that claims the mainland. From this perspective, it is the administrative 
phantom of the ROC that stands in the way of the ultimate goal of Taiwan becoming a 
normal country. Indeed, looking at the various international problems between Taiwan 
and China, the ROC often seems no less responsible than the PRC. It has been suggested 
that it was the ROC’s own inflexibility that cost its UN seat in the 1970s. Similarly, the 
101/117 
humiliating name of “Chinese Taipei” that Taiwan is forced to use in international sports 
competitions was originally the result of the KMT government refusing to compete 
simply as “Taiwan” (Horton 2017b). As noted earlier, the concept of the 1992 Consensus 
that affirms the One-China Policy was also originally coined by the KMT, not by the 
PRC. Today, it is the awkward name “Republic of China” in passport covers that draws 
the ire of young Taiwanese. Accordingly, the pro-independence demonstrations on the 
streets of Taiwan do not usually target the PRC or the Chinese – instead, their slogans are 
aimed directly against the ROC. 
 For the Third Force and its supporters, the ethnically based dichotomies of the 
běnshěngrén/wàishěngrén and Taiwanese/Chinese identities have thus faded into 
irrelevance, giving way to an inclusive Taiwanese civic identity. In terms of their lived 
personal experience, Taiwan has become Taiwanese. Thus, what remains to be 
dismantled is the obsolete and artificial political, legal and administrative framework that 
constrains this community. Earlier, two prominent conceptualisations for Taiwanese 
national identity were presented: the ambiguous dual Taiwanese/Chinese identity and the 
notion of an overarching Chinese nation. The former describes the struggle between 
Taiwanese and Chinese identities and their ethnic and civic dimensions, while the latter 
assumes a dominant Chinese identity by placing Taiwan within the context of an ethnic 
Chinese nation. Based on the results and conclusions of this study, I have formulated a 
third model to describe the contemporary national identity of the Third Force and its 
supporters (figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: The "civic identity" model of Taiwanese identity among Third Force supporters. 
 
 
The contrast with the previous conceptualisations is obvious. The “Chinese nation” 
locates the civic communities of the ROC and the PRC under an overarching ethnic 
identity, while the notion of a dual identity rests on a confused duality of ethnic and civic 













of ethnicity is reduced to one of the sub-categories. Thus, the Chinese nation is not a valid 
basis for unification, because it is not the topmost framework for the construction of 
national identity. Instead, the confusion and hesitation of the dual identity give way to an 
unambiguous Taiwaneseness grounded in civic values. Moreover, the demoted ethnic 
dimension now rests on inclusive diversity rather than antagonistic Taiwanese/Chinese 
identities, and the emphasis on diversity characterises the other sub-categories as well: 
dichotomous cross-Strait relations are replaced by a constellation of multipolar 
international relations, and the KMT/DPP duality transforms into multi-party domestic 
politics. With democracy consolidated, its liberal institutions replace the last remnants of 
the KMT party-state and the ROC. 
 The main elements of this model are supported by data from both secondary and 
primary sources used in this study. The broad lines of the model are in line with national 
level surveys regarding Taiwanese identity and support for independence and the Third 
Force. The model also has similarities with the conclusions of certain other studies. Most 
recently, Cole (2017) has examined Taiwanese identity as civic nationalism, which bears 
obvious resemblance to the conclusions of this study. Moreover, as noted in chapter 3, 
existing scholarship suggests that modern civic values outweighed Chinese ethnicity 
already among the intellectuals of the Japanese colonial period and the ROC martial law 
era. These facts suggest that the “civic identity” model might be more broadly applicable 
to the current generation in Taiwan, not just the Third Force and its supporters. Polls 
showing the NPP as the most popular party among young people support this notion. 
These results apparently contradict some of the previous assertions about the broader 
Taiwanese identity: Hughes (2000) suggested an emergent “post-nationalist” Taiwan 
where national identity would be lodged in an intermediate state between civic and ethnic 
dimensions. Dawley (2009) interpreted the rise in independence-oriented identity as the 
emergence of an ethnic Taiwanese community. Zhong (2016) saw evidence of the 
Taiwanese still considering themselves part of the “Chinese nation”. Neither the 
ambiguity nor the ethnic focus of such interpretations are present in my analysis. 
 Despite the above, I must again emphasise that while they are somewhat 
congruent with survey data and certain other studies, the results of this study are based 
on a relatively limited qualitative analysis. Moreover, while this model might be accurate 
now, the phenomena it depicts are relatively recent, and there are significant uncertainties 
about their future. The noticeable rise in Taiwanese identity seems to have plateaued at 
around 60% in 2015, and it has declined slightly after that. The Third Force parties are 
only a few years old and have only participated in one election. Small parties have come 
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and gone in Taiwanese politics before, so there is no certainty about their longevity now. 
Therefore, the local election due in 2018 will be an important indication of the level of 
sustained political support for this version of Taiwanese identity. It should also be noted 
that after the DPP’s landslide victory in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen’s popularity has fallen 
significantly during her first year as president. An effective way to measure the political 
independence of the Third Force would be to observe its popularity as the DPP falters – 
if the NPP is indeed more than a support party of the DPP, it might stand to gain from the 
DPP’s losses and could thus increase its popularity in the next election. However, it 
should also be kept in mind that political support need not directly reflect national 
identity. As demonstrated by the ESC NCCU data, Taiwanese identity strengthened 
throughout the KMT’s eight-year pro-China reign in 2008–2016. Moreover, previous 
research and the results of this study suggest that party support and voting behaviour in 
Taiwan are often incoherent, fluid, and therefore unreliable as indicators of actual 
allegiance. Thus, emphasis should be on a comprehensive analysis of social developments 
in the upcoming years. 
 The above points suggest a fertile ground for further research. The Third Force as 
a phenomenon is new and therefore not widely studied. However, its social impact already 
warrants more attention. As the qualitative data for this study was limited in scope, the 
validity of the “civic identity” model would greatly benefit from broader quantitative 
research focusing on the civic aspects of Taiwanese identity. The results of this study 
suggest that a key aspect in the construction of this civic identity are the interviewees’ 
international experiences. Research into the role of international mobility in the 
construction of national identity would thus be useful. Further, while this study included 
a historical overview, attitudes towards history were not specifically covered in the 
interviews. A particularly interesting focal point would be the Japanese colonial period 
and how the current generation perceive that era, since it is widely seen as the genesis of 
Taiwanese national identity. Another recurring element throughout this study was the role 
of Taiwan’s indigenous people: there were interviewees with indigenous backgrounds 
and one of the five NPP legislators is indigenous. The process of Taiwanisation seems to 
have brought more focus on indigenous issues, and many young Taiwanese are embracing 
their indigenous heritage. Further research on national identity among Taiwan’s 
indigenous people would thus be valuable. Finally, this study revealed interesting patterns 
in party loyalty and voting behaviour in Taiwan that would also be suitable for further 
research from a political science perspective. Specifically, the NPP seems to have 
successfully exploited a populist approach, while the SDP seems to attract more issues-
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based support. 
 The “civic identity” model is not primarily a description of the characteristics of 
Taiwanese society. Rather, it describes concepts, ideals and objectives. Each of its 
subcategories manifests in Taiwanese society, but they are not static. The interplay of 
popular, domestic, official and foreign forces described throughout this study continues, 
and so does the dynamic evolution of identities. But at this particular point in time, the 
results of this study indicate that the domestic and popular elements have gained traction 
in Taiwanese society. The Third Force is an amalgamation of grassroots objectives all 
stemming from the basic notion that the Taiwanese should be allowed to decide their own 
fate. Its existence is a manifestation of the democratic principles first imagined over a 
century ago, and its success among the current generation demonstrates the significance 




This study was conducted for a master’s thesis, and as such, it has certain limitations in 
scope and methodology. This also means that despite the earlier pilot study, the research 
itself has been a learning process with significant instances of trial and error. Experience 
and hindsight have revealed a multitude of things that could have been carried out 
differently: different interview locations, different questions, a wider sample, more 
precise sampling, longer interviews, better language skills, and so on. However, I believe 
one of the fundamental purposes of this or any other study is to expose its own faults to 
its author. Once exposed, they can be ironed out in subsequent studies to make research 
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Appendix 1: Interview frame and questions for Third Force supporters 




































2. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
採訪問題 
 
1. Describe your family background: where are your parents / grandparents from? 
(Taiwanese / Mainlander) 
When did they come to Taiwan? 
關於你家人的背景: 你的父母和祖父母是從什麼地方來的? (本省人 / 外省人) 
他們什麼時候來的台灣？ 
 
2. Do you consider your identity to be Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both Taiwanese and 
Chinese? 
Is your identity the same as it has always been? (Has it changed over time / was it 
different before?) 
你觉得你自己的认同是台湾人，中国人，还是都是？ 
你的认同现在跟以前一样吗？(你的认同有没有改变 / 以前不一样吗？) 
 
3. What makes Taiwanese people different from Chinese people? 





4. Have you lived or studied abroad? 




5. What is your perception of mainland China?  
How about mainland Chinese people? 





6. Considering cross-strait relations, do you prefer the status quo or do you want Taiwan 
to be independent? 




7. Are you aware of the current political situation in Hong Kong?  




8. What do you think of the cross-strait relations during the term of President Ma Ying-
jeou? 




9. During President Ma-Ying jeou’s presidency, the economic relations between China 





10. Why do you support the New Power Party / Social Democratic Party? 




11. The New Power Party / Social Democratic Party was established in 2015. Why do you 










































Appendix 3: Coding frame 
(Based on coding and node structure created in the NVivo software.) 
 
 










































Relations with other countries 









Activism in general 
Third Force / Pan-
Blue & Green 
NPP 
SDP 














Appendix 4: Questions for NPP legislator Freddy Lim 





In Taiwan, surveys often ask people whether they consider themselves Taiwanese, 
Chinese, or both. It seems clear that you would answer “Taiwanese”. What does being 
“Taiwanese” mean to you? What are the things that make you “Taiwanese”? 
 
2. 近期有個民調發現，時代力量在 20 至 29 歲的年輕族群中是最受歡迎的政黨。請
問你認為原因為何？年輕人是否是時代力量主要針對的族群？ 
In a recent survey, the NPP was found to be the most popular party in Taiwan among 
people aged 20–29. Why do you think the NPP is so popular particularly among the 
younger generation? Does the NPP specifically target young people in its politics? 
 
3. 雖然時代力量在 2016 總統大選中選擇支持蔡英文，但貴黨多次聲明自己與民進
黨並無直接關聯。對你而言，時代力量是泛屬於泛綠陣營、泛藍陣營、還是獨立
於這兩個傳統政治陣營之外？ 
The NPP endorsed Tsai Ing-wen in the 2016 presidential election, but it has also stated 
that it is not connected to the DPP. How do you see the NPP with regard to the pan-
Blue / pan-Green camps in Taiwan’s politics? Is the NPP linked to the pan-Green camp 





In Taiwan, the DPP has traditionally been the pro-independence, pro-democracy, pro-
Taiwanese party. Why was it important to establish a new party that seemingly shares 
many features with the DPP? What makes the NPP different from the DPP? 
 
5. 身為時代力量的創黨成員之一，當初是什麼原因促使你在台灣成立一個新的政
黨? 為何選擇在 2015 成立？而太陽花運動對於時代力量的成立又有什麼意義？ 
You are a founding member of the NPP and its first leader. What made you decide to 
establish a new political party in Taiwan, and why was 2015 the right time for this? 





The Sunflower Movement was a response to the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s 
attempt to push through a controversial trade agreement with China. In general, what 







In January 2017, the NPP invited localist lawmakers from Hong Kong to attend a forum 
in Taipei. How would you compare the current political situation in Hong Kong to the 
situation in Taiwan, and why do you think it’s important to build contacts between the 




The NPP was originally part of the Taiwan Citizen Union 公民組合, but this 
organisation later split into the NPP and the SDP. What was the reason for this 
division, and why did the organisation not establish a single new party instead? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
